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TRANSACTIONS

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TRANSACTIONS

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ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER RECORDS

By R. Somerville, B.A., F.R.Hist.S.

Read 10 November 1945

Two hundred and fifty years ago a record-keeper sat amid the boxes, the cupboards and the shelves which housed his charges, compiling 'an account of all or most of the records in the Duchy office and how to find them'. The result was invaluable for searchers in the Duchy of Lancaster records, but lacking order and arrangement, as its author was the first to admit, it is not a systematic description of these records and it says very little about their history. There is therefore some justification for attempting a comprehensive view of these records.[1] The rich diversity of interest which the Duchy bears is fully reflected in the range of its records. It has indeed been said that 'what the records of the United Kingdom are at large, these records of the Duchy are in miniature'.[2] That is a bold assertion, difficult to sustain. For one thing, the Duchy never knew the complicated processes of the royal exchequer, and it must be obvious that the Duchy could not repeat *in parvo* the whole pattern of the nation's life. Yet the analogy gives a hint of the records' scope, and it becomes closer if we take the Duchy records to include those of the Palatinate of Lancaster. It is true that in the Public Record Office, which contains most of the records under discussion, the two series are treated separately, and the *Guide*, repeating a distinction drawn in 1868 in the Deputy Keeper's Report, says that the Duchy records 'are entirely distinct from the records of the County palatine, which, although public, are purely local, whilst the Duchy Records, though private, concern the government and jurisdiction of the entire dominion of the Duchy and embrace the County Palatine as a subordinate

[1] 'Great Ayloffe', P.R.O. Obs. 518. All records cited are in the Public Record Office, unless otherwise specified. I may appear in this paper to be a little critical of that institution; from individual members of its staff, however, I have invariably met with great courtesy and helpfulness, and I gladly take the opportunity to express my indebtedness to them.

[2] P. H. Winfield, *Chief Sources of English Legal History*, p. 34.

regality'.[1] This statement, which the grammarian finds imperfect as an example of the chiastic construction, is equally unsatisfactory to the archivist or historian if we understand it to refer to the palatinate, and not to the administration of the modern county council. We ought no more to segregate the palatinate simply because it was an organ of public administration than we should, say, a private hundred, and the description itself recognises the county palatine as a component part of the Duchy. How the judicial records of the court of Duchy chamber were any less public than those of the chancery court in Lancashire, is not explained. The distinction, in fine, is fallacious.

The Duchy of Lancaster may be described as a heritage of lands and jurisdiction in England and Wales vested since 1399 in the sovereign but entirely separate from the other crown possessions. Most of the fiefs which formed the Duchy had been acquired by the house of Lancaster before the inheritance was joined to the crown on the accession of Henry of Bolingbroke, John of Gaunt's son, who himself enlarged the inheritance by marrying one of the Bohun heiresses. Further additions were made in the sixteenth century, which saw the peak of the Duchy's influence and extent, but in the succeeding century large-scale alienation left the Duchy sadly attenuated.

One of the fiefs held by the house of Lancaster was the county from which it took its name. This county was erected into a palatinate for a life tenure in 1351 for the first duke of Lancaster, and in perpetuity soon after. Until 1399 it was known, quite properly, as the duchy of Lancaster, to the confusion of later generations, but then by an easy transference the name was applied to the wider inheritance as a convenient title for the whole.

The Duchy's seignorial origin provides the key to its administrative history, for the whole organisation developed from the pattern followed by other great lords in the administration of their lands. It was based on a decentralised system of local stewards, receivers and other officers and ministers, controlled by chief stewards and auditors for the divisions north and south of the Trent, and converging through these and a receiver-general upon a council. The council developed in course of time into a court which in one aspect was a court of revenue, in another a court of equity. On this court of Duchy chamber, as it was called, the Tudor administrative courts were modelled. The Lancaster palatinate courts of chancery, crown and common pleas were in their turn modelled

[1] i. 325.

on the royal courts. Since 1876 only the chancery court has remained with the Duchy, which still exercises considerable royal jurisdiction in the county.[1]

The Public Record Office *Guide* divides the Duchy records into ' equity proceedings ' and ' administrative, financial, etc.' I prefer a division between central and local, making it rest on the officer or department which produced the document.

One major type, however, which tends to evade this classification comprises the ancient deeds and the royal charters.[2] This is of course the residue of a once much larger collection. We see a measure of the loss from some 2,500 deeds entered in a register at the beginning of the fifteenth century ; about three-quarters of them have survived.[3]

Among the royal charters (the earliest of which dates from the eleventh century) there are some of quite considerable importance. Of the 69 ancient charters prior to 1200 in the Public Record Office, which Round edited for the Pipe Roll Society in 1888, no less than 37 are from the Duchy archives. The older portion of the collection of deeds forms a commentary on the formation of the Lancaster inheritance, and by tracing back the descent of the Duchy lands one can see how and when the collection was formed. Here will be found deeds relating to the Lacy family, the Ferrers, Bohuns and others ; there are Scottish deeds, Hebrew deeds, and a quite large number of documents from dissolved monasteries in Lancashire.[4]

Of the central archives the first to consider is the enrolment of deeds passed under the Duchy seal. Differing from the royal chancery, the Duchy from earliest times used the more convenient book form, but changed to rolls for some decades in the middle of the fifteenth century. The different types of instrument were distinctly grouped, and as business increased separate books or rolls were used for letters patent and for warrants. Until the reign of Elizabeth there is continuity in the series apart from a missing roll for one year of Henry VI,[5] but there are practically no enrolments of patents from 1568 to 1587 and few from 1599 to 1603, and there are smaller

[1] I hope that before long a fuller account of the Duchy's administration will be available in a history of the Duchy on which I am working.

[2] There are in all 5,288 : 427 royal charters, 789 ancient deeds in the three volumes of Cartae Misc., and 3,635, 106 and 331 respectively in the classes L, LL and LS.

[3] Cf. *E.H.R.*, lv. 608.

[4] The collection, anciently kept in some 90 boxes, was hence known as Grants in Boxes. It was first listed about 1700, again early in the last century, and more recently at the P.R.O.

[5] 28 Hen. VI. D.L. Chanc. Roll 18, which *List and Index XIV* makes out to be that roll, is something quite different.

gaps among the commissions and warrants.[1] The gaps, however, can be largely made good from other sources. There are warrants for patents covering the whole reign, and drafts or counterparts of leases; and from the reign of Henry VII the two auditors for their own convenience had been entering deeds relating to their respective departments. These two branches of enrolments continued to 1848. The main series, however, has never died out. Indexes are included in the enrolment books from Edward IV, and abstracts of the older volumes were made in the Duchy office in the eighteenth century: three general indexes cover the period from Henry VIII to the present day.[2]

Somewhat akin to the enrolment books are the entry books of letters—a series from 1778 to 1872. From 1873 the original in-letters and the drafts of out-letters have been kept, registered, and for the most part filed.

Fate has been hardly more kind with the annual accounts of the receiver-general, which record the payments made by local receivers and others to that officer, and the details of his disbursements. For Henry IV only one year is missing, a year in which the account was shown, as usual, to the king, who failed to return it.[3] Gaps appear under Henry V, and many years are missing in the early parts of the reigns of Henry VI, Edward IV and Henry VII, but from Henry VIII to 1912, when this form of account was discontinued, the series is not much broken. Otherwise is it with a comprehensive annual account of the whole finances of the Duchy, known as the auditor's valor and in use from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century.

The earliest considerable record of the Duchy council is an entry book of proceedings beginning in 1474. In the main it is a record of administrative work, but the corresponding volume for Henry VII's reign already contains much that is the product of a judicial tribunal.[4] By the next reign the judicial element has largely crowded out the administrative and it becomes necessary to have another book devoted to revenue matters. The series is continuous from its start to the end of the nineteenth century. To accommodate the

[1] Fragments of the missing volumes were bound up in 1686, Misc. Books 99.

[2] Apart from the regular series of enrolments there are a few volumes of special collections: most notable are the two Great Cowchers (1402–7)—Misc. Books 1 and 2, but there is also a register made up about the middle of the fourteenth century (Misc. Books 11) and another compiled towards the end of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth centuries (Misc. Books 12).

[3] 11–12 Hen. IV; see note on cover of D.L. Accts. Var. 4/7.

[4] *Trans. R. Hist. Soc.*, 4th Ser., xxiii. 175–6. The drafts of the judicial orders are fairly complete from Henry VIII.

administrative side of the court's work a series of entry books for revenue orders, or revenue proceedings, began in 1630, continuing until 1873.[1] These are essentially entry books of warrants, orders, reports, particulars and the like, and in 1761 there begins an entirely new series of entry books of orders in the 'revenue court'. To this series a new volume is added every year of the orders, or minutes as they have long been called, of the Duchy court.[2]

With the council's development as a court of equity there came into use those typical documents—bills and answers, and depositions, examinations, affidavits, reports, and so on. All these have survived in fair completeness.

Of local records the most characteristic are court rolls and ministers' accounts. There is a wide diversity of courts—ranging from the ordinary manorial courts through woodmotes and barmotes to honor courts and hundreds; and although not included in the series of court rolls, some proceedings of the courts held in the Duchy's Welsh marcher lordships.[3] A few rolls date from Henry III or Edward I, but really good runs do not start till the reign of Henry VI. Some of the rolls were formed before the courts became part of the Lancaster inheritance (e.g. Pleshey and Clare); conversely court rolls which might today have been among the Duchy archives were handed over to the purchasers of Duchy manors and lordships in the seventeenth century.[4] Other rolls of Duchy courts are outside the archives because in the fifteenth century large parts of the Duchy were held by queens in dower or by feoffees for the purposes of the king's will.[5]

The ministers' accounts are of course the product of activity by local accounting officers or ministers of many kinds—reeves, bailiffs, collectors, feodaries, receivers and others. They begin in the early fourteenth century.[6] As with the court rolls, it is not until the time of Henry VI that the ministers' accounts appear in real continuity. Closely related are the rentals, a standing record of rents and other payments charged on tenants.[7] Similar in purpose are the records of the feodaries

[1] Misc. Books 143–6, 172–85, the remainder being in the Duchy office.
[2] These are all in the Duchy office.
[3] Just. Itin. 1152–3.
[4] Sometimes these purchasers had much difficulty in securing delivery of the records.
[5] E.g. Long Bennington (Henry V's widow, 1422–37), B.M. Add. Ch. 55011–22.
[6] Accts. Var. 32/11 is an earlier example not in the series, and there is the Lacy roll of 1295/6, D.L. Min. Accts. 1/1.
[7] Not all of those extant are in the P.R.O. class of Rentals and Surveys. Some are among the Misc. Books.

and bailiffs of franchises. The valors and extents of manors provide what Miss Levett called the 'stationary' aspect of the manor's organisation: often they were made for a specific occasion. They gave place in the course of time to surveys, which were produced in quite large numbers, usually by commissioners, but some are the work of individuals.[1] The so-called 'parliamentary surveys' arising out of acts for the sale of royal property under the Commonwealth contain some original matter, not found in the exchequer series, and they are not all properly surveys.[2]

The Duchy has a good collection of maps and plans. Many of them date from the seventeenth century. The earliest is a rather crude map of about 1400 contained in a register.[3] There are specimens of the work of well-known map-makers like Saxton; and in the Duchy office there is a finely executed set of plans for all the Duchy estates which was made in 1781–3.

The inquisitions post mortem taken in virtue of writs under the personal Lancaster seal or the Duchy seal range in date from Henry III to Charles I, although few exist before Henry V. By the middle of the eighteenth century they were in great disorder and many in bad condition. They were then sorted and filed by Abraham Farley and Henry Strachey, who also prepared a Repertory to them.[4]

Also among the local records one may include the certificates and other documents relating to colleges and chantries in the Duchy, corresponding to the chantry certificates of the Augmentation Office. There are some forest proceedings and a considerable number of enclosure awards.

As regards the county palatine of Lancaster, administrative records such as the sheriff's and the hanaper accounts are included in the Duchy series of ministers' accounts. Here we are concerned mainly with the judicial records, but the Palatinate series (as distinguished in the P.R.O.) comprises also a few inquisitions post mortem, some files of warrants, petitions and writs, and the chancery enrolments.[5] Some of the chancery rolls for duke Henry and for John of Gaunt survive (a few being in the Duchy series), but there are large

[1] The three-volume survey of Tutbury honor made in 1559 goes under the name of William Humberstone, surveyor-general in the north parts of the Duchy, although in the making of it the deputy receiver of the honor was associated with him.

[2] S. J. Madge, *Domesday of Crown Lands*, pp. 129–30.

[3] Misc. Books 12, fo. 28.

[4] Obs. 509 (1754). They are calendared in *Ducatus Lancastrie*. For this purpose they were bound up in 30 volumes.

[5] The late Col. Parker has given a general description of Lancashire records, *Genealogist's Magazine*, viii (1938).

gaps in the fifteenth century. Eventually these enrolments ceased altogether as the instruments under the county palatine seal came to be entered in the Duchy enrolment books.

The judicial records fall naturally into three groups, of the chancery, crown and common pleas courts. The chancery pleadings—bills and answers—mostly bound up in volumes, run from 1474,[1] although there are not many before 1607. There are no replications before 1601, and the affidavits and, with a small exception, the depositions also commence in the first decade of the seventeenth century. The earliest entry book of decrees and orders is a thin volume running from 1524 to 1552, then there is a gap and the continuous series begins in 1603. Matters in this court were heard, as they still are, by the vice-chancellor, and the records were in the custody of the registrar. The judges of the other two courts were appointed by commissions under the county palatine seal, and the same judges heard both criminal and civil causes. The prothonotary had charge of the records of the court of common pleas, consisting of plea rolls, enrolments of fines (from 1587), the files of original feet and concords of fines from 1377, and documents relating to proceedings. The docquet rolls begin with John of Gaunt's regality, though the series is broken till Henry VI; the plea rolls are missing until 1441, except for one roll in 1401 and another in 1429. Then they are more or less complete to 1848.

Of the records on the crown side, formerly in the custody of the clerk of the crown, the bulk consists of the files of indictments, writs and so forth, and the 'assize' rolls. The files commence in Henry VI's reign. There are no assize rolls for Henry IV, Henry V, or Henry VII, and none from 38 Henry VIII to 12 James I. Eight rolls of proceedings before the justices of duke Henry are among the Duchy records, and others for the same regality are included in the general series of assize rolls.

For diverse reasons the Duchy archives include documents which are strictly not Duchy archives at all. Most obvious of these are the private papers of individual officers and others which accident and the course of years have swept into the collection. Then, since employment in the Duchy service (or in most administrations) was not in the old days a full-time occupation in the modern sense, Duchy officers will be found to have been employed in other offices. Thus among the Duchy records there are numerous documents relating to the Warwick and Salisbury lands in the fifteenth century because

[1] Not 1485 in the case of the bills, as the P.R.O. *Guide* says.

one of the Duchy auditors was also auditor for these,[1] and since the clerk of the Duchy council acted as clerk to one of the offshoots of the king's council under Henry VII, the records of that tribunal are mingled with those of the Duchy council.[2] Mixed too in the Duchy collection are some records of queen's jointures.[3] A few records of St. Bartholomew's priory have got among the Duchy's, perhaps because some Duchy records were once stored in the priory.[4] Conversely, what are properly Duchy archives will be found in other collections. Among Sir Reginald Bray's papers at Westminster Abbey are some relating to his office as chancellor of the Duchy, and of private collections in the British Museum the Liverpool papers include much that relates to the Duchy.[5] Some documents shown in the old lists but now lost, were probably discarded as being useless for the Duchy, yet they had some intrinsic value.[6]

Many of the losses can be traced to an old absence of understanding for the official nature of such muniments. When a man left office he would take its records with him; frequently they would be in his own house. How often had the Duchy authorities to write to ex-officers, or the widows or representatives of deceased officers, in order to recover official papers. It was the usual practice (at least in theory) for an outgoing officer to deliver his records to his successor, normally by indenture: the few surviving examples of such indentures are valuable in showing what records were extant at the time. Some records taken out supposedly on loan were never returned, and there were deliberate thefts. In 1763 (to cite a recorded instance) it was discovered that some of the boxes containing ancient grants had been stolen eight years previously when the officer in charge had been ill. Eleven of them were eventually found in the hands of the thief's widow. More had already been burnt and many of the contents had been sold to make glue.[7]

The Duchy records have perhaps suffered proportionately fewer ravages than the public records. On the whole the

[1] Min. Accts. bundles 637–51. [2] *E.H.R.*, liv. 429.

[3] E.g. Accts. Var. 1/11, 5/8 Min. Accts. 12035. Accts. Var. 2/1–11 are accounts of the treasurer and comptroller of Calais for some years of Henry VII.

[4] Accts. Var. 33/8–10. Less easy to account for is a volume of directions for the signet office, Misc. Books 133. This is actually a register of bills signed by the king; cf. Maxwell-Lyte, *The Great Seal*, pp. 91, where his reference to this volume is given as 153.

[5] Add. MSS. 38446–51.

[6] Among these was a list of the royal army in 1620 (Obs. 818) and a copy of Queen Anne's first speech (Obs. 517 f. 2). The warrant, signed by Edward VI, for the arrest of Ket in 1549 was apparently once in the Duchy records. It was already missing in the eighteenth century. Misc. 35/19, fo. 76 v. [7] Obs. 520.

central records have been well cared for; records which remained in local custody have not survived so well, and the early county palatine records have had a worse fate than the rest. Most of these were kept in Lancaster castle, which Farrer has called 'that relentless devourer of historical materials in time past'.[1] Even they, however, compare not unfavourably with the Durham palatinate records. Certain it is that from the reign of Elizabeth, with two short breaks in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there has been a succession of officers who have cared for the Duchy records and shown more than a passing interest in them. But negligence has undoubtedly caused the loss or damage of Duchy archives. Benjamin Ayloffe suffered in his great work for the Duchy records from the want of official encouragement. And there have been the natural hazards of fire, water and vermin. A fire at Gray's Inn in the seventeenth century, which caused damage to other papers, did little injury to the Duchy records, thanks to Ayloffe's efforts to save them.[2]

In the seven centuries that have elapsed since the Lancaster heritage began its separate existence the archives have, naturally, had their own history. Quite early, on the forfeiture of the second earl in 1322, they came with the inheritance into crown possession. Coincident with Bishop Stapledon's reforms at that time there was an 'array' of exchequer records, and the opportunity was taken to inspect and arrange the archives of the late earl of Lancaster which were then lying in Tutbury and Pontefract castles.[3] The muniments and the lands eventually came back to the Lancaster family, but not so the records formed while the forfeited lands were under royal administration. Another crisis came in John of Gaunt's time. The malevolence shown against court rolls during the Peasants' Rising extended also to his rolls, and the destruction of his Savoy palace in 1381 caused the loss of some muniments. Not long before that event most of the central accounts had been transferred to the Savoy, and there they must have perished. But the destruction of records was fortunately not complete, for we still have many documents which two inventories made before the date of the rising show to have been then in the duke's treasury.[4]

[1] *Lancashire Court Rolls*, 1323–4, p. xvii.

[2] Misc. Books 144, fo. 96. Early in the nineteenth century a burst pipe did some harm, but on the whole the Duchy has been fortunate.

[3] The inventories are Misc. 1/35, 36, and cf. 37. For the exchequer array, see V. H. Galbraith in *Essays presented to T. F. Tout*, p. 231.

[4] Misc. 1/33, 3/27. *John of Gaunt's Register* 1379–83 (Camden 3rd Ser., lvl), i. p. xv.

Many records at the time were in local repositories. A register compiled about the middle of the fourteenth century drew from deposits in the Lancaster castles of Kenilworth, Leicester, Tutbury, Bolingbroke, Pontefract and Pickering, as well as in London.[1] Similarly, the compiler of the 'Great Cowchers' went to Kenilworth, Bolingbroke and Pontefract to look for material, and the collections in Lancaster and Halton castles were also examined.[2] Those required for entering in the 'Great Cowchers' were brought up to London and subsequently returned. This scattering of records had its inconveniences: the clerk of the Duchy council, for instance, had more than once to ride to Kenilworth to inspect evidences. In the sixteenth century, however, there was some progress in centralisation. Elizabeth's grant of Kenilworth to the earl of Leicester meant that a new home had to be found for the records in the castle. They went for a few years to Leicester castle, and then in 1570 to London.[3] From 1521 a house in the Savoy had been in use as the Duchy office and as a repository for records, for which it was fitted with presses. A year or two after that date six chests of Duchy records were removed to the new office from St. Bartholomew's priory, where they had been for nearly a century.[4] A few records had also been stored in Westminster Abbey in the fifteenth century.

It was obviously convenient that local records should be kept locally—usually in a neighbouring Duchy castle, and the auditors from time to time collected court rolls, ministers' accounts, rentals and the like for preservation. Throughout the fifteenth century the receivers-general had used a house in the city of London for their records, as well as a treasury for money. The records of the Duchy council remained in the council house, situated in the exchequer of receipt at Westminster Palace. Here, too, for a time were kept the records of the Duchy chancery—mainly the enrolment books and rolls which were not then of great bulk. But by the end of the sixteenth century most if not all of these scattered central records had been gathered together in the Savoy. Early in the seventeenth century the Duchy office moved to Gray's Inn, although for a short time the Savoy repository continued in use. When the Commons committee reported on the public records in 1732 the Duchy records, still in Gray's Inn, were found to be well preserved and properly sorted, a description which unfortunately could not be applied to all the public

[1] Misc. Books 11.
[2] *E.H.R.*, li. 599.
[3] Misc. Books 97, fo. 99 v., Accts. Var. 9/11, fo. 14.
[4] Misc. Books 95, fo. 78.

collections.[1] In 1789 the Duchy office, and with it the Duchy records, transferred into Somerset House, but thirty years later, as space was required for other purposes, it was turned out. A new building was erected in Lancaster Place to house the office and records, and thus the centre of Duchy administration returned to its ancient site where it had been developed some five or six centuries earlier.

The concentration of Duchy records in London in the sixteenth century was opportune, for the growing study of English history and institutions took the Duchy into its ambit. Here we may ask, what means of reference existed to facilitate searches? There were of course indexes to enrolment books and to books of proceedings and orders, but for general guidance searchers would rely mainly on the Duchy officers, and especially on the clerk of the council (or his deputy) who from quite early in the fifteenth century had also been the keeper of the Duchy records. For fifteen years in Elizabeth's reign this office was occupied by William Tusser, who went through the Duchy records accessible to him, noting matters of interest. Another officer, Matthew Bacon, who may have entered the office in Tusser's time, went further. In the thirty years from about 1595 he compiled what he called ' A directory, guiding to find out diverse things worthy the noting contained in the records of the Duchy of Lancaster '. He arranged his material by counties, and gave references.[2] The various presses and cupboards were numbered or lettered, but books and bundles were not yet numbered and reference to them often involved periphrasis. Thus we have ' in a white canvas bag in the broad flat trunk in the study ', or ' in a great box behind my seat in the ground '. This was no advance on the method employed a century earlier, when we find the clerk of the council saying of a document that it ' resteth in my window in London ', or putting another ' in the little chest at my back where I am wont to sit in the chamber '.[3] Some descriptions in the older inventories are tantalisingly vague and brief. Thus a box at Kenilworth was listed as *carte ignote*, yet in that box was a deed by Edward Baliol during his brief reign as king of Scotland granting in fee to Henry of Lancaster 1,000 marks worth of land to be taken in any convenient place in Scotland.[4] Before the seventeenth century was out there had

[1] *House of Commons Committee Reports*, i. 524. At that time the Pipe Office was also in Gray's Inn.

[2] Misc. 35/19.

[3] *Ibid.*, fos. 39, 80: Entry Books of Orders 5, fos. 125, 161.

[4] Misc. Books 97, fo. 100 v. There was the usual collection of linen, canvas and leather bags, wicker cases, pixes, chests and hutches in which the records

been a great improvement in the arranging and listing of the Duchy archives. For this the Duchy was indebted to one whose name the office still remembers, however little recognition he won in his lifetime. Benjamin Ayloffe was associated with the Duchy from 1661, and he became clerk and keeper of the records in 1685. After enjoying that office for some thirty years he was unjustly dispossessed, but seems to have been restored to it. Eventually he died in 1723 at the advanced age of 95. Like Tusser, Ayloffe went through the Duchy records. He made a large collection of notes and on his death he left a score of volumes, descriptive of the records or of searches he had made, or containing calendars or lists of certain records. He numbered the records and the boxes and noted their position more exactly than his predecessors did. He attempted the first comprehensive list of ancient deeds—the ancient grants in boxes. He found them in great confusion, the description on the boxes not always corresponding with the contents. So he began numbering the deeds in a rather haphazard way. 'When I examined any box', he writes,[1] 'the first thing that came to hand I marked with number 1, which possibly might be a grant of E 3 : and the next I marked with number 2 and maybe that was a grant of King John, and so of all the others.' He modestly describes his work as 'in the nature of an Essay, for such successor as shall take the pains to proceed further as to the other boxes'.[2]

In the generation following Ayloffe's death—a period representing the lowest ebb in the Duchy fortunes—the records fell into neglect, but in the revival towards the middle of the eighteenth century they had their share of attention. Abraham Farley and Henry Strachey were called in to help with their marshalling and methodising, in the current phrase. There was much sorting, and the two produced in 1752 a repertory which is the direct ancestor of later lists, including the present Public Record Office list.[3] Farley and Strachey also listed in some detail the ministers' accounts and court rolls, and made a repertory to the inquisitions post mortem.[4] Imperfect in some respects as these may have been, they were at least a foundation for subsequent labours. The older registers were

reposed. Some large chests which existed already in 1400 were scrapped only at the beginning of last century.

[1] Obs. 520.

[2] Ayloffe's chief single monument is his compilation known as 'Great Ayloffe'. For some account of him see W. D. Selby, *Lancashire and Cheshire Records* (Lancs. and Chesh. Rec. Soc. 7) xiii ff.

[3] Farley is of course known for his later work on Domesday.

[4] Obs. 510, 509.

calendared or 'abstracted' by John Topham about the same time.[1] All this activity was primarily designed to assist the Duchy officers in their administration, and it may be noted that this was ten years or more before methodisers were appointed to deal with the state papers and the records of the Augmentation Office, although 'methodising' of exchequer records had been going on for a couple of decades.[2]

The work thus begun was assisted and continued by Richard Wolfe, a Duchy officer, and at this time and earlier in the century many of the ancient volumes were repaired or rebound. Further sorting, cleaning and listing resulted from the appointment of Francis Russell as solicitor and later as deputy clerk of the council. He was commissioned to 'digest and regulate' the records of the clerk of the council, the clerk of the revenue and the auditors, and some brought from Knaresborough castle. It was through him, no doubt, that the Duchy engaged William Minchin who was destined to carry on the tradition. As solicitor and clerk in court Minchin spent some thirty years in the Duchy office. What he lacked in scholarship was to some extent counter-balanced by his industry. He worked over many of the existing lists and calendars, improving or adding. A three-volume production in the folio Record Commission series was largely his work.[3] The impending publication of these volumes led to a fresh arrangement of the documents and to their binding. At the same time the Duchy council ordered the arranging and binding of the later chancery records at Lancaster which were then in a state of disorder and gradual decay.[4]

When the Duchy records were moved into the new office in Lancaster Place in 1824 a new repertory was made, and Minchin continued with his labours of sorting, binding and repairing, setting out the results in a series of quarterly reports. It was then that 'an ingenious and diligent young man' (a contemporary description) lately in the Record Office in the Tower came to the Duchy to assist Minchin in his work. William Hardy, a brother of T. D. Hardy, thus introduced to the office, became clerk of the Duchy records in 1832 and continued in that capacity to 1868. In that long time he did comparatively little work of note. He represented the older

[1] The calendars are on the open shelves at the P.R.O.

[2] H. Jenkinson, *Manual* (new edn.), p. 236.

[3] *Ducatus Lancastrie*. It contains calendars of the Duchy inquisitions post mortem, the pleadings in the Duchy Court (Henry VII—Eliz.), and depositions (Hen. VII—Philip and Mary).

[4] This and most of the succeeding paragraphs are based on material in the Duchy office.

type of record agent, and after he had gone to the P.R.O. on the transfer of the Duchy records and eventually succeeded his brother as deputy keeper he did little to advance his reputation.[1]

The transfer of the older Duchy archives to the Public Record Office in 1868 was the result of sixteen years of negotiation and waiting. Neither the Duchy nor, on the whole, the master of the rolls were responsible for the delay, which was rather the result of characteristic behaviour on the part of the Treasury. It was in 1852 that the Duchy authorities first considered the possibilities of transfer. An order in council made in March of that year under the 1838 Record Office Act placed under the charge and superintendence of the master of the rolls all records belonging to the queen deposited in any other office or custody than those specified in the act. The Duchy had not been expressly included in that act.[2] As the order in council rested on the 1838 act, and the Duchy of Lancaster, like the crown, is not bound by legislation, unless specifically included, it might have been argued that the order in council did not apply to the Duchy, although its records certainly belonged to the sovereign. None the less, the existence of the order and the construction of the new public repository in Chancery Lane (the first block was completed in 1856) were good reasons for doing something with the Duchy records. The Duchy council were also greatly influenced by a desire to make the records accessible to the public, as facilities for research in the office were inadequate. An approach was therefore made to the master of the rolls (Lord Romilly) in 1855, and he at once gave his opinion that the Duchy records ought to be under his charge. The deputy keeper, however, felt that the question was of larger extent than at first appeared, and wished to make a written report. No report, in fact, was ever made and the Duchy heard nothing further.[3] In 1863, urged on no doubt by increasing applications to consult the ancient records, the Duchy council reopened the matter. The master of the rolls was still willing to take the records at once, particularly as the transfer would fit in with a proposed transfer of the Land Revenue records. But the Treasury did nothing. The clerk of the council reminded the master of the rolls again in 1866. In the meantime the Chetham Society had presented

[1] While with the Duchy he was allowed to carry on a lucrative business as record agent.

[2] The Duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster and the Office of Woods sought exemption for their records, although both Duchies had been recognised as offices of state in the reports of 1800 and 1837.

[3] P.R.O. Correspondence 27, 15 June 1863.

a memorial to the chancellor of the Duchy pressing for greater facility of access. A last, and this time successful, approach was made in the summer of 1868. The Treasury now moved with remarkable speed, and by December the records of the Duchy, up to about 1760, were housed in the Public Record Office.[1]

In reporting on this valuable acquisition the deputy keeper hinted at the desirability of the transfer of the palatinate records, which were still in Lancashire. On a vote for public records in 1873 reference was made to the dusty condition of the records in Lancaster castle and to the possibility of their removal to London to be placed ' alongside the other portions ' of the Duchy records. The chancellor of the Duchy thereupon called for reports.[2] The Chetham Society supported the proposed transfer but opposition came from the visiting justices of Lancaster castle. Duffus Hardy declared it to be most desirable to have the records ' incorporated ' with the Duchy records at once. There was the more reason for haste as by the establishment of the Supreme Court of Judicature the records of the Lancashire courts (except the chancery court) would pass to the new court, and some complications were foreseen. Accordingly, on 17 September 1873 the master of the rolls issued a warrant to the deputy keeper to take over the Lancashire records.[3]

The transfer of the Duchy records was followed at once by the publication in the deputy keeper's reports of an inventory prepared by William Hardy and based on the old Duchy repertory, and then by a few calendars of individual classes. An inventory of the palatinate records and a calendar of the chancery rolls appeared after 1873. Most of these calendars are indifferently done, abounding in errors and omissions. In 1901 a volume in the series of *Lists and Indexes* was devoted to the Duchy records. It marked a considerable advance in classification, and is probably as good as any of the earlier lists in the series. The time has perhaps come when more perfect editions of these lists should be made available to the public. The Duchy list is not free from blemish. Apart from errors of description and ascription, there is still room

[1] Records of Halton honor were presented by the Duchy (*Deputy Keeper's Thirty-ninth Report*, 1878) and there were further transfers to P.R.O. in 1920.

[2] The dust was admitted, but it was claimed that the documents in Lancaster castle were free from damp.

[3] *First Report of Royal Commission on Public Records*, ii. 19. Doubts on the application of the 1852 order in council had apparently been resolved, and this warrant was then unique in placing in the custody of the master of the rolls records of courts not specified in the 1838 act.

for improvement in arrangement.[1] Nor is the list to be used as a complete survey of the Duchy records transferred to the Public Record Office. For this the old inventories are still indispensable.[2]

In commemoration of Queen Victoria's gift the original Public Record Office home of the Duchy records was called the Lancaster Tower. The name and whereabouts are unknown, I imagine, to most of the present generation of custodians.[3] The Duchy authorities had hoped and stipulated that the unity of their records would be preserved. In the physical sense this may have been difficult or impossible to observe. But one may rightly feel apprehension at some of the rearrangements by classification. It is a convenience, no doubt, to have Duchy records included in general series such as plea rolls, court rolls and ministers' accounts if their identity is preserved, but it is unfortunate when the provenance of some Duchy records is obscured by their inclusion in the artificial groups ' Obsolete ' or ' Indexes '. Even more reprehensible, as it seems to me, are transfers like that of records of the Duchy's Welsh marcher lordships into the series of assize rolls, for, as they lack further specification, their purpose and origin are likely to be overlooked.[4]

I close this review with the 1910 Commission on the Public Records. Proposals for decentralisation being in the air, the commissioners recommended that the palatinate records should return to Lancashire. Some witnesses had gone further. Tout showed an ignorance of the Duchy by suggesting that its archives should all be transferred to local repositories ; and he is even credited with the astonishing remark that Chester would be a good centre for the Duchy records. Professor Tait, better qualified to speak on the subject, thought that a transfer of the palatinate records to Lancashire was inadvisable, and he wisely excluded the Duchy records proper from any scheme for decentralisation.[5]

Such, then, in outline is the history of the Duchy of Lancaster records. Whatever value or interest the Duchy has

[1] E.g. the auditor's valors are distributed among three distinct classes.

[2] They have other uses too. A valuable clue to the dates of many of the maps and plans is overlooked in the *List and Index*, and almost irretrievably lost in the rearranged numbering of the modern combined list. The first 102 items are taken straight out of the 1752 Repertory, which reproduced Ayloffe's list made up probably before 1700. A return made by the Clerk of the Council to the Record Commissioners in 1832 contains much detailed information on the Duchy records.

[3] It was the north-east tower in Fetter Lane.

[4] See p. 5, note 3.

[5] *First Report*, iii. 107, 141, 138 ff.

itself for students of constitutional or legal, administrative or economic history, these it shares with its archives. Some of them which bear on these subjects have been published or cited, most emphasis being upon local history, and not without reason. In the course of its long history the Duchy of Lancaster has had interests in every county of England, and in considerable parts of Wales; and even Scotland, Ireland, the Isle of Man and Calais come within the scope of its records. At one time or another a dozen honors and over three hundred demesne manors were comprised within it. It is but natural that the Lancashire record societies should have found in the Duchy sources worth publishing, but the broad extent of the Duchy's interests has provided material for many another county. Yet there still remains a wide field for further enterprise, and the better it is cultivated the more amply will the Duchy be justified in having made its records freely accessible to the public.

PRESTER JOHN: A FOURTEENTH-CENTURY MANUSCRIPT AT CAMBRIDGE

By Malcolm Letts, F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S.

Read 15 December 1945

The text of the forged Letter of Prester John which began to circulate in Europe about the year 1165 was settled and printed by Professor Fr. Zarncke more than sixty years ago, and although later scholars have added their contributions to the subject and fresh manuscripts have come to light, students as a whole must still base their studies on Professor Zarncke's learned and painstaking work.[1]

The earliest reference to Prester John in Western literature occurs in the Chronicle of Otto of Freising [2] in the year 1145, but the legend of an all-powerful Eastern potentate, who is said to have received the rite of baptism and even of ordination, must be much older. It belongs probably to the period of the introduction of Christianity into Tartary by the Nestorians and was widespread in the East long before it reached Europe. Gibbon, in a characteristic passage,[3] reports that the Karait Khan, who is said to have assumed the title of Prester or Presbyter, was indulged in the use of a portable altar, but dispatched an embassy to the Patriarch to enquire how in the season of Lent he was to abstain from animal food, and how he might celebrate the eucharist in a desert that produced neither corn nor wine. These difficulties, however, seem to have vanished by the time the legend reached Europe, for Prester John's country then contained everything which priest or man could desire, from constant hot water to a postal service staffed by flying dragons.

Some twenty years later than the date mentioned by Otto of Freising, that is about 1165, began the circulation of the famous Letter which, in Gibbon's words, long amused the credulity of Europe and was subsequently to evaporate in a

[1] Fr. Zarncke, 'Der Priester Johannes' in *Abhandlungen der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, Phil. Hist. Classe, vii (1879), viii (1883). See also L. Olschki, 'Il Prete Gianni', in *Storia Letteraria delle Scoperte Geografiche* (Florence, 1937), p. 194, and the same writer's article in *Hist. Zeitschrift*, cxliv (1931), 1; also Ch. V. Langlois, 'Les Merveilles du Prêtre Jehan', in *La Vie en France au Moyen-Age*, iii. 44.

[2] *Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores*, xx. 266.

[3] *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury, v. 159.

monstrous fable. It purports to be addressed by Prester John to the Emperor Manuel, and it relates in extravagant terms and in great detail the marvels of the Prester's kingdom and the extent of his dominions. At this time Europe was thoroughly alarmed at the increasing power of the infidel, and the idea of a Christian potentate, whose territory extended over the three Indias to the sunrising and back again to the Tower of Babel, who was fabulously rich as well as endowed with miraculous powers, and who was prepared to march to the assistance of the Crusaders, was irresistible. It filled the early maps with monsters and fables, gave a new impulse to geographical discovery, brought fresh hope to Christendom, and provided story-tellers with material which lasted for centuries. I have summarised the original Letter in a series of articles which appeared recently in *Notes and Queries*.[1]

The Letter seems to have been composed not in Greek, as one interpolation would have us believe, but in Latin, although it may well have originated in the East, and its sources are not far to seek. All the material for a new book of marvels was at hand. The Letter as printed by Zarncke, without the various interpolations, is divided into a hundred paragraphs. Of these at least fourteen can be traced to the Latin version of the history of Alexander by the Archpresbyter Leo. Other paragraphs come from the bestiaries and lapidaries. There are verbatim quotations from the Vulgate. The rest could be filled in from Pliny, Solinus, St. Augustine's *City of God*, and from Isidore of Seville and other writers of the early Middle Ages. The author was familiar with the story of Sinbad the Sailor and with Rabbinical learning and tradition. One episode, at least, may be the result of personal knowledge of the Imperial Palace at Constantinople destroyed by the Crusaders in 1204, and a fertile imagination would supply the rest. The background to the Letter is no less surprising than its marvels. The author is concerned to make it clear that Prester John's kingdom, unlike Europe and the Near East, which were then in turmoil, was a peaceful and contented land. Christians, Jews, Amazons and Brahmins all lived together in peace and happiness. There were no poor in that happy land. Thieves and liars dared not show their heads. There was no crime, flattery or strife, but abundance of riches for all. Only infidels were excluded. Prester John's Letter has not yet

[1] 'Prester John: Sources and Illustrations', clxxxviii (1945), 178, 204, 246, 266; clxxxix. 4. The letter is translated, without the interpolations, by Sir E. Denison Ross in *Travel and Travellers of the Middle Ages*, ed. A. P. Newton (1926), p. 174.

perhaps been appreciated at its true worth as an early contribution to the literature of Utopias.

The Letter, however it was circulated, seems to have had an immediate success. Zarncke lists close on a hundred manuscripts, of which ten are in the British Museum. They fall into six groups, one containing the uninterpolated text, the remaining five being distinguished by the respective interpolations. The printed editions of the fifteenth century would require a study to themselves. There were translations into Anglo-Norman, Italian, Hebrew and the Scottish dialect, but chiefly into German and French. Two divergent Gaelic versions have been found,[1] and Sir John Mandeville first introduced the Letter to English readers. There were five High German versions, and in the German poem 'Der Jüngere Titurel' (*c.* 1270) the legend is woven directly into the story of the Holy Grail. The influence of the legend on other European literatures cannot be considered here, but it was remarkable.

Most of the earlier manuscripts conform to type, but as they came to be copied and re-copied, the scribes introduced a number of interesting variations. This paper is concerned mainly with a fourteenth-century Latin manuscript at Cambridge, to which Professor Zarncke drew attention in 1877,[2] and which departs so considerably from the original text that it deserves special study. Unfortunately it is imperfect. It lacks the opening words as well as the first fifteen paragraphs. Its importance lies not only in its variations from type, but in the fact that it is from this manuscript that the popular versions into French and Italian appear to have been made. It would seem further that from the French or Italian versions a re-translation was made into Latin, and manuscripts of this re-translated Latin version are in existence at Hildesheim, Paris and Milan. Still stranger is the fact that this re-translated Latin text formed apparently the ground-work for another translation into popular language, this time in the Scots dialect. It is all rather complicated, but the outline seems to be as follows:

1. The original text with its interpolations.
2. The much freer version with additions—the Cambridge manuscript.

[1] Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 1781 (R. Flower, *Catalogue of Irish Manuscripts*, ii. 543); National Library of Scotland, Gaelic MS. XLI (Mackinnon, *Catalogue of Gaelic Manuscripts in Scotland*, p. 119).

[2] University Library, Oo. vii. 48 (*Catalogue of Manuscripts*, iv. (1861), 552, no. 3235). Printed by Fr. Zarncke in *Berichte der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, Phil. Hist. Classe (1877), p. 139.

3. The French and Italian versions.
4. The re-translation into Latin—the Hildesheim manuscript.
5. The version in the Scots dialect.

The Cambridge manuscript opens with a description of the Alerion eagle. Its colours were like burning fire and its wings were as sharp as razors. There was only one pair in the world. At sixty the female laid two eggs. After sixty days two chicks were hatched, whereupon the parents threw themselves into the sea, while the other birds, who had been summoned to witness the tragedy, looked after the chicks. We are next introduced to Gog and Magog and the cannibal nations shut up by Alexander the Great, whose abominations are described with distressing particularity in interpolation C to the original Letter. They were enclosed behind lofty mountains to await the coming of Antichrist when they would overrun the whole world. In the original Letter they are left largely to their own devices, except that when Prester John went to war he fetched them out of their mountain fastness so that they could devour his enemies, after which he drove them back again. We learn from the Cambridge manuscript that they were hemmed in also by sixty-two castles, in which Prester John kept a large army under the command of a king. Next comes a description of a race of men with round hoofs like camels, who tilled the earth and paid a yearly tribute. More details are given of the Amazons who marched to war with chariots, elephants and horses, 100,000 strong, not counting the baggage ladies. The pygmies inhabited a country beyond the Gison, one of the rivers of Paradise, which was so vast that it could only be navigated by great ships. The pygmies had pygmy horses the size of rams. They were Christians and had no enemies except certain birds—the cranes—which attacked them when they should have been reaping their crops or gathering the grapes, an affliction which fell upon them annually because of the sins of their forefathers. The *sagittarii* or centaurs make a brief appearance. Their enemies were the wild men of those parts who slept in trees because of serpents. God did not suffer them to leave their country, but living specimens were collected and exhibited at Prester John's court.

Then comes a description of a race of giants, fifteen cubits high, whose height was formerly sixty cubits, but they could not leave their country because God would not suffer them to depart. They lived there under the jurisdiction of Prester John. We have next a reference to the phoenix which could be killed only by falcons, but the courtiers took the chicks

when young and brought them to court because of their beauty, a story which makes short work of the popular belief that there was only one phoenix in the world, and that it renewed its youth every 500 years. The story of the pepper harvest and the serpents—which seems to have gripped the popular imagination as much as anything in the Letter—is related more briefly. The pepper forests grew at the foot of Mount Olympus. They were full of two-headed serpents, and when the pepper was ripe the woods were set on fire and the serpents were roasted alive. Mandeville remarks, with much shrewdness, that if the serpents were burnt the pepper would be burnt as well, but the point seems to have escaped the notice of other writers.[1] The Cambridge manuscript adds that the roasted serpents were piled in heaps and that when the pepper had been cleaned and winnowed, it was cooked, and the water then formed an antidote for serpent bites.

The Cambridge manuscript now introduces from the original Letter a description of the precious stones and magical herbs found in the Prester's dominions, and passing over a Fountain of Youth which flowed from Paradise, the author comes to the Dry or Gravelly Sea behind which the Ten Tribes were hopelessly confined, as the river could only be crossed when it ceased to flow, and it rested only on the Sabbath Day.

So far as the Ten Tribes are concerned, according to the Cambridge manuscript, they were confined not only by the river but also by sixty castles, the strongest in the world, built a bow-shot from each other and manned by 4000 soldiers, 5000 cross-bowmen and 1000 archers, while the mountains were defended by 30,000 armed men, lest the Ten Tribes should break out. The Israelite king paid an annual tribute of camels, gold and silver and precious stones, and discharged the expenses of the army of occupation. These tribes seem to have been as much feared as Gog and Magog and the unclean people, with whom, not unnaturally, they were at times confused. Close to the mountains of God and Magog was a city called Oriunda, which was so strong that it could not be taken except by stealth. It was ruled by a king, but the unclean people were allowed to trade with Prester John's subjects, although only outside the city walls. In times of war they were enrolled in Prester John's army, but the old men were killed off, and because the grown men and women were very beautiful and hot-blooded, the boys were castrated and employed to wait

[1] The story however is related, and its truth doubted, by the German traveller Arnold von Harff (1496–99), *The Pilgrimage of Arnold von Harff* translated and edited by M. Letts (Hakluyt Society, 1946), p. 170.

on the young people of the Court. The Prester's war-horses were so huge that they could only be mounted from ladders. Each horse carried an armed man and food and provender for eight days.

There is a reference in the original Letter to the annual visit paid to the tomb of the prophet Daniel in Babylonia Deserta, and the Cambridge text goes into greater detail. The journey took fifteen days, and a great army was necessary, with chariots and elephants, for there were lions and serpents and seven-headed dragons in the way. Forty-five days' journey beyond the desert was a country inhabited by giants, who, if they knew the art of war, would overrun the whole world, but God had condemned them to perpetual labour because of the presumption of their forefathers who built the Tower of Babel and sought to ascend into Heaven.

Prester John kept a number of these giants in chains at his court for the edification and amusement of visitors, who gazed at them as if they had been wild beasts. Ed. Webbe, a master-gunner and a very fluent liar, claimed to have seen one of them there in the sixteenth century.[1]

The Cambridge manuscript ends as follows:

> And know that we tell you only a part of the miracles and virtues of our court and dominion, nor have we told you until now of the virtues and miracles of the Blessed Thomas, nor of his church, nor of the Patriarch and other saints in our land, whose wonders are more marvellous than those we have related. But all that which we tell you of our land and court and of other places is as true as there is a God in heaven, for we do not in any manner lie.

This reference to St. Thomas is interesting, because from early days the story of the miracles performed at his shrine had always been associated with Prester John. The story does not appear in the original Letter, nor in the various interpolations, but in an anonymous tract 'De Adventu Patriarchae Indorum' of the twelfth century, which was widely circulated.[2] Later on, the story came to be incorporated in some manuscripts of the Letter, e.g. the Hildesheim manuscript of the fourteenth century,[3] and it is included in the fifteenth-century printed editions so far as they are known to me. The

[1] *Edward Webbe, his Travails* (1590), ed. Arber, *English Reprints* (1868), p. 25.

[2] Printed by Fr. Zarncke in 'Der Priester Johannes', i. 837. See *Notes and Queries*, clxxxviii. 179.

[3] Printed by Fr. Zarncke in the contribution referred to above, p. 21, n. 2, at pp. 118–36.

story was that the body of St. Thomas was preserved intact in a shrine in the city of Hulna which was the head and mistress of India. Once a year on the Apostle's feast day the Patriarch, attended by bishops, opened the shrine and placed the holy body in a pontifical chair by the high altar. The body remained as in life. The face was ruddy, the beard red and curly, but not long, and the clothes were as fresh as when they were first put on. When the time came to administer the eucharist the Patriarch carried the wafers to the saint who received them in the palm of his right hand and offered them to the faithful. But if an unbeliever or a heretic approached to communicate the Apostle closed his hand, whereupon the heretic or sinner either repented and in penitence received the sacrament or straightway departed this life. The story of St. Thomas's ' Dooms ' is reported by Gervase of Tilbury and other writers of the early Middle Ages, and one amusing but entirely untrustworthy traveller of the fourteenth century claims to have seen the saint withhold the sacrament from three men, but moved by their cries and repentance, he later suffered them to receive it.[1]

But perhaps the most interesting feature of the Cambridge manuscript is the paragraph at the end which shows definitely that it was intended for home consumption.

> And know that in each month of the year seven kings render at our table the services appropriated to them, also ninety-two dukes and a hundred counts, without counting the English who are present at our Court. We have 2,000 English, or more, whom we make soldiers. They serve our person both at table and in our chamber, and are on guard night and day. We make soldiers of all the English, whether they are presbyters, clerics or squires, because they are steadfast in the faith and belief of Christ, and because they carry themselves well in arms and are good archers, doughty in war and faithful in the camp. And know that when we go to war the English go with us and guard our person . . . And the English give us good account of the Roman Pope, our friend and brother in the Lord. All the kings, dukes and counts, and the English eat at our table in turn. And know well that when a king or prince or duke or count departs this life without heirs, we give his lands to one of the English who guard us.

This is from an English manuscript, but its interest does not end there. This same manuscript, as I have said, was used apparently as a basis for French and Italian translations,

[1] John de Hese, 1389, printed by Fr. Zarncke in ' Der Priester Johannes ', ii. 169. Cf. *Notes and Queries*, clxxxix. 5.

with this difference, that the French or Italians, as the case may be, take the place of the English in the passage just translated. But we are still far from an English translation of the Letter. That had to wait until the fifteenth century, and before it could appear the Cambridge manuscript had to be translated into French and Italian. From one of these two versions it was re-translated into Latin, and the English translation was made from this re-translated Latin text. Unfortunately it is only a fragment.[1]

It is a manuscript of the late fifteenth century at the British Museum. It is written on paper in the Scots dialect and occupies folios 310^{a}–311^{b} of Andrew of Winton's ' Chronicle of Scotland '. So far as it goes it follows the Hildesheim manuscript very closely. It contains the opening address, describes the state and dignities of Prester John, his palace, the iniquities of Gog and Magog, the Sandy Sea, the Amazons, and breaks off with the life and habits of the unicorn. So far this is the only English translation which has been discovered.

[1] B.M. Royal, 17D. xx ; *Catalogue of Royal and King's MSS.* (1921), ii. 256. Printed by Fr. Zarncke in *Berichte der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, Phil. Hist. Classe (1878), p. 41.

THE KIEV STATE AND ITS RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE

By Professor F. Dvornik, D.D., D.Lit. (Sorbonne)

Read 12 January 1946

The early history of Russia is still in many respects an unexplored field, and the place which the first Russian political organisation occupied in Europe from the tenth to the twelfth century is not yet appreciated as it deserves to be, even by Russian scholars themselves. The research carried out in this field in Russia at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century [1] was cut short for almost three decades by political events. It is only recently that the history of Kievan Russia has aroused a keener interest among the historians of Soviet Russia, as witness the many studies published in *Vestnik Drevnei Istorii* and especially the work of B. D. Grekov.[2]

But again, the interest of modern Russian scholars centres rather on problems which do not appeal to western historians. As an instance of the slight progress made towards a final solution connected with the early history of Russia, it is enough to cite the origin of Kiev and of the Russian nation. The complexity of the questions relating to the prehistory and early history of Russia was revealed to western scholars in the recent publication on this period issued in Yale by Professor G. Vernadsky,[3] but many of them still remain unsolved. It is therefore impossible in a short paper like this to do justice to all the topics raised and to treat in detail of the early formation of the State of Kiev.[4] All we can do is to outline its main problems and to stress some features that bear more directly on the relations between the State of Kiev and Western Europe.

To begin with, it appears that the State of Kiev had its own prehistory, scarcely known to a wide public, but significant enough to explain in a way why it was so easy for a foreign race to set up a mighty State among the Slavonic masses settled on the rivers Bug, Styr, Dnieper and Dniester. Then, the Scandinavian Norsemen had their forerunners in their rule

[1] See a short review of the most important works dealing with the early history of Russia in G. Laehr, *Die Anfänge des Russischen Reiches. Polit. Geschichte von 9. u. 10 Jh.* (Histor. Studien, vol. 189. Berlin, 1930), p. 116.

[2] *Kievskaya Rus* (Academy of SSSR, Moscow, 1939, 2nd edn., 1945).

[3] *Ancient Russia* (New Haven, 1934).

[4] I am dealing more fully with these problems of early Russian history in my book *The Making of Central and Eastern Europe*, which is due shortly to appear in New York.

over the Slavonic tribes. These were the Antes,[1] most probably a Sarmatian tribe, which is believed to have been attacked by the Goths when they settled on the eastern frontiers of the Roman Empire. The Antes had their centre of power between the Dniester and the Dnieper, and must have set up their empire among the Slavs of that region at the end of the second century A.D. The Goths, and after them the Huns, who raised their empire on the ruins of the ephemeral Gothic kingdom, barred the way and hampered the drift of the Antes and their Slavs towards the south and the Black Sea ; but after Attila's death in 453 the Antes resumed their eastward drive towards the Don and the south, where they came up against the eastern frontiers of the Roman Empire. They would probably have followed the track of the Huns and the Goths and forced their way into the eastern provinces, had they not been prevented by the Avars from doing so. These sixth-century Avars did their work well and made an end of this political unit of Eastern Slavs, the first ancestors of the Russian State.

The foundation of this first Slav empire on Russian soil is still a subject of debate, and the very name of the Antes is one of the major puzzles which Slavonic archaeologists and philologists are trying to solve. The most likely hypothesis seems to be that the empire was set up by a tribe of the Sarmatians who invaded these countries in the second century A.D., and succeeded in imposing their rule on their nearest Slavonic neighbours. The Sarmatians, who formed the fighting and governing class, were then swallowed up by the prolific Slav element to which they left their political system and their name. We can therefore say that the formation of the first State among the eastern Slavs was similar to that of the Danubian Bulgaria by the Turkish Bulgars. In this case, however, it is possible that if the Avars had not put an end to the empire of the Antes, the creation of the Slavonic State due to the Scandinavians of the north would have started from the south, and the Slavonic State, instead of bearing the Scandinavian and Finnish name of Russia, would have borne a Sarmatian name from a tribe of Iranian stock.

This consideration may clear the way to the solution of another puzzle in Old Slavonic history, the origin of the Croats and the Serbs. There exist some vague accounts of the existence of an empire north of the Carpathians and on the Upper Vistula which flourished in the sixth and seventh centuries and was called the Empire of White Croatia. The

[1] On the Antes, cf. my work *Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome au IX^e siècle* (Paris, 1926), pp. 22 ff., 55 ff.

reports are few and confused, but the existence of such an empire can hardly be denied. Some of the Sarmatian tribes were driven by the Huns as far as the region of the Upper Vistula, where they settled among the Slavs in occupation, united them, and founded a State which rose to prominence after the destruction of the empire of the Antes by the Avars. The existence of this empire called White Croatia was known to King Alfred [1] and to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, and also to such Arab writers as Kardisi, Ibn Rosteh and an anonymous Persian geographer of the same period. The fact that Slavs called Croats were to be found in countries that were later known as Russian, Polish and Czech authorises us to assume that the empire of White Croatia extended north of the Carpathians over modern Galicia, the Upper Vistula, the Upper Oder and perhaps even parts of Silesia and Eastern Bohemia. But it seems now established that the Iranians penetrated even further and imposed their leadership and their name on the Slavs who lived in modern Saxony, between the rivers Saale, Elbe and Mulde and were called Sorbs, Serbs or Sorabs. Even among these Slavs, the Serbs of Iranian stock seem to have formed the preponderating and military element, but to have assimilated the language of their subjects.

This should help us to understand what Constantine Porphyrogenitus says about the arrival of the Croats and the Serbs in the south, which he dates from the reign of the Emperor Heraclius.[2] He moreover credits the Croats and the Serbs with the destruction of the Avar overlordship among the Southern Slavs. His account, which Slavonic scholars have so far refused to accept, is true and deserves every credit. If we admit the existence of a White Croatia and a White Serbia, we shall find it proportionately more consistent to admit the expansion of the Moravian Empire starting in the ninth century from the valley of the Morava and reaching by the end of the same century the Upper Vistula, the Bug and the Styr. For Svatopluk of Moravia merely annexed to his realm the empires of White Croatia and White Serbia. These two countries were fully organised, but must have had their strength sapped by the emigration of a substantial portion of the Sarmatian military

[1] J. Bosworth, *King Alfred's Anglo-Saxon Version* (London, 1859), p. 18. See the study by K. Malone, ' King Alfred's North, A Study in Medieval Geography ', *Speculum*, v (1930), 139–67. But Malone's correction of Alfred's geographical information is not warranted. Alfred is right in locating the Horoti to the east of the Dalamentsan, since he was thinking of the White Croats in modern Galicia, not south-east, where the existence of a White Croat tribe in Eastern Bohemia is established by other evidence.

[2] See *Constantini Porphyrogenniti de Administrando Imperio* (ed. J. B. Bury, London, 1920), chs. 29–76.

class to the south. These findings have their importance in early Russian history: the rivalry between Russia and Poland at that early period can be explained as a drive from either side for the spoils of the Moravian Empire, which had absorbed White Croatia, when the Magyars overran Great Moravia.

The Sarmatians were succeeded in Kiev and in what is now Southern Russia by the Khazars,[1] who belonged to the Turko-Tartar branch of races that probably helped the Slavs of later Southern Russia to shake off the yoke of the Avars for good, and stepped straightway into the position which the Avars had vacated. Their empire, which had its centre on the Volga delta in Itil, was neighbour to the Bulgars in the Middle Volga. The Bulgar State, known to contemporaries as the Great Bulgaria, existed till the thirteenth century, when it was overthrown by the invading Mongols. There was then serious danger that the Eastern Slavs, the future Russians, would be permanently subjected to Asiatic influences and fall a prey to the powerful Asiatic hordes as they swept by on their way to attack what remained of the Roman Empire in the east.

It may sound strange, but it is nevertheless true to say that the eastern Slavs were saved from that fate by the Germanic Norsemen from Sweden. An Anglo-Saxon account handed down by King Alfred [2] tells us that in the second half of the ninth century the Vikings penetrated into Biarmaland, on the shores of the White Sea, where they opened commercial contact with the native Laplanders and kept up with the Baltic and Finnish populations on the shores of the Baltic relations that can be traced as far back as the eighth century. From there the Norsemen must have heard of the two flourishing empires established on the River Volga, the Khazars and the Bulgars.[3] The Khazars at that time carried on a brisk trade with the Arabs of Bagdad, for the Volga was an unique artery of communication.

But the Norsemen were also on the scent, and they soon discovered the great natural artery by which all these exchanges were going on, though probably not from the Gulf of Riga but from the Gulf of Finland and from Lake Ladoga. Ladoga

[1] On the Khazars see ch. v of my book *Les Légendes de Constantin et de Méthode vues de Byzance* (Prague, 1933), pp. 148–78.

[2] Bosworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 19 f. See also Alan S. C. Ross, *The Terfinnas and Beormas of Ohthere* (Leeds School of English Language, Texts and Monographs, no. vii. 1940), new edition with commentary on the passage and recent bibliography.

[3] See new materials on the commercial relations between the Bulgars on the Volga and the northern peoples in J. Marquart, 'Ein arabischer Bericht über die arktischen Länder aus dem 10. Jh.', *Ungarische Jahrbücher*, iv (1924), 322 ff.

offered easy access to the Volga by way of Beloozero, but there was a third route, via Lake Ilmen, which the Slavs had reached already before the ninth century. On both these routes two important Norse colonies, Beloozero and Novgorod, were founded, and the native population soon grew familiar with the regular expeditions of Norse warriors and traders.

Incidentally, it should be mentioned here that modern Russian scholars have not been successful in their latest attempt to deny the Germanic origin of the Russians, nor has Professor Vernadsky succeeded in proving that the Russian State started not in the north but in the south, in the Taman Peninsula of Kerch, and that the Russians were rather a Sarmatic tribe of the Antes-As—the Ruks-As. All these theories are doing violence to known historical facts, and we must hold out for the theory that the Russians were Scandinavians, most probably from Sweden, and that the Finns shared in the coining of the name of Russia. It may derive from the Swedish *rodd*, 'rowing'. Early documents frequently mention *Rods lagen*, the part of Sweden nearest to Finland and the first with which the Finns became acquainted. The Finns transferred the name to the whole Swedish land and to the nation, which they still call *Ruotsi*. The Finnish name for Russia is Venäjä.

Though the contact established by the Norsemen between the Khazars and the Arabs was of some importance, yet it did not produce in European history so profound a change as did the discovery by the Norsemen of a route from Novgorod via the Dnieper and the Black Sea to Constantinople. The Norsemen traded with Byzantium from the first half of the ninth century. A third important Nordic colony was established east of Smolensk, where the Volga and the Dnieper run in close proximity. On the way to Constantinople there existed no full-fledged State, only loosely knit Slavonic tribes such as the Krivitchi, the Radimitchi, the Severianes and the Polianes, so that the temptation for the Norsemen to make the best of their opportunity proved too strong.

The Primary Russian Chronicle picturesquely describes the settling of the Scandinavians among the Slavs.[1] The situation matured first in the north both among the Slavs and the Finns who lived there, and Novgorod began to take shape in the first half of the ninth century.

But as trade with the Byzantine Empire and its profitableness increased, the Norsemen considered it imperative to

[1] See the English translation with introduction by S. H. Cross, *The Russian Primary Chronicle* (Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature, xii. 1930), pp. 144 ff.

establish colonies further south on the Dnieper, their main route to the Black Sea and Byzantium, and there was one place better than any, whose strategical importance and economic advantages were evident—Kiev, on the confluence of the River Desna with the Dnieper. It must have been an important commercial centre even before the arrival of the Norsemen,[1] as its value had not escaped the attention of the Khazars who owned it and from there ruled over the Slavonic tribes of the neighbourhood. But as the Khazars were not able to afford the necessary protection against the Magyars, who at that time lived in Southern Ukraine, and against other nomads, the local Slavs were only too glad to exchange Khazar rule for the overlordship of the Norsemen, whose immediate interest it was to protect their city and to keep the Dnieper route safe. This must have happened much earlier, as indicated by the Primary Chronicle, probably during the first half of the ninth century.

The tradition which attributes the occupation of Kiev to Askold and Dir rests on solid ground; but the Norsemen must have belonged to a clan other than those who settled in Novgorod,[2] and as all the clans were keen on imposing their leadership on as many Slavs as they could, the different clans must have been jealous of each other. This would explain the hostilities that later broke out between Novgorod and Kiev.

The growth of the new Kievan State can be summarised in a few words. In 860 the rulers of Kiev and of the Slavonic tribes between the Dniester and the Dnieper made in the best style of Scandinavian tradition an unsuccessful attempt to plunder the treasures of Constantinople. But pressed by the Byzantines and by the Khazars, Askold and Dir thought better of it and decided to keep on good terms with Byzantium. They officially became Christians and a bishopric of Kiev was created for the benefit of Norsemen and Slavs.[3]

The whole history of Russia would have shaped differently had Christianity at its first stage taken root in Kiev and spread thence to other lands occupied by the Slavs in east and west. Unfortunately, the first Christianisation of the Russians was of short duration. Kiev was captured by Prince Oleg of

[1] N. K. Chadwick, *The Beginnings of Russian History* (Cambridge, 1946), pp. 12 ff., rightly points out that the centres where the Norsemen settled must have been flourishing long before their arrival, the very reason why the colonists felt attracted. The land of the Polians played its part as early as the Sarmatian period of Kievan prehistory.

[2] This is also vouched for by the *Primary Chronicle* (ed. Cross, p. 147, an. 6368–6370). It is not sure, though possible, that they were of Hálogaland origin, as suggested by N. K. Chadwick, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[3] For particulars, see my books *Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome*, pp. 138, 146; *Les Légendes*, pp. 172 ff.

Novgorod (about 882), Askold was killed, and Kiev became pagan once more and had to wait for another century to become Christian again.

Oleg was the real founder of the Kievan State. He linked Kiev with Novgorod and applied his statesmanship to the fusion of the Varyag upper class and the Slavonic elements along friendly lines. His name deserves therefore a place beside the names of two other great Norse conquerors who altered the course of European history—William the Conqueror and Robert Guiscard. The commercial treaty with Byzantium concluded by Oleg in 911 and renewed by his son Igor in 944 enabled the Byzantines to penetrate into Kiev peacefully and paved the way for the policy of Igor's widow Olga, who went to Byzantium to receive baptism.[1]

At the same time as the Russians came under the cultural influence of Byzantium, we hear of their first attempt to come into closer contact with the West, when Olga sent an embassy to Otto I of Germany, the victor over the Magyars at the Lechfeld in 955, with the request to send a bishop to Kiev. This seemed so extraordinary to many Russian historians that they simply refused to admit the authenticity of the Annals which reported it. The report is however genuine. But Olga's move becomes understandable if we remember that the Scandinavian elements in Kiev were suspicious of Byzantium's political and religious influence, and that Olga tried to allay their apprehensions and intended to neutralise Byzantine interference by closer contact with the Roman Empire as renewed by the king of Germany, Otto I.

On the other hand, it had been Otto's one desire to extend his influence as far as possible over Slavonic lands, and at the time of Olga's embassy, the king was nursing ambitious plans of including the Slavonic East bodily in his new Empire. This scheme was embodied in the foundation of the metropolis of Magdeburg, which in his dreams was destined to embrace all the Slavonic nations from the Elbe to the east as far as ambition could reach. Olga's embassy was therefore a godsend, and gave him the feeling that his plans were nearer realisation than it had seemed possible to his sceptical counsellors.[2]

[1] For a detailed discussion of the sources and the bibliography on the baptism of Olga, see Laehr, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–6.

[2] The religious policy of the Ottos deserves closer attention on the part of historians. A. Brackmann tried to break new ground in his interesting studies, especially in 'Die Ostpolitik Ottos des Grossen', *Hist. Zeitschrift*, cxxxiv (1926), 254 ff., but he underestimated the Slavonic element and the Polish reaction against Otto's designs. We have outlined Otto's plans in a

But Otto's schemes and Olga's plans came to grief at the very outset. Probably before Otto's envoy, the bishop Adalbert, had reached Kiev, Olga had been forced to hand over all effective authority to her son Svyatoslav, and the new master of Kiev had no time for either Byzantine or western Christianity. There was even a serious danger under Svyatoslav's reign that the fascinating civilisation of the Khalifs might outshine that of Christian Byzantium, and that instead of Christianity in either its western or eastern form it would be Islam that would cross the Dniester, the Dnieper, the Carpathians and obtain a footing perhaps even among the Magyars. Besides, when Svyatoslav defeated the Bulgars of the Middle Volga, who had become Musulmans, he was so charmed by the Arab culture that had found entry into Bolgar, the capital of the Bulgarians, that he made up his mind to transfer his capital to the Volga.[1]

The danger was averted by Byzantium. Svyatoslav yielded to the attraction of the Danube and instead of settling on the Volga, fought the Danubian Bulgars on Byzantine invitation and in these adventures met his death.

The fate of the Kievan State was finally decided by Vladimir, Svyatoslav's illegitimate son, of whose conversion the Russian Primary Chronicle gives us a graphic account.[2] According to this Russian source, Vladimir was baptised in Cherson by a Byzantine bishop. This report was recently questioned on the ground that the hierarchy of Kiev had been established by Rome and not by Byzantium. The main argument for this surprising statement quotes the Annals of Lampert to the effect that in 973 a Russian embassy attended the last diet held in Quedlinburg by Otto I. This would indicate that Vladimir's successor Yaropolk must have reopened negotiations with the emperor. Another statement in the Russian Chronicle of Nikon is to the effect that Vladimir received an embassy from the pope in Kiev. The episode, if true, would be interesting, and the theory it supports has made an impression in some quarters.[3]

short paper ' The First Wave of the Drang nach Osten ', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, vii (1943), 129 ff. and we will deal with it fully in a work to be published in the near future.

[1] See the recent study on the Volga Bulgars by A. P. Smirnov, ' Ocherki po Istorii drevnikh Bulgar ' (*Trudy Gosud. Istor. Muzeya*, xi, Moscow, 1940), 55–136.

[2] *Ad a.* 6494–6497 (Cross, *op. cit.*, 183–207); also the complete list of sources bearing on Vladimir's conversion in H. Koch's study ' Byzanz, Ochrid und Kiev ', *Kyrios*, iii (Berlin, 1938), 290–2.

[3] The theory was developed by N. de Baumgarten, ' Vladimir et la Conversion de la Russie ', *Orientalia Christiana*, xxvii (1932). We are told there that Scandinavian priests had acquainted Vladimir with the principles of Christianity and that Olaf Tryggvason finally prevailed on Vladimir to

But when examined in detail, the theory does not hold water. The Roman embassy to Kiev at the time that Vladimir became a Christian is correct enough: only, it was not sent by the Pope, but by the Empress Theophano, the widow of Otto II, who was at that time in Rome and who had special reasons for being interested in Vladimir's baptism, since his new wife was a Byzantine princess and Theophano's cousin. His marriage with a Byzantine princess had been Vladimir's *sine qua non* for his acceptance of Christianity.

The Byzantine princess did not fancy the union, but she had to make the best of it and find consolation in the knowledge that for her sake her husband had dismissed his five wives and 800 concubines, an extravagant number even for a Viking—a figure probably improved upon by the chronicler to demonstrate the baptismal transformation of a pagan soul. Theophano knew by experience what it meant to be married to a semi-barbarian and may have felt sympathy for her cousin. Hence she sent her some relics of saints with a few words of consolation. If the pope had anything to do with the embassy, it was only to send his blessing to the Russian duchess and her husband and to endorse the message of the Empress Theophano.

Though the Byzantine origin of Russian Christianity cannot be questioned, it would be going too far to see in this religious dependence of Kievan Russia on Byzantium any limitation of its political independence. This problem still preoccupies scholars, and many postulate a kind of vassalage of Russia under Byzantium.[1] But this is an exaggeration. The relationship that existed was based on Russia's free acceptance of Byzantine political philosophy. Like the Byzantines, they looked upon the Basileus as the representative of God on earth, and therefore as the supreme head of all Christians and sole legislator in matters concerning Christianity.[2]

With regard to the traces of western canon law found in the organisation of Kievan Christianity, as for instance the introduction of tithes, a Frankish custom unknown to Byzantium, there is no need to suppose that they were due to Rome

embrace the faith. Yet, it is well known that Christianity made very slow progress in Novgorod, where Scandinavian influence was most marked. This would make Scandinavian Christian influence in Russia very doubtful. The 'western theory' was lately developed by M. Jugie in his book, *Le Schisme byzantin* (Paris, 1940), pp. 177–86. I am dealing with it in the work about to be published.

[1] See Vasiliev, 'Was Old Russia a Vassal State of Byzantium?' *Speculum*, vii (1932), 350 ff. Cf. N. K. Chadwick, *op. cit.*, 71 ff.

[2] I have dealt with this problem in my Birkbeck Lectures, Cambridge, 1946, which I hope to publish.

or to the Scandinavian clergy who converted the Russians ahead of the Byzantines. There is an alternative and better explanation of how such western practices found their way into Kievan Russia. For Russian influence spread westward when Vladimir occupied the so-called Red Cities (Czervien) together with Przemysl. It was there he came upon the Poles who at that time were emerging into history under their first known duke, Mieszko I. He became a Christian in 966 with the assistance of the Czechs. Those regions had been part of White Croatia and their spoils had been a subject of dispute between the Russians, the Czechs and the Poles. After the defeat of the Magyars by Otto I, Boleslas I of Bohemia extended his dominion over Moravia, a great portion of Slovakia, and over Silesia and Cracow, territories which the Poles were soon to claim for themselves. Thus it came about that three Slavonic empires met on the Carpathians and that Vladimir's Russia came into contact with the western Roman Empire as renovated by the Germans, Bohemia being part of that empire. The gate to the west stood wide open to Vladimir and his Russians. It is this combination of circumstances which is so often overlooked by historians who happen to be interested in this period.

It was through this gate that western literary documents in Old Slavonic translations reached the new Christian State and contributed to the growth of its Slavonic literature. It is true that the merit of passing on the Slavonic language really belongs to the Bulgarians,[1] though Bohemia also enriched it with Slavonic works. Recent discoveries have revealed what Slavonic literature meant to the life in Bohemia in the tenth and eleventh centuries. The disciples of St. Cyril and St. Methodius, the inventors of the Slavonic alphabet in Great Moravia, had found refuge in Bohemia, and some of them must have survived in what is Slovakia to-day and the region of Cracow, as these countries had not been destroyed but only subjected by the Magyars. The Legend of St. Methodius, written in Moravia before the catastrophe, thus found its way into Russian territory. The eight manuscripts that have survived are all of Russian origin, which is remarkable, since the Legend was unknown to the Serbs and the Croats ; but then, the Magyars blocked the way. In the same manner, a fragment of the Old Slavonic missal was saved by Kiev. Great literary

[1] Their share is somewhat overdone by the partisans of the so-called Bulgarian theory first elaborated by M. D. Priselkov and later developed by H. Koch, *op. cit.*, pp. 254–92. There is no serious evidence for the Bulgarian origin of the Russian hierarchy.

activity continued in the Przemyslid Empire throughout the tenth and eleventh centuries and endowed Kievan Russia with both translations and original works. Among them we find the oldest Life of St. Wenceslas, written in Slavonic soon after 929, and the Slavonic Life of his grandmother Ludmila, now lost, but which was known in Kievan Russia and embodied in the Lessons of the saint's feast by the Russian Church.[1]

Another Life of St. Wenceslas written in the tenth century in Latin by Gumpold of Mantua was translated in Bohemia, enlarged, and taken to Kiev. A Latin Life of St. Vitus, patron saint of Saxony and Bohemia, was also translated in the latter country and is found in a Russian collection dating from the twelfth century and called the *Uspenski Sbornik*. Again, the account of the martyrdom of St. Apollinaris of Ravenna, in Old Slavonic of Bohemian origin, is found in a Russian manuscript of the fourteenth century. The translation of the Latin Life of St. Benedict of Nursia can be read in a manuscript of the same century and the martyrdom of Pope St. Stephen in another of the fifteenth. Other cases in point are a short homily on the feast of SS. Peter and Paul, a short sermon for Easter on the Baptism and Ascension of Jesus Christ, and another homily on St. John the Baptist and SS. Cosmas and Damian.[2]

Some of these texts may be credited to St. Methodius' favourite disciple St. Clement who fled to Bulgaria, as for instance the sermons on SS. Peter and Paul and on St. John the Baptist, and the Easter sermon. As regards the translation of Pope Stephen's martyrdom, the editor has discovered striking similarities of style between the translator and the author of the Life of St. Methodius. Another relic of Old Slavonic literature, a sermon by St. Gregory the Great, translated from the Latin and found in a Russian manuscript of the thirteenth century, offers many similarities to the style used in the so-called Glagolitic fragments of Kiev referred to above. What is more, a similar affinity of style is found to exist between the writers of those documents and the author of the Old Slavonic Life of St. Wenceslas. This would establish the Czech origin of the two documents.

More instances could be quoted to show that in spite of the official schism of 1054 between the Western and Eastern

[1] For more details on these recent discoveries, see the study by M. Weingart in *Svatováclavský Sborník* (Prague, 1936), 863 ff.

[2] Most of the documents were published by A. I. Sobolevsky in *Izvestya Otdeleniya Russk. Yazyka I Slovesnosti Imp. Akad. Nauk*, viii (1903), x (1905), xi (1906), in the *Sbornik* of the same Institution (vol. lxxxviii), and in *Russkyi Filologicheskii Vestnik*, no. 1 (1900).

Churches, a lively intercourse in the religious field brought Kievan Russia and Western Europe together. And Bohemia was the principal liaison agent. That would explain how the cult of SS. Wenceslas and Ludmila, two Czech (but Latin) saints, came to be popular in Russia in the eleventh century. There are indications that without gaining the same popularity, the cult of St. Adalbert (Vojtěch), bishop of Prague, the great friend of Boleslas the Great of Poland, was known in Russia at the same period.

An interesting document in this connection is a prayer to the Blessed Trinity, of western origin and belonging to the eleventh century, which could have found its way into Kievan Russia, where it was popular in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, from nowhere but the Przemyslid empire. Here are the names of the western saints whose intercession is asked for in this prayer: SS. Magnus, Canute, Olaf, Alban, Botulf, Martin, Victor, the Popes Linus, Anacletus, Clement and Leo, the saintly brothers Cyril and Methodius, Wenceslas and Adalbert. The composition or the translation of this prayer probably belongs to the end of the eleventh century, since St. Canute and St. Olaf died in 1086 and 1072 respectively, and it has come to us in different versions found in Russian manuscripts dating from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century; but as A. I. Sobolevsky rightly points out, it has kept words that betray lineage from the Old Slavonic period.

This choice of saints is characteristic. St. Magnus, Abbot of Füss in Swabia, who died about the middle of the seventh century, was a disciple of SS. Columban and Gall and was held in great veneration in Germany at the time the prayer in question was composed. The legendary Life attributed to the hermit Theodore, a contemporary of Charlemagne's father Pipin, pretends that Magnus was of princely origin and belonged to the Scots royal family, but it is more likely that he was of German extraction. The Life was written in the tenth century, probably anonymously, by an author who used as his main source the Lives of SS. Columban and Gall. In the eleventh century, Othloh of St. Emmeram in Regensburg wrote another Life of the same saint.

The spread of the cult of Canute of Denmark and of the Norwegian king Olaf to Russia is not surprising, considering her many contacts with Scandinavia.[1] The spread of this cult to

[1] On the church of St. Olaf in Novgorod which was set apart for the Scandinavian and German merchants, see W. Abraham, 'Powstanie Organiz. Kosciola Latinsk. na Rusi', *Rozsprawe* of the Polish Acad., Phil. Hist. Cl., 1904, pp. 47 ff.

Germany would explain the juxtaposition of those two Christian heroes with another favourite German saint in a prayer composed at the end of the eleventh century. St. Alban, martyred in 406, was a patron saint of Mainz, and his Life was written in 1062 by Goswin, canon of the same city. Botulf was an Anglo-Saxon saint who died at the end of the seventh century as Abbot of Ikanhoe, and his cult must have been revived in the eleventh century when his relics were translated in the reign of King Edgar. St. Martin can be no other than the bishop of Tours, whose cultus is still popular throughout Central Europe. St. Victor [1] should probably be identified with the famous martyr of Solothurn in Switzerland, where he is venerated in association with St. Ursus and the soldiers of the legendary legion of Thebes, especially at St. Gallen.

Bearing in mind Bohemia's relations with Saxony, Mainz and Regensburg, we can imagine how the cult of those northern saints passed into that country. It was there, then, that the prayer was, if not written, certainly translated from Latin into Old Slavonic, since such a selection of Germanic and Slavonic saints could only have been made in eleventh-century Bohemia. There is no valid reason for assuming direct penetration into Russia from Scandinavia.

Another Old Slavonic prayer, for protection from the devil, has also a curious miscellany of western saints, some of them taken from the prayer to the Blessed Trinity, but with the addition of SS. Lucy, Cecilia and Walpurga. The Collection in which the prayer is found has other prayers which in the opinion of their editor A. I. Sobolevsky, may likewise be translations from a Latin original, especially the one attributed to St. Gregory the Great and addressed to St. Ambrose in the manner of the Latin *Confiteor*. As the manuscript belongs to the thirteenth century there should be no difficulty in dating it from the twelfth, when other prayers of western origin found their way into Russia.

The main link in this religious intercourse was the Abbey of Sazava near Prague, founded by St. Procopius, which kept its Slavonic character till 1096. Among its treasures was a relic of SS. Boris and Gleb, who were canonised by the Russian Church in 1071. But that was not the only centre. When the monks of Sazava were expelled for the first time in 1055, they took refuge in northern Hungary, evidence of the existence

[1] For the lives of these saints see *Acta Sanctorum*: St. Magnus (6 Sept.), St. Canute (10 July), St. Olaf (29 July), St. Alban (21 June), St. Botulf (17 June), St. Victor (30 Sept.).

of another Slavonic institution in that country, which must have survived the suppression of Sazava.

The Czechs were not the only go-betweens. The feast of the Translation of the relics of St. Nicholas from Myra in Asia Minor to Bari was probably not due to Bohemia. An office of the Translation was composed in Kiev in Old Slavonic soon after 1091 ; [1] and as the Byzantines looked upon the Translation as robbery, the introduction of the Latin feast into Russia has its significance. In 1066 the Byzantines settled some Russian mercenaries in Bari, and Praxedis, daughter of Vsevolod of Kiev and wife of the Emperor Henry IV, may have had something to do with the Latin feast. She was in touch with Matilda of Tuscany and Gregory VII and returned to Kiev in 1095.

Such religious contacts were possibly made via Germany and Regensburg, as attested by Scottish monks who lived in that city. We read in the Life of St. Marianus,[2] abbot of the Scottish foundation, of German traders travelling from Regensburg to Kiev, and we are told of a monk Mauricius who took advantage of these relations to go to Kiev and ask the king of the city (Vladimir Monomakh who died in 1125) for a contribution towards the completion of the abbey. The Scottish monks must have been popular in Kiev, for they built there a church and a monastery, probably towards the end of the twelfth century, to minister to the German colony and other foreign merchants who traded with Russia. Their foundation in Kiev was wrecked at the destruction of the city by the Mongols.[3]

We may in this connection mention another case of religious contact in the twelfth century. We read in the *Translation of the Relics of St. Godard* [4] that a number of pilgrims returning from Russia (*quidam peregrinantes de Ruzia*) were attacked by robbers and rescued by the intercession of St. Godard. The expedition was apparently a religious pilgrimage to the shrine of Kiev. As the *Translation* was written after 1132, the incident should be placed within the first decades of the twelfth century. At that time, the two Churches were held apart by an official schism.

To help one to grasp the position held by the Kievan State in contemporary Europe, it is well to remember that the ducal family of Kiev was matrimonially connected with every court

[1] For particulars, see B. Leib, *Rome, Kiev et Byzance* (Paris, 1924), pp. 65–74.

[2] 'Vita S. Mariani', *Acta Sanct.*, 9 Feb. ch. iv.

[3] For details, see W. Abraham, *Powstanie Organ. Kosc. Lac.*, 69 ff.

[4] *Mon. Germ. Hist., SS.*, xii. 647.

of eleventh- and twelfth-century Europe. Vladimir gave away the sons and daughters of his last liaison to western princes and princesses—Svyatopolk to a daughter of Boleslas the Great of Poland, Premislava to Ladislas the Bald of Hungary, Yaroslav to Ingegerde of Sweden, Mary to Casimir I of Poland; and it is believed that in 1025 Boleslas the Great married Vladimir's daughter Predslava. Yaroslav followed his father's policy. His son Izyaslav married a sister of Casimir I of Poland; the daughters Elizabeth, Anne and Anastasia married Harald of Norway, Henry I of France and Andrew of Hungary respectively; and his sons Igor and Svyatoslav married Cunegonde of Germany, daughter of Otto, Margrave of Meissen, and the German Oda, whose mother may have been a daughter of Henry III's brother. Yaroslav's successor Vsevolod broke with the habit and turned east by marrying a daughter of the emperor Constantine Monomakh, but his daughter Praxedis (Eupraxia) went to Germany to become first the wife of Henry von Stade, Margrave of the Nordmark, and after the Margrave's death, wife of Henry IV, whilst his son and successor, the famous Vladimir Monomakh, found his wife in distant England, when he married Gytha, daughter of Harold, the last Saxon king, and niece of Sven, the king of Denmark. Two Polish princes, Boleslas II and Mieszko, married Russian princesses: the former, Vicheslava, daughter of Yaroslav's son Vladimir, and the latter, Eudoxia, daughter of Izyaslav. Boleslas III of Poland also married a princess of the Izyaslav line, Zbislava, daughter of Svyatopolk and sister of Predslava, who married a son of Coloman of Hungary. Vladimir Monomakh's children followed the tradition, Euphemia marrying the Hungarian king Coloman, and Mstislav, Christina of Sweden. Lastly, his daughter Malmfrid married Sigurd of Denmark and her sister Ingeburge married St. Canute of Denmark.[1] Kiev's contacts with the Scandinavian countries were of course true to tradition, but those with Poland and Hungary were a significant demonstration of friendship. Suggestive, too, were Kiev's relations with Germany and the deference paid in France and Saxon England to the prestige of the court of Kiev.

The part which Russia played in the commercial history of Europe also deserves consideration. The earliest document which points to brisk commercial exchanges between Kiev

[1] Details, sources and bibliography will be found in B. Leib, *op. cit.*, 143–78. Saxo Grammaticus' account (*a.* 1067, in *SS.* xxix. 67) of the unfortunate English princess's marriage to the Russian duke is pathetic enough. Cf. also S. H. Cross, 'Medieval Russian Contacts with the West', *Speculum*, x (1935), 137–44.

and the rest of Europe is that of Raffelstetten (903–906).[1] It regulated the duties to be paid by Russian and other traders on entering the Ostmark and crossing the Danube. The city of Enns was the first of the German towns to benefit by this trade, but Regensburg became its main centre,[2] which increased in importance when pilgrims and crusaders used it on their way to the Holy Land and to Constantinople as a stage for rest and supplies. From the eleventh century till the beginning of the thirteenth Regensburg enjoyed the same trading facilities with Russia as Novgorod enjoyed later. The complaints sent from Regensburg by Conrad III to John Comnenus of Constantinople about traders being waylaid and killed in Russia,[3] and the privileges granted to the Regensburgers by the Duke Leopold of Styria,[4] are evidence of a brisk intercourse. The Regensburg merchants must have had a clearing house in Kiev, since a German trader operating there settled a considerable sum of money, which a Regensburg trader owed him, on the convent of St. Emmeram.[5]

The famous Jewish merchant and traveller Petachias,[6] who described his travels through the lands of the Tartars, Turks, and Armenians to Babylon, Bagdad and Palestine, was a native of Regensburg. He started on his journey in 1182 from Bohemia, crossed Poland to Kiev, 'city of Sarmatia', and crossed the Dnieper 'into the lands of the Tartars'. Other documents speak of the transit through Hungary of Russian trade, while many ornaments of Byzantine origin or made in Kiev such as bracelets, rings and buttons, which are found in Czech graves of the period, tell their own tale.[7] Besides their own products such as furs, horses and beeswax, the Russians thus exported cloth and silks imported from Byzantium, where Russian traders had their own quarters.

The *Anonymous Gallus* [8] mentions an alternative route of Russian trading through Poland. The northern route via the

[1] Published in *Mon. Germ. Hist., Capit. Reg. Franc.*, pp. 244 ff.

[2] Relative documents were published in V. Vasilevskii's study 'Drevnaya Toroga Kieva s Regensburgom', *Zhurnal* of the Ministry of Instruction, 1888, no. vii., 121 ff.

[3] See W. Bernhardi, *Jahrbücher der Deutschen Geschichte: Konrad* III (Leipzig, 1883), pp. 271 ff.

[4] A. V. Meiller, 'Öster. Stadtrechte u. Satzungen', *Archiv f. Kunde Öster. Geschichtquellen*, x (1853), 92–6.

[5] *Codex Traditionum S. Emmerammensium* in Pez, *Thesaurus Anecdotorum* (Augsburg, 1721–9, t. i, pars 3), p. 173.

[6] *R. Petachiae Itinerarium*, in B. Ugolinus, *Thesaurus Antiq. Sacr.* (Venice, 1767) vi. 1168 ff.

[7] J. Schránil, *Die Vorgeschichte Böhmens und Mährens* (Berlin, Leipzig, 1928), pp. 298 ff., tables 65–74.

[8] *SS.* ix. 418.

Baltic was at the beginning in Russian hands and their merchant fleet sailed to Scandinavia, where the island of Gotland was used as a place of call, to Lübeck and Denmark.[1] A charter granted in 1188 by the Emperor Frederick I to Lübeck mentions the Russians first, and in the following year German merchants and Novgorod discussed the first draft of a commercial agreement.[2] But in the thirteenth century this trade fell into German hands and became the monopoly of the Hanseatic League. It had its own clearing house in Novgorod and special treaties regulated its operations.[3] The northern route interested Flemish traders, and in the twelfth century their cloth made of English wool found a good market in Novgorod.[4] Later, when English cloth came into its own, the English had a hard fight with the Hansa throughout the fifteenth century in the defence of their trading rights with Novgorod.[5] French enamels and articles of Latin devotion were also popular in Kievan Russia, to judge at least by archaeological finds.[6]

Frequent references to Russia in the *Chansons de Geste* and the French romantic poetry of the time show that the Kievan State was very much in Europe's thought, and a detailed analysis of the Russian allusions in French literature has been made by G. Lozinskij.[7] To French writers, Russia was a reality. In Ipomedon (s. xii), Octavian (s. xiii), Cléomadès (s. xiii) and Thèbes (s. xii) Russia is located beyond Germany as Poland's neighbour, and beyond the Danube as Hungary's neighbour. Merchants from ' Great Russia ' bought Beuve de Hamtoun in Hungary as a slave and sold him in Armenia. The third French version of the poem is more explicit and specifies the maritime Varangian route to Russia and the Black Sea from England through the North Sea and the Baltic. It should, however, be observed that the Anglo-Norman romance of Sir Beues of Hamtoun displayed no more interest in Russia than did the other versions of the same romance.

In this class of literature, Russia was regarded as a very rich country and a home of valiant knights. Her main pro-

[1] Confirmation of Russian trade in the eleventh century is to be found in an English document, ' Ex Libris de S. Thoma Cantuarensi ', *SS.* xxvii. 4.

[2] *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* (Halle, 1876–86), i. 41, no. 33 ; L. K. Goetz, *Deutsch-Russische Handelsverträge* (Hamburg, 1916), pp. 15–72.

[3] For details, see L. C. Goetz, *Deutsch-Russische Handelsgeschichte des Mittelalters* (Lübeck, 1922), pp. 31–46.

[4] Cf. H. Pirenne, ' Draps d'Ypres à Novgorod au commencement du XII^e siècle ', *Revue Belge de Phil. et d'Histoire*, ix (1930), 563.

[5] L. C. Goetz, *Deutsch-Russ. Handelsgesch.*, pp. 152 ff., 160 ff., 289 ff.

[6] Cf. B. Leib, *op. cit.*, pp. 77, 96 ff.

[7] ' La Russie dans la littérature française du moyen age ', *Revue des Etudes Slaves*, ix (1929), 71–88, 253–69.

ducts, furs and horses, are often mentioned besides precious cloth, gold and silk, which were of Byzantine origin, but imported into the West by Russian traders.[1]

Western pilgrims and crusaders met Russians in Constantinople and in the Holy Land, but these were in the service of the Byzantine emperors and not always friendly to the crusaders. This would explain why French epic poets often depict Russia as a pagan country and use the name Rossia, derived from the Greek Rôs.

In English contemporary literature, information about Kievan Russia is scanty, but knowledge about that country must have been as widespread in England as in France and Germany owing to the proximity of Denmark and Scandinavia. Adam of Bremen was quite clear on the position of Russia and knew of the old Varangian route over the Baltic and Lake Ladoga to Novgorod (Ostrogard), and thence over Lovat and the Dnieper to Kiev and the Black Sea.[2] Adam's description is hazy, but his general conception was correct. Gervase of Tilbury,[3] who left his home as a boy and lived on the continent, had a good recollection of the travelling facilities from Britain to Russia by way of the Baltic. Henry of Mainz [4] showed similar competence with his map of the world (1110), which links the Baltic with the Black Sea by the River Tanais. Better still is the famous Hereford map of the world (1276/83) which connects the Baltic with the Black Sea by way of the 'fluvius Meotides et palludes'.[5] Russia is located north of the Danubian Delta.[6]

These brief indications make it clear that the old Varangian tradition of Kievan Russia was still alive in the minds of western and northern Europe as late as the thirteenth century. It was killed by the crusaders' preference for the Mediterranean route. The Hansa only traded with Northern Russia,[7] and the Mongol invasion swept Russia off the stage of European politics and commerce. Echoes of the catastrophe are heard in English chroniclers [8] and in Chaucer's Canterbury.

[1] Lozinskij, *op. cit.*, pp. 262 ff.

[2] *Gesta Hammaburg. eccl.*, ii. 19; iv. 1, 10–14 (*SS.* vii. 368, 372 ff.).

[3] *Ocia Imperialia* (*SS.* xxvii. 37).

[4] K. Miller, *Mappaemundi* (Stuttgart, 1895), iii. 21 ff.

[5] *Ibid.*, 16 ff.

[6] The Map of the Psalter of London (*Ibid.*, iii. 37 ff.), dating from the second half of the thirteenth century, also places 'Ruscite' on the left bank of the Lower Danube.

[7] The Map of Ebstorf (about 1248; *ibid.*, v. 24 ff.) reflects the new knowledge of northern Russia.

[8] For instance, in the Continuation of Gervase of Canterbury's *Gesta Regum, a.* 1240 (*SS.* xxvii. 310); *Annals of Burton, ibid.*, 474; *Matthew of Paris, Chronica Maiora,* in *ibid.*, xviii. 207 ff., 292.

Tales.[1] After that, confusion reigns in the minds of western writers whenever they refer to Russia.[2]

We may conclude from this rapid survey that Russia was never more conscious of her common interests with Western Europe than in the period between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, and this at a time when Europe stood in the greatest need of a friendly intermediary between the Latin and the Greek worlds. Kievan Russia belonged to the Greek cultural sphere and had thoroughly assimilated the cultural treasures of Byzantium. These she had every opportunity to transmit to the Latin world. Greco-Slavonic traditions were still alive in the Przemyslid empire in the eleventh century, and given the close relationship between Poland and Bohemia, a new Slavonic power was rising on Russia's western frontier that would have provided the ideal link between the Latin and Greek cultures. After the annexation of the Przemyslid empire, Poland under Boleslas the Great had sufficient strength to build a 'Sclavonia' able to stem the Saxons' brutal *Drang nach Osten* and provide a friendly meeting ground between East and West. Greco-Slavonic traditions were still alive in the region of Cracow which had treasured up so much of the Moravian Old Slavonic culture and new Greek influences were pouring into Poland from Russia; Mieszko II, Boleslas' successor, was even complimented by Matilda of Swabia for being able to praise the Lord in Slavonic, Latin and Greek.[3]

However, fate decided otherwise. Conrad II broke up this potential 'Sclavonia'. Kievan Russia, exhausted by internal divisions and subjugated by the Mongols, vanished from the scene, and the Latin and Greek worlds lost their last opportunity to reach a friendly understanding. The western

[1] Complete Works (ed. W. W. Skeat), iv. 2 (Prologue, v. 54), 461 (The Squieres Tales, v. 10).

[2] This is what the monk of Malmesbury says of Russia in his *Eulogium*, ch. 121 (ed. F. S. Haydon, p. 944): 'Rucea sive Rucena provincia est in Minori Asia; habet ab Oriente Gothiam, a Septentrione Pannoniam, ab Occidente Graeciam. Cum Boemis et Sclavis concordat in idiomate. Haec in quadam sui parte Galatia est vocata, ad quam Paulus Apostolus Epistolas dirigebat.' Cf. also ch. 67 (p. 62) on the Slavs. The monk takes this information not from the *Geographia Universalis*, an anonymous work preserved in the fourteenth-century manuscript No. 123 of the Arundel Collection in the British Museum (fo. 17r, 18r, 19)—as F. S. Haydon believes—but from the fifteenth book of Bartholomaeus Anglicus' famous work *De Proprietatibus Rerum* (ch. 131, 140, ed. G. B. Pontanus a Braitenberg, Francfurt, 1601, pp. 693, 697), written about 1250. As the study of the Arundel Manuscript has shown, this part of the anonymous Geography was simply copied from Bartholomaeus' work. It should be noticed that the English Franciscan is not as emphatic in placing Russia in Asia Minor as is the author of the *Eulogium*. Bartholomaeus places 'Ruthia' 'in Minoris Asiae confinio'. His information on the Baltic Slavs is surprisingly accurate.

[3] See her letter to Mieszko in *Mon. Poloniae Histor.*, i. 323.

crusades embittered the relations between East and West, and when in the fifteenth century Russia stepped out of the mist, she faced a Europe too proud of its superior culture to comprehend what its first ambassadors and travellers had reported from Muscovite Russia. There lie the roots of Europe's tragedy.

Additional Note

The problems concerning the relations between the State of Kiev and Western Europe have been attracting, lately, the attention of Soviet literary historians. M. P. Alekseev in his study 'Anglo-Saksonskaya Parallel k Poucheniyu Vladimira Monomakha', *Institut Russkoy Literatury, Trudy Otdela Drevne-Russkoy Literatury*, ii (Moscow, 1935), 39–80, believed he had found in an Anglo-Saxon composition which, according to him, Gytha had read in the library of Leofric, bishop of Exeter (1050–72), the source of her husband Vladimir Monomakh's admonition to his sons. Alekseev's argument is not, however, conclusive. Such works were numerous in Byzantine literature, and it is more natural to suppose that Monomakh derived his inspiration from Byzantium. M. P. Alekseev gives in his study some interesting details, but no new substantiated facts, concerning this intercourse between Kiev and the West. The same applies to the study of D. V. Ainalov, 'K Istorii Drevne-Russkoy Literatury', *ibid.*, iii (1936), 5–10.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Delivered 16 February 1946

By Professor R. W. Seton-Watson, D.Litt., Ph.D., F.B.A.

The Foundations of British Policy

I fear that my address to-day will inevitably disappoint expectations, for I have no state secrets to offer you, and in the time at my disposal I obviously cannot hope to cover so vast a field. A more modest, and therefore more correct, title would be 'Some Aspects of Foreign Policy', planned merely in outline, but capable of evoking and sustaining fuller discussion in parallel fields.

Without for one moment presuming to forestall the verdict of posterity upon the policy pursued by the victorious allies, and by Britain in particular, during the twenty years that separate the two World Wars, it is quite safe to affirm that never, even in the eighteenth century, have there been such sudden and drastic reversals of traditional maxims, or the acceptance of such far-reaching commitments, as in the period following the so-called 'settlement' of Munich. In contrast to the stop-gap measures adopted by the Chamberlain Government when Hitler's seizure of Bohemia at long last convinced them that they had been scandalously duped and had brought their country into imminent peril, there have been since 1940 welcome signs that methods of long-term planning are being applied to foreign affairs. No student of this much-canvassed but very little studied subject can fail to be struck by the opportunist methods employed by even the greatest of our statesmen.

That the average Prime Minister tends on the whole to be better informed on domestic than on foreign affairs is an almost inevitable consequence of our political system, just as ultimate responsibility in foreign affairs, and therefore the last word (including the power to override or dismiss his Foreign Secretary) must inevitably rest with the Prime Minister. This may of course have disastrous consequences when a Prime Minister who has for most of his life been absorbed in party politics, proves himself sufficiently self-confident and obstinate to conduct his own foreign policy, and to brush aside the advice of his expert advisers, in favour of men still more ignorant and less qualified than himself. We cannot expect

that all Prime Ministers should follow the wise precedent of Lord Liverpool, who, knowing his own limitations, assigned the Foreign Secretaryship to two successive men of genius, Castlereagh and Canning. Some indeed may think that we have received more than our deserts when Providence, in our greatest hour of crisis, vouchsafed to us a Prime Minister who not only possessed unique experience of almost all the great offices of state, but combined the outlook of the politician with that of the historian, and probably had a better knowledge of foreign affairs than any of his predecessors in office. In his case there was never much fear that he would be content, like some of the best of them, to shelter himself behind high-sounding platitudes, though on occasion he had the habit of coining effective watchwords of his own.

Meanwhile it must not be supposed that the haphazard fashion in which our Foreign Secretaries have been selected—according to party qualifications rather than real knowledge—is in any sense inherent in democratic or representative government, or is something that can be more easily avoided under autocratic or totalitarian regimes. It will suffice to point out that under the most autocratic rule which Germany has ever known, foreign affairs fell under the control of a house-painter and a champagne manufacturer—the one, who knew no foreign language and had never crossed the German frontiers in peace, the other, whose overweening arrogance made him incapable of judging foreign psychology: while, in Italy, the Duce, in the later stages of his rule, deputed foreign affairs to one whose sole qualification was that he was his own son-in-law.

At the risk of appearing a captious critic, it seems to me necessary, at the outset of any such general survey, to establish the fact that many of our best Prime Ministers have shown abysmal ignorance of foreign countries and the history of our relations with them, and have thereby adversely affected the fate of future generations and arrested plans of domestic reform. We may pass on, in thankfulness that this emphatically did not apply to our wartime Premier, but remembering that it did apply no less emphatically to his immediate predecessor, and that if some future electorate should prove as unwary as others in the not too distant past, it might very easily come to apply to one of his successors.

Canning on one occasion claimed that 'Britain maintains a policy of her own, suited to her position and constitution: she will be no party to a general interference in the concerns of other states, though prepared to interfere on special occasions in her opinion justifying such interference'. But our states-

men, when asked for definitions of policy, have as a rule preferred to fall back upon watchwords such as Pitt's celebrated 'Security' or the even more indefinable watchword of 'Peace'. 'When people ask me for what is called a policy', wrote Lord Palmerston to his Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, in 1856, 'the only answer is that we mean to do what may seem to be best, upon each occasion as it arises, making the Interests of Our Country one's guiding principle.' Palmerston once claimed to have demonstrated that 'Liberty is compatible with order, and individual freedom is reconcilable with obedience to the law'. His most famous escape from awkward facts to eloquent abstraction was in the debate about Don Pacifico, when he compared the citizenship of Britain with that of Rome—with the balance weighted by implication in favour of the former. A generation later it was outbid by Disraeli's winged phrase 'Imperium et libertas'. These and similar catchwords, such as 'Peace with Honour' or 'Peace in Our Time', are good so far as they go, but do not take us very far. Indeed, the irreverent are sometimes tempted to wonder whether these glittering generalities were not emitted as smoke-screens, behind which their authors could evade inquiries of an all-too-searching character.

How constantly and how profoundly have even the ablest of statesmen and diplomatists misjudged the countries with which they had to deal. The classic example is that of the younger Pitt, who, in the words of his foremost biographer, had 'no knowledge either of continental peoples or their policies', and who, having in his first period of power pursued as his ideal a close entente with France, actually told the House as late as 1792 that in his opinion there 'unquestionably never was a time in the history of this country when from the situation of Europe we might more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace'. Within a year this would-be 'Peace Minister became the organiser of war in a conflict which was to last almost uninterruptedly for twenty-three years—nine years beyond his own death. Pitt's great name gives added piquancy to the miscalculation: but hardly less amazing is the pronouncement of the man who in July 1870 had filled the post of Under Secretary for fifteen years and who, only two hours before the first news of the crisis which led so speedily to war between France and Germany, had committed himself to the statement that 'he had never known so great a lull in foreign affairs'.

It would be easy to provide other instances of a similar lack of foresight and judgment on the part of other serious

statesmen. For my present purpose it must suffice to point out that the French misjudged the British no less profoundly, notably during the American War. ' The idea of annihilating England ', writes Sorel, ' was a current idea towards the end of the *ancien régime* in France.' In the eyes of Joseph II England was ' completely fallen, and for ever '. And meanwhile Austrian, Russian and Prussian statesmen, amid all their complicated intrigues, were at one in totally misreading the Eastern Question and taking it almost for granted (as Sir Thomas Roe had done a century and a half earlier) that the Ottoman Empire was on the very point of final collapse. In the second decade of our own century it is hardly too much to say that the blow which did at last overthrow Turkish rule in Europe—that administered by the Balkan League in 1912–13—could hardly have been delivered if the statesmen and military advisers of the Great Powers, almost without exception, had not held aloof, on the ill-grounded assumption that the Balkan states would be speedily defeated, and would then have to throw themselves upon the mercy of the Powers.

If, then, even the ablest statesmen have proved unable to read the signs of the time in neighbouring countries, it may quite plausibly be argued that success is more likely to result from short-term than from long-term aims. This is the view which Sir Edward Grey seems to endorse in his war memoirs, when he commits himself to the belief that ' British Foreign Ministers have been guided by what seemed to them to be the immediate interest of this country, without making elaborate calculations as to the future '.

II

Let me turn the kaleidoscope and inspect the new pattern that results.

Foreign policy is as old as the nation itself: for it is simply the product of political relations with other nations. But ' British Foreign Policy ', in the sense in which we use the phrase, is comparatively modern, dating as it does from 1782, when the Foreign Office, as subsequent generations have known it, first came into existence. At the same time there is no part of the British Constitution which has been so inadequately explored and still remains so ill defined. Little or nothing can be gleaned on this subject from such authoritative writers as Bagehot, Anson or Dicey: and the situation is to-day more obscure than ever, owing to the truly revolutionary innovations of the last quarter of a century. Parliament's attitude to the Treaty of Versailles, the Statute of Westminster, the establish-

ment of the Dominions Office, of High Commissioners in London and of Dominion Ministers in most foreign countries, and the change which this has wrought in the functions of the Colonial Office, to say nothing of the equivocal position of 'Eire', which defies inclusion in any known category of states—all this has had its effect upon the relative positions of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and even upon their relations to the Crown. It must, moreover, be remembered that there is no period in our modern history comparable with that of 1935–41, in which there have been such sudden and drastic changes of policy, such jerks of the tiller now to starboard and now to port. How far these changes were due to superficiality of judgement or to failure to read the signs of the times, is not an inquiry proper to this occasion. It is, however, reasonable to suppose that the constitutional position may again be profoundly modified according as the Dominions and the mother country are welded into some kind of Commonwealth or super-state, linked up in its turn with the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the smaller states of Europe (unlikely as this may for the moment seem to be), or alternately as the tide turns towards international government of a hitherto untested kind.

These observations form a logical preface to any summary of our policy, however slight: for there is a fundamental distinction between the period preceding what we have now almost forgotten to call the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688, and the period of over two centuries that separated it from the modern Thirty Years War of 1914–45. At the parting of the ways stands the great figure of William III. Before him foreign policy was essentially dynastic, the personal prerogative of the Crown, but it has always been possible to draw a distinction between dynastic and national policy. The greatest of our kings knew how to reconcile the two, and were careful not to push unduly when a rift arose between them. Henry II certainly exploited the resources of England for foreign conquest in the personal interests of the Angevin House, but his domestic policy as a purely English king was in the highest degree constructive and left permanent results. More than one of his Plantagenet successors skilfully fanned the nation's pride and warlike qualities; the most crass example of failure, and even disaster, was that of King John, and this was because he followed equally false lines in foreign and domestic policy, and ultimately set all classes against him.

John's grandson Edward I, on the other hand, while pursuing a policy of expansion in south-west France, in Wales,

and in Scotland, was careful to keep English national sentiment behind him. In the case of Scotland this had truly disastrous results, since it drove a nation which under Alexander III had been almost on the point of fusion, into acute hostility. This hostility took the shape of close alliance with England's hereditary enemy—an alliance which, it may be noted in passing, was the longest in all European history save that of England and Portugal. It is curious that the long series of similar blunders committed by English kings in Ireland did not as a rule create the same international complications.

It was only natural that the Tudors, experimenting in personal government, should have pursued a dynastic policy, but two at least of them had ministers of the very first quality —Henry VIII in Wolsey, Elizabeth in Burleigh. The difference in the relations of sovereign and minister in these two cases offers a field of much interesting speculation. It is under Wolsey that the doctrine of the Balance of Power assumed its first shadowy form, perhaps inevitably in an age when Charles V seemed on the point of establishing world-power for the Habsburgs. In Burleigh's time Spain became the centre of aggressive world-power, coupled with the militant Counter-Reformation : and he and Elizabeth rallied the nation against this double peril, political and religious, developing the weapon of Sea Power in the expanding period of overseas discovery.[1]

In all these centuries England's relations with Europe were in the hands of the King : but there was never a clash equivalent to that under John between dynastic and national policy. It is not surprising to find that such clashes tend to occur only in purely autocratic states, where no buffer exists between the contending forces. The crudest examples are to be found in Russian history, first of all when the German clique round the Empress Anne, then after an interval the degenerate Peter III, and after a still longer interval his unbalanced son Tsar Paul, followed aims directly obnoxious to all articulate classes in the nation.

Without pressing the analogy too far, something not altogether dissimilar may be said to have occurred in the England and Scotland of the seventeenth century. Under James I there was an immediate decline in prestige after the spacious days of Queen Elizabeth, and this because the whole nation could feel how wavering was the hand upon the tiller.

[1] It is too often forgotten that though Edward III had a navy, and controlled the Narrow Seas for his French adventures, the fifteenth century was one of eclipse, in which sea power rested in the hands of the Germanic Hanseatic League. Only as this unique confederacy declined did English naval power assert itself.

Under Charles I the balance between the foreign and domestic policy was still further deranged, because the King only saw foreign sovereigns and states as chessmen on the board of his autocratic ambitions at home. Thus during the Civil War—which some foreign writers have aptly named the First English Revolution, in contrast to 1688—England is almost entirely isolated and forced to neglect international politics. It was probably fortunate for her that other Powers were absorbed in the still more devastating Thirty Years War.

Incidentally, the Personal Union of the Crowns in 1603 was an event of decisive importance because, though followed by eclipse, it did in fact render possible for the first time a comprehensive and expanding foreign policy. Moreover, behind the mists of sentimental theory and prejudice that surround the century of the Stuarts, we have to admit that the first two Stuarts, when transplanted from their native country, never succeeded in acclimatising themselves to English soil, while Charles II and James II came of French and Italian stock on the mother's side, and in their whole outlook and physique were essentially un-English or even alien. This is not affected by the difference of temperament between the two brothers, the elder of whom based his whole policy and conduct upon a firm resolve not to go for a second time into exile, whereas the younger, the most obtuse, obstinate and inelastic of men, made himself universally impossible in an astonishingly short space of time.

Between the two pairs of kings stands the great figure of Cromwell, who after securing his two flanks by the reduction of Scotland and Ireland, made of England for a time the virtual arbiter of Europe, wooed and flattered by many to whom his regime was altogether odious. His dream of a 'Perpetual Alliance' of the Protestant Powers—to which France was to be admitted in return for the liberty of the Huguenots, and which was combined with an onslaught upon Spanish overseas power—was of course not realised. But Cromwell understood the necessity of choosing between France and Spain, the vital importance of defending the Narrow Seas, and (a fact which was not so obvious to our ancestors as it is to us to-day) the utter folly of war with Holland. He was the forerunner of that natural process by which Britain and Holland united against the aggressive power of Louis XIV, and Sir John Seeley has very plausibly written of him as in some sense the founder of the Entente Cordiale, though the time was still far from ripe.

Under Charles II Britain's inglorious isolation was renewed.

The secret Treaty of Dover of 1670 is perhaps the most disgraceful episode of its kind in English history: for Charles II not merely sold his control of policy to his cousin Louis for hard cash, to be used in suborning Parliament at home, but he did it with extreme secrecy while ostensibly upholding the Dutch alliance. If Charles was perfidious, his brother James was also incompetent, and was still more dependent upon France, linking this up with those catholicising aims which roused all the prejudices of the nation in domestic policy. Meanwhile his nephew, William of Orange, stood out more and more as the champion of the Protestant North, and of representative government, of what is now loosely called democracy, though William would hardly answer to the name of democrat to-day.

William III restored the European balance, disturbed by Louis XIV's ambitions, and he undoubtedly used England to promote Dutch and general Continental interests. But it would not be true to say that he drew Britain into war, for in each case war was provoked by his cousin Louis. William was the presiding statesman who held all the threads of Europe together, and remained while he lived the soul of the Coalition. Under him and his sister-in-law Queen Anne, British policy was stabilised, and its national and dynastic aspects were reconciled. He made possible that union of England and Scotland which was realised under Anne, and which first made a reality of Great Britain.

It may be claimed that the First English Revolution (in the sense already quoted) was due to exclusively domestic causes and led to complete isolation, but that the Second could hardly have come about if it had not been intimately connected with general conditions in Europe. The English Revolution really begins, not in 1688, but in 1670, with the Treaty of Dover, and only becomes a finally accomplished fact with the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, when the last possibility of British dependence upon France is dispelled, and the attack upon English liberties inspired by France has finally failed. This was no doubt partly due to the fact that Louis XIV, in Seeley's phrase, defied almost all states at once, and both religions.

The essential point for our present purpose is that from William III onwards dynastic and national policy were once more in line, and that the balance is henceforward steadily weighed down in favour of the latter. Personal factors contributed to this result. It would be unfair to describe Queen Anne as a mere cipher, but she was obviously unequal to framing and conducting foreign policy at the height of a

European struggle. Her two successors were foreigners, and it is a commonplace that two factors—their dependence on Parliament, to whose decision alone they owed the Crown, and the handicap of never mastering the English language and thus being unable to preside over Cabinet discussions—combined to reinforce the long Whig predominance of the first half of the eighteenth century, alike in domestic and foreign affairs. By the time George III came to the throne, the machine was already running in grooves out of which it could not easily be forced. Early in his reign he dropped the elder Pitt at the very height of his unique triumph, and replaced him by the incompetent Lord Bute, whose disastrous record in foreign policy can only be equalled by those of Lord North and Mr. Neville Chamberlain. But though King George's meddling in politics was constant, and on the negative side had far-reaching consequences (notably the loss of America, the Irish Union and the veto upon Catholic Emancipation), he never succeeded in his ambition of creating a party of ' King's Friends '. What rendered this finally impossible were his own periodical bouts of madness, and the peculiar character of his six sons, the Royal Dukes.

In the eighteenth century, however, British ministers undoubtedly suffered from a certain insecurity of tenure, which continued under the changed circumstances of the nineteenth century for party political reasons. Though it is impossible to examine these circumstances here, it is necessary to allude briefly to the two crowning examples of instability, because they passed into a legend on the Continent, and continued to influence foreign opinion to our detriment right on into the days of Bismarck and Grey, of Geneva and of Munich. I mean the two *volte-faces* of 1711 and 1761, to which more than anything else is probably due the damaging label of ' Perfidious Albion '. The War of Spanish Succession (1701–1713) was fought by the Grand Alliance of Britain, Holland and the Empire, in order to prevent a French hegemony in Europe—in other words, to prevent a union of the French and Spanish Crowns on the head of a Bourbon prince, and at the same time, it is too often forgotten, to limit French power in the Mediterranean and to promote the colonial overseas interests of the Maritime Powers. Indeed, all through the century we see the British outstripping exhausted Holland, laying the foundations of British World Power and extending them point by point at the expense of France and Spain, till brought up short by the quarrel with the American colonies and their eventual secession. Unhappily the victories of the

great Marlborough were intertwined with the party brawls of Whigs and Tories, and as Professor Trevelyan has put it, their behaviour in 1709–10 ' made it difficult for their successors to obtain peace for Europe without bad faith '.

Apologists for the final settlement of 1713 are of course quite right in saying that the death of Joseph I and the succession to the Imperial throne of his brother Charles VI revolutionised the whole situation. A war begun in order to prevent the union of France and Spain under a single Bourbon could not reasonably be continued in order to promote the union of Spain and the Empire under a single Habsburg. Moreover, it is also clear that the war in Spain had turned decisively against Charles and his British ally, and that, with the important exception of Catalonia, the Spanish people preferred Philip V to Charles III and VI. Having inherited the Austrian dominions, Charles could not expect to obtain Spain and her colonies as well, and he therefore had little to complain of when left with such solid acquisitions as Milan, Naples and the Spanish Netherlands (the Belgium of to-day). This must not, however, be allowed to obscure the vital fact that long before Joseph's premature and quite unexpected death at the age of 31, secret negotiations were on foot for a separate peace with France, and that St. John (the future Bolingbroke) was pursuing the perfidious aim of reaching an agreement such as could be dictated at a future conference to the other Powers. Moreover, an essential feature of the whole intrigue was a commercial bargain highly favourable to Britain, and indeed consisting of a monopoly of what we had originally promised to share with the Dutch. Worse still, he not merely overthrew the great commander, but withdrew the British army from the fighting line, betrayed the military secrets of Prince Eugène to the French, and instructed the Duke of Ormonde, Marlborough's successor, not to fight himself, but to conceal from the Dutch and Eugène the fact that he had received such orders. It is true that the modified Barrier Treaty which the Dutch eventually secured was by no means unfair to them, and that Charles VI obtained a series of very valuable territorial concessions. But in both cases a legacy of profound distrust remained, and was not diminished by the further fact that Britain left her Catalan and Huguenot friends to their fate. The Imperial Ambassador in London expressed the rage and indignation of Vienna so trenchantly that he was forbidden the entrée at court and had to be recalled. Prince Eugène, when he visited England, had a great personal reception, but was as helpless to secure any change of policy as was his dis-

graced comrade-in-arms, Marlborough. To sum up: it may be admitted that the Treaty of Utrecht proved more lasting and workable than many other peace treaties. But Britain earned a reputation for inconstancy of policy which did her no good even in a century which it was once customary to regard as unsurpassed in diplomatic cynicism.

The eighteenth century is the classic example of the interconnection of continental and overseas interests in our policy. The pacific tactics of Stanhope and Walpole under George I and II made it all the easier for Britain to pursue her ambitions in the New World, while France was plunging into the quicksands of the War of Austrian Succession. Britain's skilful intervention in the European conflict that centred round the duel between Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great, served as a diversion from the colonial field and strengthened her naval power. The Seven Years War in Europe enabled Britain to establish her predominance in India and America, and left her stronger than ever in the Mediterranean. The famous phrase of the elder Pitt at the height of his career cannot be too often recalled: 'Hanover ought to be as dear to us as Hampshire' because we should 'conquer America in Germany'. In actual fact the war was essentially a naval and colonial war for Britain, and brought with it the splendid fruits of Canada and India. On the Continent our only ally, Frederick the Great, owed the very survival of Prussia as a state to British subsidies. This is not the place to recall his perfidy and prowess, or what patriotic German historians have christened 'The Miracle of the House of Brandenburg': but without for a moment questioning his great military talents, we may ascribe a large portion of his success to really bad Austrian generalship.

Frederick counted, with every reason, upon Pitt as a loyal ally. In May 1759 he wrote of Pitt as 'a truly Roman Character', 'a man of honour in whose hands my interests are safe'. But within a year George II died, and his grandson flung Pitt out of office and employed the wretched Bute in the task of making peace. As in 1711, our main aims had been achieved, and the final peace represented a reasonable general settlement. If, however, Frederick survived, he owed it not to the merit of his allies, but to the changed attitude of his enemies. In January 1762 the Empress Elizabeth died and was succeeded by Peter of Holstein, a scatter-brained degenerate who, having grown up as a blind admirer of Frederick, promptly withdrew Russian troops from Prussian territory (at the supreme crisis they had even occupied Berlin), and thus broke up the European Coalition. This was intensely unpopu-

lar at the Russian Court, and led to Peter's assassination. But when his widow Catherine II felt herself secure upon the throne, she ignored the manifesto of the conspirators, who denounced Prussia as Russia's arch-enemy. She maintained friendly relations with Prussia and thus prepared the way, a decade later, for a joint policy of Polish partition, and for that community of action between Russia and Germany for which there was always a strong party in both countries right through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It might indeed be argued that the tendency continued to subsist and was only really destroyed by Stalin's army purge and Hitler's insensate attack upon the Soviet State in 1941.

Needless to say, Frederick was the last man on God's earth who had the right to complain of a little sharp practice on the part of an ally. But nothing can alter the fact that the crude diplomatic *volte-face* executed by George III and Bute confirmed continental statesmen in the belief that Britain could not be trusted and would pierce the hand that leant on it too hard. Frederick to the end of his life piled up against us such adjectives as indecent, infamous, insidious, tricky, treacherous, and the British envoy to Berlin, Sir Andrew Mitchell, wrote home that ' the late frequent changes in England have created a degree of diffidence in foreign Powers which renders all negotiations with them difficult and disagreeable '.

It is easy to see, in the perspective of a hundred and fifty years, how fundamentally continental statesmen misjudged Britain in the two decades that followed the Seven Years War, when the personal policy of George III, of which Bute was the first instrument, reached final bankruptcy with Lord North's fiasco in the American War. In 1783, no less a statesman than Vergennes expressed the view that ' the almost daily changes of ministry prevented it (England) from having any fixed principles on the affairs of the Continent ', while Prince Kaunitz, Metternich's great forerunner, remarked that ' with so singular a Government one really cannot count on anything '. (It was he who said on another occasion ' It is astonishing how much the English *do not know* of Europe ' .) In the same year, 1783, perhaps under the influence of Frederick, Joseph II told his brother Leopold that England, after holding France in the balance, had ' tombée entièrement et pour toujours ', and had fallen to the rank of Sweden or Denmark. And these three men, Vergennes, Kaunitz and Joseph, were three of the greatest statesmen of their century.

Such miscalculations ran parallel with the widespread assumption that Turkey, and again that France, was on the

point of demise. It may perhaps be argued that what we should to-day describe as the most amazing of *gaffes* were more excusable at an epoch when the study of foreign affairs was the preserve of a wealthy oligarchy and a few royal favourites. But it may be doubted whether, with all our added means of study and communication, the miscalculations of the Era of Appeasement were any the less profound than those which make us critical of the Age of Enlightenment.

Speaking broadly of the period from Anne's death to the loss of the American colonies, we see that the last abortive attempt to set up personal government in Britain signally failed, and that its renewal was averted on the one hand by the mediocrity of the King's character and his successive bouts of madness, and on the other by the emergence of a minister perhaps even greater than the great Chatham, in the person of the latter's own son the younger Pitt. But of course there were other no less decisive causes, and above all the growth of the machine of constitutional government. It is probably no mere accident that the Foreign Office in its modern form first came into existence in 1782—in other words, just a year before Pitt's accession to power, and on the eve of a new epoch of history, as little foreseen by him as by most of his contemporaries. A century and a half later Mr. Lloyd George, in his War Memoirs, committed himself to the view that ' there is no office upon which it is more necessary that the Prime Minister of the day should keep a constant oversight, than the Foreign Office '. [1] The strange thing about it is that no office is surrounded by such an atmosphere of obscurity and uncertainty. If asked for an exact definition of its functions and powers, most politicians take refuge in generalisations, and those who seek weapons from the armoury of the great constitutional writers, such as Dicey, Anson, Bagehot or Lowell, come away with almost empty hands. Even Professor Jennings, the most satisfactory of our contemporary writers on this subject, is still very fragmentary.

The fact no doubt is that the conduct of foreign policy has been in evolution for a hundred and fifty years, and has been affected by the growing supremacy of the House of Commons, and that the extent to which it has been controlled by the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister has constantly varied owing to the forcefulness of this or that personality. In Dicey's view, foreign policy after the Revolution remained as one of the restricted prerogatives of the Crown, and the powers of which that policy consisted tended to pass more and more into the

[1] *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, i. 265.

hands of the Prime Minister. Already in 1825 George Canning put a veto upon George IV seeing foreign diplomats upon his own initiative: and the severance of the Crown of Hanover from that of England in 1837 deprived the sovereign of what had in effect been an independent diplomatic service of his own. Private letters addressed by Queen Victoria to foreign sovereigns were shown to the Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary first: and nothing quite like the 'Willy-Nicky' letters was possible in England, though it is of course to be borne in mind that many of the latter were not really private letters at all, but the joint concoctions of William II and his Chancellor Prince Bülow. In the middle of the nineteenth century Bagehot wrote the familiar phrase: 'The Queen could by prerogative upset all action of civil government within the Government, could disgrace the nation by a bad war or peace and could, by disbanding our forces, whether land or sea, leave us defenceless against foreign nations.' But that was a picturesquely expressed theory, and any attempt to put it into practice would have been little short of suicidal.

Gradually the conduct of foreign affairs worked out as a monopoly of the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister and the Crown. The practice of a daily letter by the Prime Minister to the Sovereign was very strongly insisted upon by Queen Victoria, and was a serious burden upon more than one holder of the office. From the historical point of view it was of extreme importance because, owing to the strict veto upon any minister taking notes during a Cabinet meeting, there was normally no record of Cabinet decisions except this daily letter. Since the institution of the Cabinet Secretariat with its agenda and minutes, necessitated by the exigencies of the last war, the daily letter naturally became less important.

For over a century past decisions of capital importance could hardly be taken by the Foreign Secretary without reference to his chief: he would at least be risking his dismissal, and this is what happened to Palmerston on the famous occasion of the French *coup d'état* of 1851. Matters of war or peace naturally tended to be submitted to the Cabinet, and individual members were overridden. A classic example in our own times was the decision of 3 August 1914, and the resignation of Morley and John Burns. Speaking broadly, in the period preceding the Great War there was no direct popular control, and no necessity for submission to Parliament, though periodically public opinion asserted itself, for good or for bad. Lord Salisbury, one of the few statesmen who combined the offices of Premier and Foreign Secretary, and who therefore

occupied an exceptionally strong position, ceded Heligoland to Germany without previous sanction. But it was always possible for the House of Commons to insist upon debating foreign policy as a whole, or some special aspect of it, and to throw out the Government if it failed to make a case for itself. It is probably not untrue to say that in the period between the two Wars there have been more far-reaching changes in the control and status of foreign policy, than in the whole period since the Foreign Office came into existence. On the one hand Parliament's undoubted powers of decision are asserted far more frequently than ever before, while on the other hand the subtle change in the type of official employed both in the diplomatic service generally and in the Foreign Office in particular, has become more marked in recent years.[1] The change is due above all to the Statute of Westminster ; and our new relations with the Dominions, with India, and with the administered Colonies, have altered the very atmosphere which we breathe.

During the late war, it should be added, Parliament was supreme as never before in wartime, being constantly consulted and giving expression to its views : and this was above all the case because Mr. Churchill prided himself, very properly, upon being ' a House of Commons man ', and never missed a chance of referring to it as the ultimate source of power.

III

It is scarcely open to challenge, that most of our statesmen from Pitt onwards have set themselves to prevent any power from establishing its hegemony on the Continent, and it is often assumed that this can best be achieved through the medium of a Balance of Power. But this is an over-simplification, for while it is quite true that Britain has on occasion thrown her whole weight into the scales between two rival states, she also on occasion has not hesitated to destroy all attempt at balance, by joining hands with another equally strong power, when once she had convinced herself that it was peaceably minded and not bent upon either conquest or preponderance. Many examples could be given, and worked out in detail : perhaps the most fruitful would be the attitude of Lord Salisbury towards Bismarck, who though full of tricks and intrigue, genuinely had no territorial designs against Russia or Austria and favoured the Mediterranean *status quo*.

[1] The reader will find in the final chapter of vol. iii of the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* a unique and enlightening account of Foreign Office evolution by Mr. Algernon Cecil.

If we attempt to discern certain constants of British policy, we may safely put at the head of the list the firm resolve to prevent the hegemony of any one state, but a somewhat opportunist attitude as to the means to be employed for its prevention. Moreover Britain employed the respite thus obtained, in withdrawing into one form or another of splendid isolation. Foremost among the instruments employed was sea power, constantly studied and adapted to ever-changing situations, as an obstacle to invasion and as a screen behind which colonial aims may be safely pursued. It would be interesting to hear a reasoned statement from one of our naval authorities on the extent to which naval strategy has been modified by new weapons and improved communications, and by the new fifth dimension of the air.

If we try to give flesh to abstract considerations, we can easily trace through over two centuries of our history those twin British interests of the guardianship of the Narrow Seas, and river-mouths, and the independence of the Low Countries. Scarcely less constant at every phase of our history has been our interest in the Mediterranean sea routes, in such key-points as Gibraltar, Minorca, Malta, Corfu, Crete, Cyprus, Rhodes, the Straits and the Canal, in a word, the way to Arabia, the Persian Gulf and India. During the past century Britain has no less than eleven times been either on the brink of, or actually involved in, a major war arising from problems of the Near and Middle East : and the last war has demonstrated more clearly than ever our vital concern with most Mediterranean problems, though it is sometimes easier to see the necessity than to give the reasons.

As the Ottoman Empire reached its final stages of decay, a vacuum was created in its European provinces, into which the fluid of half a dozen national revivals was poured : and inextricably mixed up with this were the rivalries and mutual suspicions and political manœuvres of the Great Powers. Yet it is not altogether easy to diagnose all the motives that underlay British policy in the Near East : for it cannot escape any serious student that successive British Governments, in their attitude to national states and nationalistic movements, followed diametrically opposite lines to the west and to the east of a line drawn down the Adriatic to the point of Greece—giving all their support to the Porte against its Christian subjects (especially of course its Slav subjects), and completely failing to understand how deep and how inevitable Slavophil feeling in Russia was. Nothing can rob us of our share in the rebirth of Italy and Greece : but it was Nicholas I, Napoleon III

and Alexander II—three of the foremost despots of the nineteenth century, who turned the scale in favour of Roumanian unity and Serbian and Bulgarian liberty. Without venturing upon the hot bricks of current policy, I note with anxiety certain signs that history is repeating itself, and that we are pursuing quite different policies in Greece and in the southern Slav countries, while Russia continues to reap the fruits of her consistent and not unenlightened backing of her lesser kinsmen in need.

Using, then, a word which would have at first puzzled our grandfathers, but which is merely a modern nickname for a very old vintage, we may ask whether it is possible to detect a durable ' ideological ' line in British policy. I would suggest, (1) that our support has generally been forthcoming to small nations in distress (excepting those left to the tender mercies of the Turks) ; (2) that we often encouraged constitutional and liberal movements, while quite ready to ally ourselves with the Sultan or with Napoleon III, or in later times with Nicholas II and finally with Stalin ; (3) that from Waterloo on into our own century the main currents of policy have run strongly against anything so concrete as an alliance.

You will remember that when Napoleon attacked Spain in 1808, Canning, then Foreign Secretary for the first time, at once told the House of Commons that ' we shall proceed upon the principle that any nation of Europe that starts up with a determination to oppose . . . the common enemy of all nations, whatever may be the existing political relations of that nation with Great Britain, becomes instantly our essential ally '. In passing I may ask you to compare with this Mr. Churchill's words of 22 June 1941 : ' Any man or state who fights against Nazism will have our aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe. . . . It follows therefore that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people.' In the same year he paid to the Jugoslav Partisans under Tito the same glowing tribute with which Canning had welcomed the Spanish insurgents.

Certain it is, however, that Castlereagh and Canning were at one in the famous State Paper of May 1820, in declaring Britain to be ' the last Government in Europe which can venture to commit herself on any question of an abstract character '. They were sceptical as to the possibility of fitting Britain into a ' System ', and Castlereagh at his death was drawing definitely away from the idea of ' government by Congress '. Canning feared above all that ' the next war ' in Europe would be ' a war not so much of armies as of opinions ' : with all his respect

for public opinion and his definite efforts to get a wideawake nation interested and solidly behind him, he never went so far as Palmerston afterwards did, as to declare 'constitutional states' to be 'the natural allies of this country'. Canning detested despotisms and democracies almost equally and was prepared to hold the balance between them, or as he once said, 'a middle course between Jacobinism and altruism'. He wished to live on terms of amity with arbitrary governments and to refrain from interference in the private affairs of other states.

Palmerston, on the other hand, was not always consistent. He encouraged liberalism in Italy and gave good but utterly unacceptable advice to Austria, whom he wished to preserve as a Great Power, even at the expense of Hungary. He told Guizot in 1841 that H.M.G. 'does not happen to recollect any country in which a constitutional Government has been established, that has not upon the whole been better off in consequence': and again, that H.M.G. 'is not pedantically attached to any particular form of political constitution'. In 1848 his most famous utterance was still more opportunist: 'We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.' And he went on to endorse Canning's declamatory phrase, that the interests of England should be 'the shibboleth of every British Minister'. This passage in the speech followed directly upon another, which acclaimed the 'championship of justice and right' as the foundation of policy, and no one in the House appears to have noticed any conflict between the two conceptions.

It would not be difficult to bring forward at this point a considerable array of documentary evidence: and we might then dwell for the short time still at my disposal upon such rehearsals of British policy as the Castlereagh-Canning State Paper of 1820, the Granville memorandum to Queen Victoria in 1852, Gladstone's Midlothian speeches of 1880, or Sir Eyre Crowe's memorable Report of 1907—the first and last of which only saw the light between the two wars. But this method would not merely destroy any such proportions as this paper can lay claim to, but when pursued farther, it would reveal the fragmentary nature of the evidence and probably reinforce the opinion of Sir Edward Grey which I quoted earlier.

I want, then, in the concluding section to summarise under four heads the different kinds of diplomatic dealings which have lain open to us:

1. The first presumably consists of subsidies in men, material and credits, which were especially employed in the wars

of the eighteenth century and against Napoleon, but of which the American Lease-Lend and our Arctic convoys were only the latest phase.

2. Second come commitments undertaken for a specific purpose in a limited field, especially for the removal of international disputes or grievances. Even such vital acts as the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian Conventions of 1904 and 1907 would fall under this heading, partly no doubt because public opinion in those days still viewed such acts with invincible prejudice, whereas they are to-day accepted as more or less inevitable.

3. Third come regular treaties of alliance, a form of relationship necessitated by the circumstances of coalition warfare against Napoleon, but soon shaken off when the post-war Holy Alliance assumed a rigid and permanent form and aspired to be a sort of super-government. For the greater part of a century it was possible for us to avoid any commitments of that type, thanks largely to the protective armour of overwhelming Sea Power. After the alliance which the World War imposed, we again reverted to our old prejudices against entanglements, and while paying lip-service to the League of Nations, declined to undertake any responsibility in Eastern Europe.

4. The fourth, which needs to be carefully examined in its character of blowhole, consists of guarantees to specific states, these guarantees being somewhat in the nature of a warning displayed well in advance, to keep off certain ground.

During the nineteenth century the practice of guarantees often served as a *pis aller*, rendering a treaty unnecessary. Canning in 1823 laid down that ' objectionable as a territorial guarantee is shown to be, the objections to the guarantee of internal institutions are infinitely stronger '. Palmerston was the first to apply the theory of guarantees to concrete cases in Belgium and in Greece. It would be superfluous for me to trace the history of the Belgian guarantee, which justified itself during the Luxemburg crisis of 1867 and in the war of 1870, but failed when the huge weight of the Schlieffen strategic plan bore down the resistance of Belgium and her allies. The Greek settlement, on the other hand, was less a guarantee than a treaty between three Great Powers, pledging themselves to uphold Greek integrity and independence : it survived a series of Balkan crises and in 1916 provided a certain legality to the intervention by which the Allies forestalled Germany's designs of occupation. That it proved ineffective against Italy's invasion in 1940 was due to purely strategic rather than

political causes: but in view of events in the winter of 1944 one is tempted to wonder why two of the Guarantor-Powers, having put the third into Coventry, showed such surprise at the resulting policy of pinpricks.

It is interesting to note Palmerston's definition of the distinction between a treaty and a guarantee. 'The fact', he laid down in 1848, 'of having been one of the signatory Powers of such a treaty gives the right to intervene, but does not impose upon it the obligation to do so in the case in which the state of possession has been changed.' Not the least curious of all our guarantees was that of the tiny state of Luxemburg, dating from 1839, but interpreted by Derby and Stanley in 1867 in a highly disingenuous way, as 'a collective guarantee of all the Powers', which 'does not impose on this country any special and separate duty of enforcing its provisions'. Stanley declined to commit Britain in advance, and his general attitude may be said to have deprived the guarantee of most of its value. Russia's violation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris does not come into the category of guarantee.

Most singular of all the guarantees ever given by Britain was the Cyprus Convention of 1878, by which the island became a British protectorate, though still tributary to the Porte, and Britain in return stood committed to defend Turkey's north-east frontier. This meant accepting the liability of a land war with Russia, without even the remotest prospect of ever being able to send adequate armies to the help of Turkey. Salisbury was in earnest in wishing to build up a new administration in Asia Minor, but this, the one good point in the whole project, was obstructed by the Turkish authorities and the Sultan himself. The guarantee remained valid to the end, but providentially it was never put to the test.

It remained for the Chamberlain Government in 1939 to undertake guarantees such as went far beyond anything previously known—to Roumania, Poland and Greece, in that order—and indeed seemed to many serious students of the map of Europe, hardly capable of fulfilment. We have now reached the point at which this address started. Side by side with 1711 and 1761–3, 1938–9 represents a jerking of the tiller as violent as any in our history. Needless to say, it is not my intention to discuss the Munich-Prague-Danzig tragedy of those years. It may be that we have not yet acquired sufficient perspective to pass a final judgement, but certainly far more of the inside facts have already come to light than is usual after a great upheaval. But it is not a mere academic question: it carries within it the still unanswered question, what caused

such sudden reversals of policy as the dismissal of Mr. Eden on the very day of the Austrian Anschluss ; the collapse of ' Peace in our Time ' only five months after Munich, and within a few days of a speech on the impending ' Golden Age ' by a leading member of the Cabinet ; the no less sudden abandonment of *désinteressement* in the East of Europe ; the proclamation of guarantees whose worthlessness was equally obvious to their recipients and to Hitler : the negotiations with Soviet Russia so soon after a so-called ' settlement ', of which the main purpose had been the exclusion of Russia from the councils of Europe.

All these notes of interrogation were, and indeed still are, very much in the minds of continental statesmen, just as the fear of a reversion to isolation on the part of the United States has at intervals during the long struggle preoccupied public opinion in Britain. Beyond this point our survey of policy must not go, for in that case it would inevitably trespass into the field of contemporary politics. But I hope that I have marked out the foundations upon which, on later occasions, it may be possible to construct similar enquiries into the policy of other Powers than Britain.

THE YORKSHIRE ASSOCIATION AND THE CRISIS OF 1779–80

By Professor H. Butterfield, M.A.

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Even before the beginning of the movement which it is our purpose to examine, the position of the government of Lord North had come to be critical. Perhaps never in English history has a ministry known comparable distress and at the same time been compelled to go on existing through it. The difficulties came to a head in a catastrophic manner in October and November 1779, after the government had shown its helplessness in the face of a possible invasion of these islands, and news had come of the development of a semi-revolutionary situation in Ireland. And as Parliament was to reassemble on 25 November the internal condition of the ministry deteriorated—some members resigning, the rest in a state of anarchy, Lord North himself almost a pathological case, often paralysed by his doubts and incapacitated by his moods of depression—and, precisely because of these difficulties, there was the prospect of a union of opposition factions who might well believe that one last desperate endeavour would complete the overthrow of the ministry. On the top of everything, there was the fact that the next general election was beginning to seem imminent, and at this stage in the life of a Parliament the members in an extraordinary manner would begin to be sensitive to opinion in their constituencies. When Parliament re-assembled the political conflict was made more dramatic in that the issue was more clearly set out by the opposition as a matter of the People *versus* the King. On repeated occasions the dangerous influence of the crown—and especially the closet activity—was made the principal object of opposition attack. Henceforward this is a central theme in parliamentary debate.

A little time before the meeting of Parliament, many of the freeholders of Middlesex, faced with a by-election, desired to choose as their new representative George Byng, but were confronted by the difficulty that he was already a member of the House of Commons. Byng applied for the Chiltern Hundreds, but another member of Parliament, called Tuffnell, had been induced to contest the same seat on behalf of the govern-

ment ; and he received the promise of the Chiltern Hundreds first, with the result that Byng was told that he could not have the place. The freeholders—as though they had not the rest of the country to choose from—accused the government of an attempt once again to foist its own candidate upon the county of Middlesex. Some of them were even in favour of electing Byng in spite of the disqualification. It is clear in any case, as we shall see, that they were straining for another conflict with the government. It happened that Tuffnell finally decided not to contest the seat after all, and he did not go through with his intention of taking the Chiltern Hundreds. At the same time the county of Middlesex had had no choice but to adopt a third candidate, Thomas Wood, whose election was unopposed. The enemies of the government claimed his return as a great victory for liberty and independence. They had a grievance, however, and they decided to generalise it as they had done in 1769. They determined to ' go to the country ', so to speak—to alarm freeholders everywhere—on the issue of the freedom of elections.[1]

The recognised mode of procedure was by the presentation of petitions to the king or to Parliament, and in 1769 many of these, to the same effect, had been sent up from boroughs or from county meetings, in an endeavour to produce by synchronised action the impression of something like a general movement of the country. The enemies of the government, however, were greatly exercised at that period by the ineffectiveness of petitions, and after the failure of the great effort of 1769 some regions had gone one step further, sending up this time not merely prayers but ' remonstrances '. Now, after the experience of ten years before, the leaders of the people were determined not to be satisfied with an *ad hoc* meeting of freeholders, a futile petition, and then a complete dispersal. At a Middlesex meeting on 13 November 1779, on the subject of the new election grievance, there are signs not merely of discontent but of something like exasperation, many

[1] The *Cambridge Chronicle*, 23 Oct. 1779, prints a letter from Lord North to the Middlesex election committee which was read at the meeting on 18 October, and in which North says that Tuffnell is not prepared to take the hostile verdict of a meeting in Hackney as the sense of the freeholders of the whole county. North adds : ' While he persists in his canvas, I do not think it would be right for me to take any step contrary to the declaration I made to Mr. Byng in my letter of the 4th of this month.' In the *Cambridge Chronicle*, 18 Dec. 1779, there is a report of the House of Commons debate of 10 December which gives two points omitted in *Parliamentary History*, xx. 1267–70. North declared that he promised Byng the Chiltern Hundreds if Tuffnell withdrew his demand. Tuffnell declared that he was confident of his power to carry the election in Middlesex, but withdrew because there was a danger of riots if he went forward with his candidature.

people regarding the policy of petitioning the House of Commons as ' too temperate ' a measure. At the same time a petition was drawn up, stating that ' we have been deprived of the exercise of a most valuable franchise ', and demanding ' that some permanent law may be provided for the effectual security of those rights '.[1] It was decided to invite other counties to combine with that of Middlesex in a new campaign on behalf of the rights of freeholders. At another meeting on 22 November at Freemasons' Tavern it was resolved that ' for the purpose of preserving the independence of this county a general meeting of the freeholders be held monthly during the sitting of Parliament '.[2] When the petition was actually presented to the House of Commons there was talk of the ' freeholders coming to the house with other instruments than parchment '.

It would be true to say, however, that this pretended electoral grievance was merely an ostensible issue, one which covered and disguised a much deeper and wider exasperation. In fact, as we shall see, men were interested not so much in the avowed object of the petition as in the possibilities of ulterior action. The essential starting-point for the whole movement which we are studying was a petition which it was necessary that the House of Commons should reject at the instance of the ministry. Within a short time it was being suggested that the freeholders might have found a better cause to carry to the country than this doubtful election issue ; and the petition itself opened the way to a further and broader discussion ; for appended to it was the demand that there be held an ' immediate and thorough enquiry . . . into the true cause of those misfortunes which have reduced this once powerful and flourishing empire to a state which words cannot describe '. In conformity with this demand John Wilkes declared that on 3 February 1780 he would move for an enquiry into this subject in the House of Commons.[3] At this period, indeed, as Horace Walpole noted, Wilkes was beginning to make a noise again, attempting to revive his reputation as the

[1] See the account of this meeting in e.g., the *Norwich Mercury*, 20 Nov. 1779. Wilkes evidently made his reappearance at this meeting, explaining that previously ' it did not become him to interfere even by advice in their choice '. Mr. Maskall opposed even petitioning, and said ' we had an accursed House of Commons. Shall we ask of those whose authority we cannot acknowledge ? He wished an appeal to the country at large '. The petition is printed in *Parliamentary History*, xx. 1267–9.

[2] *London Courant*, 4 Dec. 1779.

[3] *Ibid.*, 11 Dec. 1779. Report of proceedings in the House of Commons on 10 December 1779 (the day on which the Middlesex petition was discussed). Not reported in *Parliamentary History*, xx. 1267–70.

man of the people. It was precisely in these weeks that, after a number of vain attempts, he finally secured his election to the lucrative office of Chamberlain in London.

But though the main skeleton of the original Middlesex design was retained in the movement of 1779–80, a change of plan in one respect soon became advisable, if not actually essential; and one of the reasons began to be clear on 10 December when the petition of the freeholders was presented to the House of Commons. It transpired that the subject of the petition, the very topic which was to provide the ostensible issue, namely the question of the electoral grievance, had been badly chosen after all. It soon became apparent that in any case North was too clever a parliamentary tactician; indeed he showed a surprising readiness to give satisfaction at this moment to the complaining electors of Middlesex. On the present occasion he explained that the right of granting the Chiltern Hundreds had always been an embarrassment to him as Chancellor of the Exchequer. He had promised the Chiltern Hundreds in the first place to Tuffnell because Tuffnell had been the first to make the application for the office. For the rest he would be glad if Parliament only would provide some fair expedient and relieve him from what had been a disagreeable prerogative. When the new member for Middlesex proposed 'that leave be given to bring in a Bill to enable members of the House of Commons to be eligible to serve in Parliament for any other county, city, borough, town or place', the motion was passed unanimously. The men of Middlesex were thwarted at the start because they could not proceed to the programme of ulterior action which it was precisely their intention to devise. It was necessary to their purpose that their petition should be rejected, and that the House of Commons should allow itself to be trapped into betraying its corrupt and unrepresentative character.

The newspapers were already announcing that other counties were preparing to follow the example of Middlesex and to arrange petitions on the subject of the electoral grievances. The further gathering of the freeholders of Middlesex was due to be held a month after the previous one, on 20 December, and was summoned by advertisement 'for the purpose of establishing meetings to maintain and support the freedom of elections'. When the freeholders assembled on the 20th, however, a total change of plan occurred, and the meeting abandoned the topic that had been advertised in order to take up another issue—one better suited to provide the pretext for 'establishing meetings', and developing the machinery of

ulterior action. In fact it is remarkable to what a degree public attention had turned by this time to a totally different range of abuses.

As early as 2 November—even before the movement which I have been describing—a correspondent in the *Public Advertiser* had demanded that county meetings should be summoned to protest against the waste of public money. On 7 December resolutions on this topic were proposed in the House of Lords, and at about this date it was finally decided that there should be a meeting of the Yorkshire freeholders to discuss this very issue; though Lord John Cavendish would appear to have been speaking the truth when he said that even the project of such a meeting had not become known in London at this time. On 13 December, a correspondent, writing to the *London Courant*, made the complaint that attention was not sufficiently drawn to the question of the application of the public revenue, and bewailed the fact that so little reference was made to this important matter in the political discussions of the day. 'Œconomy seems to be wholly disregarded', he said—a remarkable statement in view of what was about to happen. On the following day, the 14th, a correspondent in the *London Evening Post* urged the freeholders of Middlesex to abandon their 'trivial' election controversy and direct their attention to the more serious problem of the waste of 'the people's money'. By the time of the Middlesex meeting on the 20th the waves of this agitation were rising and gathering power, and it was known that the Yorkshiremen were proposing to hold a meeting and approach the House of Commons with a petition on this subject. When the Middlesex freeholders actually met, therefore, they decided so to speak to change the label but not to change the essence of the movement. Abandoning the lead, they adjourned their meeting until 7 January for the purpose of adopting a petition similar to the one which the Yorkshire freeholders were expected to have produced and published in the meantime.[1] Stooping to conquer—adopting the Yorkshire programme in order to set an example to other counties—they advanced towards the achievement of what was one of their primary ends, namely, concerted action by the counties in one sort of petitioning movement or another. Opposition newspapers, which had been advertising the readiness of others to follow the example of Middlesex in a controversy concerning the freedom of elections, changed their language from this time and spoke now of Yorkshire as

[1] *London Courant*, 21 and 28 Dec. 1779. In the *Gazetteer*, 31 Dec. 1779, is the advertisement of the meeting to be held 7 January 1780.

the prime mover, telling the other counties, cities and boroughs that they must henceforward follow her lead.[1]

Before the Middlesex meeting of 20 December, however, another important step had been taken—an address had been prepared in writing and had been handed to the chairman for presentation to the assembled freeholders. The author claimed in fact to be the initiator of the whole grand design of 1779–80, and said that he had put it in writing to Sir George Savile in 1776. The address was immediately published and ran through a number of editions, appearing later under the name of John Jebb, who played an important part in the movement we are studying.[2]

According to Jebb's scheme, the counties of England were to abandon the idea that even a multiplicity of synchronised petitions would serve any purpose ; and, acting upon a uniform plan, they were to establish standing committees, which were to send deputies to a central representative assembly ' provided it should ever be thought requisite for them to confer upon a common cause '. An estimate was to be formed of the landed and commercial property in each of the areas of the country, so that the number of deputies could be properly assessed for all, and the perfect representative system achieved. Then, once it had become clear that through this machinery ' a majority of the landed and commercial interest of the kingdom had agreed upon a certain matter ', the new institution could claim the supremacy over the House of Commons, which as a purely derivative body would be superseded by a higher organ, a more perfect representation of property. ' The command would proceed from the principal to the delegate ', says Jebb ; for members of Parliament are mere ' proxies ', and their voice ' must be regarded as annihilated when the voice of the Principal shall be thus distinctly heard '. It would even ' be constitutional to declare the House of Commons dissolved ', and the act of the organised counties, once it had the concurrence of the Lords and the assent of the king, would in fact be the law of the land. ' No unconstitutional coercion would be exerted against the remaining branches of the Legislature ', once the corrupt House of Commons had been disposed of, says our author. But he argues that even these—even the king and the House of Lords—' would perhaps perceive it prudent to comply with the temperate claims and wishes of

[1] E.g., *London Evening Post*, 5–7 Dec. and 14–16 Dec. 1779 ; cf. *London Courant*, 20 and 30 Dec. 1779 and 5 Jan. 1780.

[2] *An Address to the Freeholders of Middlesex, December* 20, 1779. Reprinted from the 4th edn. of 1782 in *The Works of John Jebb*, ed. by J. Disney (1787), ii. 453–90 ; cf. Wyvill, *Political Papers*, iv. 505.

the commons '. He talks of the ' right of the people to new-model the constitution '. He suggests that the decisions of the new representative body might be ' properly authenticated as the public Act of the Combined Counties '. He even thinks that the people, acting directly through their own institutions in this way, might achieve a Federal Union with the American colonies.

This is the Middlesex side of the story then : and Jebb still envisages a combination of counties on the original Middlesex issue ; he still has in mind the question of the freedom of elections. If, however, in the middle of December the freeholders of Middlesex decided to take their cue from the conduct of the Yorkshiremen, the same was true of the parties of Lord Rockingham and Lord Shelburne which had begun to collaborate in the hope of completing the break-up of the government. They were attacking the undue influence of the crown, as we have seen, but hitherto they had tended to direct their artillery against what was called closet-influence, against the power of irresponsible advisers behind the scenes. It was impossible, however, to drive home the attack—to do more than beat the empty air—so long as this was the issue, and the members of the opposition seemed to be lunging at shadows. The demand for public economy, for an enquiry into the civil list, for a reduction of pensions and sinecures, immediately presented itself as a programme more strategically effective for the purpose of diminishing the undue influence of the crown. It was calculated to have behind it the force of the overburdened tax-payers in the country. Rockingham and Shelburne could easily combine in support of such a cause. Unlike many other issues it could be presented as a matter that was above party. Here, therefore, in the middle of December, we can see the genesis of the remarkable parliamentary opposition-programme of 1780. When Burke on 15 December announced his intention of producing a plan of Economical Reform and when on the same day Shelburne raised the question of public expenditure again in the House of Lords, it was clear that the events in the north had already just begun to create a stir in the capital. The evidence suggests that the opposition-leaders had hurriedly decided to take the hint from the Yorkshire freeholders and to adopt a programme that would have the country behind it.[1] The two movements—the one inside and

[1] *Parliamentary History*, xx. 1295–1305 ; cf. the account of this debate in the *London Courant*, 31 Dec. 1779. Concerning Thomas Gilbert's project of economical reform, the renewal of which appears to have been anticipated by Burke's announcement at this time, see *Parliamentary History*, xix. 803, 873 ; xx. 1304, and a letter to the *Public Advertiser*, 22 Dec. 1779.

the other outside Parliament—came to their climax on 6 April when the House of Commons went into Committee to consider some forty petitions that were the product of the Yorkshire movement, and during the course of the proceedings Dunning carried his famous motion concerning the increased influence of the crown.

The Yorkshire movement, which so deflected the plans of the Middlesex freeholders and the programme of the parliamentary opposition, had been carefully prepared by a handful of men in the North Riding. Soon after the first of the Middlesex meetings which I have mentioned, on 23 November 1779, the Reverend Christopher Wyvill, a considerable landowner and member of an ancient family in the county, was staying at the house of his friend, General Cary, at Leven Grove, and these two, together with William Chaloner and Lieut.-General Hale, decided to summon a meeting to protest against the waste of public money. Wyvill returned home on the 25th, consulted some of his neighbours, and wrote to a few people. Amongst these the Rev. William Mason, the friend of Thomas Gray and Horace Walpole, was almost the first to offer support, and, though hitherto a stranger to Wyvill, became one of his principal collaborators. A circular, more widely distributed, on the 29th, provoked many discouraging answers, however, for though there was considerable agreement concerning the subjects of complaint, one man refused to commit himself to giving his signature to an advertisement for a meeting ; another claimed that he had been involved in a similar movement before and had been let down by his associates ; another said that people in Leeds were afraid of being implicated and then ' left in the lurch ' ; another had never known any good come from such meetings ; and another refused to harass the government in the midst of a desperate war. By 5 December it almost seemed that the project would have to be abandoned, but Wyvill persisted, and by the 8th the balance was turned by a stimulating letter and a handful of signatures from Pemberton Milnes of Wakefield, the leading figure amongst the Yorkshire dissenters.[1] It is clear that Wyvill from the first, like the men of Middlesex, had his *arrière-pensée* and his programme of ulterior action, though he was very guarded in the way he

[1] Wyvill, *Political Papers*, iii. 137–8, 138 n. Mason, writing to Walpole on 7 December 1779, was not sure that the meeting would actually take place (*The Letters of Horace Walpole and Rev. William Mason*, ed. Mitford (1851), ii. 53–5). The large number of clergymen taking part in the movement became a subject of comment and satire in prose and in verse (letter of ' Unus Multorum ' in *York Chronicle*, 21 Jan. 1780 ; cf. *ibid.*, 4 Feb., 18 Feb., and *York Courant*, 15 Feb.). Cf. also Wyvill, *Political Papers*, i. 354.

allowed hints of it to leak out, and concerning the whole matter he insisted that his correspondents should maintain absolute secrecy for a time. He already had it in mind to produce combined action by the counties, to create standing committees in each locality, and to establish what was called an Association. The ultimate intention was to secure parliamentary reform and particularly a more independent House of Commons, by an increase in the number of county members, and the establishment of annual parliaments.[1]

The local newspapers, which in the preceding months had given no evidence of general hardship in the country or particular grievances in Yorkshire,[2] now began to print paragraphs illustrating the extravagance of the government, the decline of commerce and the decay of the landed interest. Anonymous letters were sent to the press to stimulate interest in the petitioning movement, and one particular argument was used to alarm the county—the report that the government was contemplating a more equal assessment of the land-tax, which had hitherto fallen on Yorkshire at the rate of virtually 1/– in the £, while in some parts of England the nominal amount, in other words, the full 4/–, was being levied.[3] Wyvill drew up both a petition and a plan of association, but it was

[1] Wyvill, *Political Papers*, iii. 151.

[2] Even in November 1779 there still appeared in the newspapers (e.g. *York Chronicle*, 5 Nov.) an advertisement calling in the subscription which the men of the North Riding, at a general meeting in July, had agreed ' by a very great majority ' to raise for the purpose of maintaining a regiment to serve during the war.

[3] Wyvill's circular letter of 29 Nov. 1779 (*Political Papers*, iii. 116) mentions ' the apprehension of an additional land-tax '. In his circular letter to members of Parliament on 29 Nov., Wyvill speaks more plainly (*ibid.*, iii. 151) of ' the general apprehension of a heavy addition to the land-tax in the North '. The reply to the former from Nathaniel Cholmley, 5 Dec. (*ibid.*, iii. 131) says that ' what is called an equal Land-Tax ' would not be just, ' as the great difference that appears to be from the unequalness of it at present, proceeds from the great expences and trouble the distant parts of the Country from the Metropolis have been at to improve and cultivate their Lands, which those nearer the Metropolis have been enjoying, with the great advantage of plentiful Markets over the others, those lands being sufficiently cultivated before the Land-Tax was first laid in 1696 '. The proposal to equalise the Land-Tax is mentioned in *Four Letters to the Earl of Carlisle from William Eden* (1780), p. 107. The *York Courant*, 30 Nov. 1779, says : ' A Plan has been laid before the Lord of the Treasury for raising the Supplies for the Service of the ensuing Year by a more equal Assessment of the Land-Tax, and also a Poll-Tax ', and a letter from ' A Freeholder of Yorkshire ' in the same issue, as also in *York Chronicle*, 3 Dec. 1779—undoubtedly one of the anonymous letters from promoters of the petitioning-movement—attempts to awaken the interest of the people by stating that ' the North in particular is threatened with a double Land-tax, which under pretence of greater equality in that tax will leave not a shilling in this county '. In the south the enemies of the petitioning-movement attempted to turn the indignation of the over-burdened tax-payer against the Northerner who failed to carry his due share of the burden (*York Courant*, 1 Feb. 1780).

decided at a previous meeting on 29 December to withhold the latter for the time being—that is to say, not to put it to the general meeting of the gentry and freeholders, which was to take place on the 30th. Also on the 29th at the suggestion of Thomas Hill of Leeds one important amendment was made to the petition ; after the description of the abuses of financial extravagance, the significant words were added :

> Whence the Crown has acquired a great and unconstitutional influence, which if not checked, may soon prove fatal to the Liberties of this Country.[1]

According to Savile over 600 people were present at the general meeting of the county on 30 December, and according to Rockingham property amounting to £800,000 a year was represented there. Wyvill's petition was carried, if we are to believe the published account of the proceedings, with only one dissenting voice ; though a considerable proportion of the speeches had been distinctly hostile even to the ostensible purpose of the movement—even to the idea of an approach to the House of Commons on the question of public economy.[2] The petition itself embodied a sinister request, which suggests that recent events in Ireland had had some influence ; for it demanded that ' no new burthens ' should be laid on the country until the prayers of the people had been granted. At the end of the meeting, which had already lasted many hours—with men moving in and out—and which had become more tumultuous towards its close, an additional resolution was proposed and carried, to the surprise of many who were present, for there had certainly been no hint of the matter in the previous discussion. Without debate, and with the

[1] This account of the preparation of the Yorkshire meeting is largely based on the materials in Wyvill, *Political Papers*, iii. 107–49, and the notices, correspondence, etc., in the contemporary *York Chronicle*, *York Courant* and *Leeds Mercury*.

[2] The account as sent to the newspapers is in Wyvill, *Political Papers*, i. 9–40, and pp. v–viii. of the same volume give some notes on this. It is interesting to see that great pains were taken to reproduce *in extenso* a long opposition speech by Leonard Smelt, who put out all the doctrines of the Patriot King, but Wyvill was content to condense very greatly the speeches in favour of the petition, some of which were long, while at the same time toning down their violence or extravagance in certain cases. Smelt produced his own version of what he had said, *An Account of some Particulars relating to the Meeting held at York*. P. Johnson wrote to W. Eden on 1 Jan. 1780 a hostile but detailed account of the proceedings, which is in Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 34,417, fos. 1–2. Further light on the course of the meeting can be gathered from letters of Henry Goodricke to the *York Chronicle*, 7 Jan. and 28 Jan., and *York Courant*, 18 Jan. 1780, together with other information relative to this correspondence in *York Courant*, 11 Jan., also *The Correspondence of Horace Walpole and Rev. William Mason*, ed. Mitford (1851), ii. 60–1 ; and *The Yorkshire Question or Petition and Address* (1780).

acquiescence of many who are known to have had misgivings shortly afterwards (when they saw the possible implications of the decision), it was agreed to appoint a committee of 61 which was to promote the objects of the petition, to 'further the laudable reform' (whatever that might mean), and to prepare a Plan of Association.[1] Copies of the petition were put into the hands of a number of gentlemen who acted as local agents, and it would appear that the number of signatures depended to some extent on the zeal of the man who had charge of the matter locally. From Halifax it was soon reported that signatures did not come if the document was merely left at a public-house. In Leeds there were some enthusiasts who decided to form a club to promote the objects of the whole movement.[2]

There is clear evidence that though the whig magnates, and the Rockinghamite influence in Yorkshire, were not responsible for the origin of this agitation, there was a higher class of landowner, a group of men similar to Wyvill—well-educated, and skilled directors of an agitation—who consciously gave the lead to a mass of smaller freeholders, summoning them to an interest in politics. An enemy might say, as Rigby had said ten years before, that the mass of the freeholders were an 'ignorant multitude', not by any means fitted as yet to enter on matters of government or to give the law to the House of Commons. A friend might say that here is an important moment in the development of political consciousness in wider classes in both town and country—that new men were being brought into the orbit of politics. Sir George Savile deprecated any attempt to seek merely a multitude of freeholders' signatures: 'You would be tauntingly asked, *how John and Thomas came to know of these abuses?*', he said. Gamaliel Lloyd, writing on behalf of a number of gentlemen in Leeds, confessed:

> And what recommends the Association the more, is, that it has been promoted by so many Gentlemen of large independent fortunes, who from education and other circumstances, have had much better opportunities of being rightly informed in Politics than ourselves.

At the Nottinghamshire meeting the Rev. George Walker

[1] Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 34,417, fos. 1–2; letter of Henry Goodricke to *York Chronicle*, 28 Jan. 1780; Wyvill, *Political Papers*, iii. 173 and 177.

[2] *Ibid.*, i. 52–5; iii. 203. In the York City Library are the copies (made at the time) of the signatures to the petition. The list is of 8,407 signatures, of which 652 were from the region circulated by Wyvill, 341 on the copy at the York Tavern, 437 in Bradford and something over 300 in Leeds. I have to thank the York City Librarian for enabling me to examine these and other documents connected with the Association and for procuring local newspapers.

began by talking down to the crowd, explaining to them why they had been summoned by their betters to confer on matters so high as those of politics.[1] It is not irrelevant to note that though Savile in parliamentary debate asserted with unusual violence the strength of public opinion behind the Yorkshire movement, his private letters to Wyvill after the first stage of the proceedings are distinctly pessimistic on the subject of this particular layer of public opinion—he thinks that the people lack political foresight, that things must get worse before good can be done, and that the majority will not be roused until they actually feel the pinch. He confesses that, as yet, he has little hope for the simple reason that men do not sufficiently feel the pinch.[2]

In the first days of January other counties began to follow the procedure of the Yorkshire meeting, the earliest being Hampshire and Middlesex, the regions already prepared for common action on a different issue—where indeed meetings of freeholders, etc., had already been summoned in connection with the election controversies previously mentioned. York and London quickly set an example for other cities. About forty petitions in all seem to have been presented.[3] In one place the petitioning movement would be directed by a local magnate, as in the case of the Duke of Richmond in Sussex. In another, the meeting would be led by a handful of Middlesex radicals, like George Byng, who would be able to appear at a number of the county meetings in the neighbourhood of London. Occasionally the local magnates would collect their following and make issue with one another at the county meeting, as in the case of Huntingdon, where we are told that the proceedings turned into a 'debate between the principals'. The government and its supporters did not, as in 1770,

[1] *Substance of the Speech of the Rev. Mr. Walker at the General Meeting of the County of Nottingham held at Mansfield on 28 Feb. 1780* (1780).

[2] Wyvill, *Political Papers*, iii. 156, 203–4, 223 and especially 236–8.

[3] Yorkshire, Hampshire, Middlesex, Cheshire, Cumberland, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Sussex, Surrey, Dorset, Bedfordshire, Essex, Somerset, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Devonshire, Norfolk, Berkshire, Derbyshire, Brecon, Nottinghamshire, Buckinghamshire, Kent, Suffolk, Northumberland, Flintshire, Herefordshire, Cambridgeshire adopted the petition, but Northamptonshire declined it, preferring to instruct its representatives in Parliament to promote economy, and not all the counties agreed to form Committees (e.g. Suffolk, Northumberland, Hereford and Derby declined; *Annual Register*, 1780, p. 88). In Kent one section of the county sent in a petition and formed a Committee while the other section merely petitioned. Cities and boroughs, like York, London, Nottingham, Newcastle, Westminster, Reading, Gloucester, Bristol joined in the movement. A letter in the *Morning Chronicle* of 29 March reproached Lancashire for being 'almost singularly silent'. In the case of Huntingdonshire, Hertfordshire, Norfolk, Surrey and Sussex protests were drawn up by sections of the county.

attack the petitioning-movement as such or deny the legitimacy or authenticity of the petitions. They focused attention upon a more critical issue, and as a counter-movement developed in late January and early February it was directed chiefly against the supplementary resolutions—the Committees of Correspondence and the Plan of Association.[1]

It is in the idea of the Association that the remarkable implications of the movement of 1779–80 are to be found; and though the general programme of these years draws so much on the historiography of the early Stuart period and the theories of seventeenth-century political writers—though the radical leaders in their various compilations are at pains to collect the precedents and shew the sources of their plans and policies—it is curious to note that they seem to have found their own way to the type of Association that they now adopted, and their references to the revolutionary period in the middle of the seventeenth century are astonishingly few.

Soon after the middle of December a London paper, having made the announcement of the forthcoming Yorkshire meeting, predicted that it would be 'a second Runnymede'.[2] Sir George Savile, writing to Wyvill in the middle of the following January, referred to the contemplated organisation as a National Assembly, and admitted that the nickname of 'Anti-Parliament' would be justified.[3] Over and over again the supporters of the movement place their reliance on two historical precedents that are not without significance: they say that the body which forced Magna Carta on the king was an Association; and so was that 'Convention Parliament' which placed William and Mary on the throne at a moment when it was impossible to assemble a legitimate Parliament.[4]

[1] E.g. *Parl. Hist.*, xx. 1352 (Lord Hillsborough: 'They were set up as another estate, unknown to the constitution. They would, if not timely suppressed, lead to anarchy . . .'); xxi. 80 (Lord Mulgrave: 'The associations had as much as declared, that if parliament did not grant the prayer of the petition, other means would be taken than those the petitioners had used . . .'); xxi. 107 (the Attorney-General: 'A very great judge . . . had given it as his opinion, that associations of every kind, though for legal purposes, were in themselves illegal'). The protests of Sussex and Surrey were directed not against the petitions but against the Committees of Correspondence, and what the Sussex Protest (*London Chronicle*, 3–5 Feb. 1780) calls 'General Associations apparently tending to over-rule the Legislature'. Cf. § 6 of the Hertfordshire Protest, *York Courant*, 8 Feb. 1780.

[2] *London Evening Post*, 18–21 Dec. 1779.

[3] Wyvill, *Political Papers*, iii. 204.

[4] *A Letter from the Rt. Hon. Lord Carysfort to the Huntingdonshire Committee* (1780), p. 7. Cf. p. 15, where an association in the time of Henry III, A.D. 1223, is declared to have led to Magna Carta; *The Associators Vindicated and the Protestors Answered* (1780), p. 13; J. Burgh, *Political Disquisitions*, iii. 297–8, 430–1. Cf. the letter under the signature of J. A. in *Public Advertiser*, 4 Dec. 1779.

Even the Rockinghamite peers, in those early days when they supported all that had been resolved upon at the meeting of the Yorkshire freeholders, took the line that here was one of those rare occasions when the direct interposition of the people supersedes the ordinary machinery of government, and a quasi-revolutionary endeavour is called for to restore the constitution to its original principles.[1] Locke was quoted in favour of the thesis that 'when the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them' it is proper to have 'an extraordinary delegation from the people' to enquire into the laws and liberties of the kingdom.[2] The newspapers were announcing in January that:

> The intention of assembling the independent gentlemen of the different counties at this alarming juncture is to elect Committees to whom the power of the people is to be delegated, and which Committees, or a delegation from them, is to form a convention . . . to restore . . . the liberties of the people to their antient purity.[3]

The term 'Congress' was repeatedly used by the enemies of the movement, for it was one to which the American Revolution had brought a sinister flavour. And, whereas we might feel that the movement is important in that it raised the issue of parliamentary reform on a national scale and awakened political interest in broader classes of the people, the men who directed operations at the time were clearly working for an immediate success of a more dramatic character. When they talked of possible failure they would say with bitterness that in such a case they were afraid that their efforts would serve as nothing but an example for the future or an instrument for the spread of political education.

It is useful to note that one political writer of the previous decade had set out to show that the historic moment, the quasi-revolutionary crisis, was approaching; and this was in the work which laid out the programme of what might be called the Association *par excellence*. The work was one which became a kind of Bible to the radicals; and it greatly influenced John Cartwright in the famous pamphlet *Take your Choice*, which was published in 1776 and used to be claimed as the first work on the subject of parliamentary reform. It was referred

[1] Joint Letter of the Peers to W. Chaloner, 30 Dec. 1779, in Wyvill, *Political Papers*, i. 45–6. Protest of the Peers, 8 Feb. 1780 (*Parliamentary History*, xx. 1369).

[2] *A Letter from the Rt. Hon. Lord Carysfort to the Huntingdonshire Committee* (1780), p. 7.

[3] *Cambridge Chronicle*, 15 Jan. 1780; *Leeds Mercury*, 25 Jan. 1780.

to by Wilkes when he brought forward his motion for parliamentary reform in 1776. The author in question was James Burgh, who was evidently a fanatic on the subject of associations, for he tells us at an earlier date how it had been his hope to establish a Grand National Association for the production of more virtuous periodical literature to counteract the influence of the philosophy of Bolingbroke. He suggested another against the iniquitous practices of Engrossers, and also one that was to support public credit and ' prevent a diminution in the Stocks '. He even mentions a further one, amongst people who would undertake, when writing testimonials, to give domestic servants their true characters.

It was in 1774–5, however, that he published his curious compilation, his *Political Disquisitions*, a work packed with extracts from writers and speakers, ancient and modern, on the decline of liberty. The latter half of this third volume is devoted to a lengthy Conclusion ' addressed to the independent Part of the People of Great Britain, Ireland and the Colonies ', and it is here that Burgh makes his prediction that the crisis of English liberty is near. He deprecates insurrection, but he says that ' desperate diseases require desperate remedies '. At the same time he does not propose a resort to force, but tells us that he wants ' to apply the power of the people . . . directed by men of property ' :

> Before all other things, he says, there must be established a GRAND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RESTORING THE CONSTITUTION. . . . There must be a copy of the ASSOCIATION for every parish, and a parochial committee. . . . And there must be a grand committee for every county.

By this method it can be established whether the majority of the people desire reform or not, for, he says, ' resistance to government, unless it be by a clear majority of the people, is rebellion '. If the king will not be a Patriot King and head the movement for parliamentary reform the ' independent nobility ' may take the initiative ; but if these should fail, then, says Burgh, ' let the great, the rich, the independent city of London take the lead '. Very soon in fact he is using the name : ' the London Association '. Burgh's suggested reforms —his ultimate objects—are annual parliaments, a more adequate representation, exclusion by rotation, and the limitation of the number of placemen and pensioners in the House of Commons. Besides collecting the sense of the people and presenting petitions, his new organisation is ' to raise and have in readiness, the strength of the nation, in order to influence

government and prevent mischief'. He talks of peace at one moment but he readily forgets himself and turns to revolutionary ideas, enumerating the occasions upon which the pressure of the people or the power of a mob have in the past forced the hands of government. He says:

> Members of parliament would hardly dare to reject the proposed reformation-bill, as knowing themselves not to be invulnerable, and remembering that they could not command a guard of 500 soldiers each at their country houses all the time.

Later he goes on: 'I know nothing of war, and therefore can propose nothing concerning the conduct of it; but to wish that it may be avoided if possible.' Finally he says that he will omit the further details which he had intended to enter upon, lest he should 'alarm the more timorous part of readers, and render them less inclined to join the grand national association'.[1] Cartwright at the end of his famous booklet, *Take Your Choice* (1776), reproduces at considerable length Burgh's plan of an Association; but he deprecates the suggestion of violence and the hint of a *coup de main*, pointing out that if the membership is widened in order to include all Englishmen the proposed system of delegation will be irresistible. He makes the interesting remark that he has reason for believing in the early emergence of such a movement for which the necessary leadership would soon appear; so that once again 1776 appears as a significant date. The work of Granville Sharp in the same decade had stressed the fact that the reform of the representative system or the change in the duration of Parliaments—being matters beyond the competence of the House of Commons—could only be decided by the property-owners in their county meetings.[2]

The movement of 1780 is permeated with these ideas, and is packed with the identical insinuations.[3] Its enemies claimed

[1] J. Burgh, *Political Disquisitions*, iii. (1775), 426–35. In the Dedication to *Crito* (1766), p. 18, Burgh had noted that the time was peculiarly favourable for associating, 'as being near the end of a parliament'.

[2] J. Cartwright, *Take your Choice* (1776), pp. 89–97; e.g. p. 89: 'As soon as leaders worthy of such a cause shall have made themselves known to the public (and such I have reason to believe will soon appear)'; G. Sharp, *The Legal Means of Political Reformation*, Part I; 'Equitable Representation', pp. 20–23: 'No Reformation however can be safely made respecting *a more equal representation of the Commons* until the mode of doing it hath been first adopted and approved by *the majority of the ELECTORS themselves in each county*.'

[3] E.g. *The duty of a Freeman, addressed to the Electors of Great Britain* by 'Anglo-Saxon' (4 Sept. 1780), p. 9: 'We can only be saved by people at large exerting themselves at this awful moment and demanding the restoration of rights and renovation of the whole frame of government'; *Constitutionalist's Letter to the Electors and People of England* . . . (1780), p. 4: 'forming a pretty

that the Committees and the Association sought to over-awe or over-rule or over-ride the Legislature, to impose themselves ' as another estate unknown to the constitution ', and to reduce Parliament to a mere court of record to register their edicts.[1] One general complaint on the part of the government spokesmen was the fact that the people were being told that they had their own means of redress if the House of Commons failed them ; lurking somewhere in speeches and pamphlets there always seemed to be a more or less unspecified threat. The leaders of the petitioning-movement, when thus attacked, would coo like a sucking-dove, and say that they were mere petitioners, that Englishmen had a right to petition, and that the Association always described itself as being ' legal and constitutional ', always claimed to be entirely pacific in its objects. Yet, as we have seen, the whole movement had

serious beginning of a national and universal association . . . to restore . . . this our once happy constitution to its former purity ' ; *The Associators Vindicated and the Protestors Answered* (1780), p. 11 : ' The fundamental principle is a natural controul residing in the people at large over those to whom for convenience they have entrusted their legislative powers, which latent right must never be called into action before the trustees have actually swerved or are likely to deviate from the primary cause of their creation. . . . The people must necessarily judge for themselves when and in what manner to exercise and put in force this dominant principle . . . from the humble Petition and peaceable Association to the last and awful appeal to Heaven ' ; *London Courant*, 4 Jan. 1780, letter of ' Junius Brutus ' : ' My opinion is this, that there be immediately established a Grand National Association . . . to procure . . . the passing of an act to recover and preserve to the people a true and efficient representation in parliament ' ; *The Works of John Jebb*, ii. 469, ' Address to the Freeholders of Middlesex ' : ' That solemn hour, when the delegates of a state, chosen according to forms which not law and custom but necessity or expedience shall prescribe . . . shall sit in awful judgment ' ; *ibid.*, ii. 507 (' A Letter to . . . the Chairman of the Huntingdonshire Committee ') : ' Is there any absolute necessity for having recourse to the House of Commons . . . and would not an act of delegates, freely chosen by the people, assented to by the King and hereditary nobility, be sufficient for this purpose ? ' ; *Speech of Thomas Day to the Meeting of the Freeholders of Essex*, 25 Apr. 1780, p. 15 : ' The House of Commons has but a subordinate existence . . . we have the right to chuse in what degree, under what modification, we will delegate our inalienable rights ' ; Report of the Sub-committee of Westminster, 27 May 1780, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 38,593, fos. 38–44, printed in Wyvill, *Political Papers*, i. 228–43 : ' No effectual reformation of the abuses in question can take place unless the people exercise their inherent and undoubted right of reviewing the whole plan of delegation ' ; Address of the Committee of Association of the County of York, January 1781, Wyvill, *Political Papers*, i. 306 : ' Let it be acknowledged then that this deputation is an uncommon appointment. . . . When new dangers arise to public liberty, new modes of defence, adapted to resist the attack, are . . . absolutely necessary. . . .' Cf. J. Burgh, *Political Disquisitions*, iii. 6 : ' In planning a government by representation, the people ought to provide against their own *annihilation*. They ought to establish a regular and constitutional method of acting by and from *themselves*, without, or even in opposition to their *representatives*, if necessary.

[1] See above, p. 81, n. 1 ; cf. the Bishop of Peterborough on the danger of religious associations, *Parliamentary History*, xx. 1054–6.

started from the assumption that mere petitioning was bound to fail, and its supporters were ready to reiterate the assertion that a prayer to a corrupt House of Commons was like an appeal ' to a band of robbers ', that indeed ' no effectual reformation of [abuses] can take place unless the people exercise their inherent and undoubted right of reviewing the whole plan of delegation '. Opinions might differ when it came to the question of suggesting what ' sanctions ' would be employed, what means would be taken to force the hands of a corrupt legislature that flouted the wishes of the people. But in the speeches of parliamentary spokesmen, in newspaper paragraphs, in anonymous letters to the press, in the propaganda put out by the leaders of the movement and in the official declarations of the various committees themselves, the same quasi-revolutionary language is employed—and vague ideas of ' sanctions ' are perpetually leaking out. Before the beginning of the movement, on 2 November 1779, there is a prophecy of the whole scheme in a London paper which says: ' Join as the Irish do to prohibit your Members to grant the supplies 'till the Pilferers of the Empire are brought to account.' We constantly read of the way in which the Americans had set the example or we are told ' to take the Irish receipt ' in order to turn members of parliament into honest men. The influence of the Irish Volunteer Associations, whose endeavours had brought Ireland to the edge of revolution and had induced the government of Lord North to make important concessions at the close of 1779, was clearly in mind and showed itself at the original meeting in York, as well as in the subsequent connection between the movements in the two countries.[1] In England in 1780 it is urged that if the petitions are rejected, the minority should secede from Parliament, put themselves at the head of the Association, and then confront what will be merely the rump of the corrupt legislature.[2] Or it is asserted that the Irish had formed an Association, and the populace had exerted pressure in Dublin, to secure the act of 1768 which reduced the duration of the Irish parliament to eight years. The Rev. William Mason in a letter to Horace Walpole approved the idea of a refusal by the people to pay taxes.[3] Burgh and others

[1] E.g. *Public Advertiser*, 2 Nov. 1779; *Leeds Mercury*, 18 Jan. and 1 Feb. 1780. Cf. ' Amicus Patriae ' in *London Courant*, 13 Dec. 1779; also *ibid.*, 5 Jan. 1780.

[2] Jebb, ' Letter to . . . the Chairman of the Huntingdonshire Committee ' in *Works*, ii. 508 n.; cf. *ibid.*, ii. 481 n.; *Leeds Mercury*, 1 Feb. 1780; cf. *London Evening Post*, 14–16 Dec. 1779, and *Gazeteer*, 15 May 1780. Fox and the Duke of Richmond appear to have threatened something of this kind in May and June 1780.

[3] *The Letters of Horace Walpole*, ed. Toynbee (1904), xi. 177.

suggested the policy of electing members of parliament for one year only and then refusing obedience—refusing to pay the taxes for example—if the House of Commons pretended to sit after the expiry of the period of their delegation.[1] One writer acknowledged that the proposed new organ, like the House of Commons itself, might be subject to imperfections as a representative institution; even he, however, claimed that its decisions were beyond question once they had been reported back to the county meetings and ratified by the direct action of the people.[2] And when it was urged against the Association of 1780 that such a body was bound to be dangerous if the House of Commons failed to satisfy its demands, the very men who bitterly resented the imputation provided further reinforcement for it; they argued that the case could not arise—that the House of Commons would never dare to contravene the wishes of the people so unmistakably expressed.[3]

It is true that there existed concurrently a more limited doctrine of the Association, and Wyvill restricted himself to this on those occasions when it was necessary to reassure the timorous. There was one 'sanction' on behalf of which the leaders could count on rallying a considerable amount of general support. According to this view the members of the Association merely made the engagement to vote in parliamentary elections for no candidate who failed to give a specific undertaking to support the objects of the movement—initially the project of 'œconomical reform'.[4] This was a development of the policy of the Wilkes faction in the general election of 1774 and the Society of the Supporters of the Bill of Rights; and there are earlier Irish precedents. There can be no doubt that Wyvill, in promoting the Yorkshire movement, had in mind—apart from more radical projects—the idea of influencing the next general election, which was expected to take place fairly soon. This whole view envisages the Association as something like a modern political party, where electors and

[1] J. Burgh, *Political Disquisitions*, i. 130; letter by 'Alfred' to *London Courant*, 30 March 1780.

[2] *The Associators Vindicated and the Protestors Answered* (1780), p. 13.

[3] E.g. Peers' Protest, 8 Feb. 1780, *Parliamentary History*, xx. 1369: 'And if it be asked what farther is to be done if these petitions are rejected, the best answer is that the case cannot be supposed . . . it is not possible to conceive that so wise an assembly [the House of Commons] will ever be rash enough to reject such petitions and by that means cause this dangerous question to be broached and agitated, whether they have not broke their trust?'

[4] *General Evening Post*, 16–18 Dec. 1779; the Yorkshire newspapers of 18 Jan. 1779. Cf. Wyvill to Hunter, 7 Jan. 1780, in Wyvill, *Political Papers*, iii. 175–6. Cf. R. B. McDowell, *Irish Public Opinion 1750–1800* (1943), p. 25. Members of the Freeholders Society pledged themselves in 1757 to support candidates free from ministerial influence.

elected are pledged to a general programme or system of policy ; and it calls to mind an advertisement which appeared in the papers in 1774 inviting all who wished for the overthrow of the existing ministry to join in an Association for that specific purpose.[1] We are at a stage in the evolution of the modern kind of political party based on an agreement concerning specific ideas or co-operation in regard to certain issues ; and it is difficult to imagine any other way in which something of this kind could have inserted itself into the eighteenth-century system, where political groups were based so largely on family connections, personal attachments and private influence, and where within the same faction, Fox and Burke could differ more radically in doctrine and policy than either of them differed from North or the younger Pitt. This whole aspect of the Association, which has in view a body of people merely pledged to an electoral programme that involved parliamentary reform, had its classic statement in a remarkable chapter in an anonymous *Historical Essay on the English Constitution*, published in 1771—a work which was used by Burgh, and which provided one of the constituents of his theory.

If it is true to say that various views and programmes were held in the Yorkshire Association—many of the rank and file only concerned to petition the House of Commons on the subject of public economy—it is important to note that the structure of the whole movement of the years 1779–80 was such as to give a particular leverage to the efforts and influence of a few radical enthusiasts who either had created, or were determined to use, the opportunity. Sometimes the initial general meeting in county or borough—the foundation of all the subsequent proceedings—adopted a series of 'stock' resolutions without serious thought and almost by acclamation ; and dissentients might be reduced to silence by more or less tumultuous means. As a contemporary critic said, a few active men drew up a list of committee-nominations and the whole would be accepted without much thought, so that it was possible to argue : 'This Provincial Congress is chosen by itself.'[2] Some of the leaders in question, holding land in various counties, passed from one local meeting to another, and were appointed to a succession of local committees. The

[1] Transmitted 'on good authority' to *London Evening Post*, 5–7 July 1774 : 'Advertisement of a Constitutional Association to be established early in the ensuing winter on True Revolution Principles to remove from the presence and caresses of the best of Kings those insidious tyrannical and profligate ministers and minions. . . .'

[2] *London Chronicle*, 23–5 March 1779.

committees might number fifty, or a hundred, or even more, members, of whom seven or twelve might form a quorum, only a dozen or so would regularly attend the weekly meetings, and the few who did attend could enlarge their numbers by co-optation. The distinguished peers whose names seemed to give respectability or prestige to these bodies evidently were inclined to stay away. A group of men who attended regularly and knew what they wanted had the opportunity to gain an extraordinary predominance in the movement. These were ideal examples of the kind of committee in which the men who disagree with the proceedings—especially those whose dissent comes from their love of moderation—know that they can achieve little by their presence and in any case almost inevitably stay away. Yet these committees still claimed for themselves what they had previously claimed for the original county meeting—namely that they were the direct voice of the people of England—and they affected to superintend the proceedings of Parliament and to review the conduct of members of the House of Commons. They claimed that public opinion was behind them, streaming up so to speak from a hundred sources in town and country. In reality they had secured a remarkable position from which to lead public opinion, or manufacture it, or guide the political education of the people.

The leaders, comprising such men as Wyvill, Jebb and Cartwright, supported by speakers such as Thomas Day, by the older followers of Wilkes, and to a great degree by Lord Mahon, took the view that the ostensible object of the petition was a comparatively unimportant matter.[1] It served to demonstrate the corrupt and unrepresentative character of the House of Commons and to increase the resulting exasperation of the people ; but the real purpose of the movement was to ' review the whole plan of delegation ', and rally the property-owners and electors to a larger scheme of reform—a revision of the representative system. This, on the view of many writers and speakers, the House of Commons was competent neither to hinder nor to undertake, since it is not for the delegate to decide upon his relations with his principal. At least the House of Commons could only act in this particular field on the instructions of the constituents. The effect of the meetings of the delegations from county and town in London

[1] E.g. *Speech of Thomas Day . . . Essex*, 25 Apr. 1780 : ' The ostensible object of your meeting was a petition for a reform of public expenditure. . . . But however necessary might be the measure I must here publicly confess that had I bounded my hopes with the mere objects of the first petition I should no more have intervened myself in its fate than in a project, for a turnpike road or a navigable canal.'

in March 1780 was to change the whole meaning of the movement—or rather to produce an open avowal of what had hitherto been the *arrière-pensée*; for it was decided at these meetings that the Association which was to be created should insist not only on an economical reform but also on the addition of one hundred knights of the shire to the House of Commons and on the policy of annual parliaments. Once these decisions had been taken the movement was primarily a movement for parliamentary reform and that programme was for the first time launched fairly and squarely upon the country at large. The programme was inserted at the tactical point in the argument, indeed at an opportunity that had been carefully stage-managed and at a moment when it would have the widest publicity. The memorial circulated to the localities along with the resolutions of the Meeting of Deputies was almost a long paraphrase of Granville Sharp, and the works of this and other writers now received a wider dissemination.[1] It had been Sharp's view, as we have seen, that only a direct decision of the property-owners in their county-meetings could authorise a revision of the representative system. From him, also, the leaders of the movement took the view that the Septennial Act had been *ultra vires*, because the representatives of the people had revised their own commission without consulting their constituents, without securing the authority of those who had delegated power to them.

The immediate success for which the popular leaders were working did not come; and henceforward the nature of the movement changed, as it settled down to a long-term campaign. As early as February 1780 Wyvill was in conflict with the Rockinghamite allies whom he had distrusted from the first, and the quarrel concerned not only the leadership but the very nature of the organisation. He envisaged the movement as not merely 'anti-government' but 'anti-parliament' and had carefully kept the Rockinghamites in the background at York, not permitting them to become part of the 'general staff'. Other counties and towns had failed to follow his example, but he threatened to leave the movement if a parliamentary leader like Fox were regarded as eligible for appointment to the Assembly of Deputies.[2] When that Assembly met in March 1780 it was only a fragment of the imposing representative organ that had been envisaged. Again it came into conflict with the Rockinghamites, who were prepared to see a discus-

[1] For the resolutions of the Deputies and the accompanying Memorial by Bromley, see Wyvill, *Political Papers*, i. 116 ff.

[2] *Ibid.*, i. 109–12; iii. 179–81.

sion of the question of revising the representative system and securing annual parliaments, but attempted to check the policy of turning these things into 'articles of Association', that is to say, into a *sine qua non*.[1] They wished to confine the Association virtually to the original purpose, economical reform; which would have made the movement a subsidiary and support to their own campaign in Parliament. Defeated on this at the Assembly of Deputies, they carried the resistance back to the local committees and the resumed county meetings, especially in Yorkshire and in Buckinghamshire.[2] The red-letter day of the whole movement was 6 April when Dunning carried in the House of Commons the famous resolutions that purported to codify the aims of the whole petitioning campaign. But it was a victory for the parliamentary allies, and rather a disadvantage to Wyvill and his friends; for it seemed to vindicate the House of Commons in spite of all that had been alleged against it, and Cambridgeshire, for example, took it as the pretext for suspending the policy of Association. The Gordon Riots arose so directly out of the attempt of a petitioning Association to put immediate pressure on the House of Commons that it caused a serious revulsion of feeling. The authorities had rather expected such riots on 6 April, and had raised a storm by the precautions they had taken then. Better news from America in the summer helped to strengthen the position of the government. Finally, the Yorkshire movement was torn asunder by the speculative controversies that the Rockinghamites had foretold. What we see in history, therefore, is only a fragment of the ambitious plan that had been originally conceived.

[1] *Ibid.*, i. 127–8; cf. *Rockingham Memoirs*, ii. 395–400.

[2] *Rockingham Memoirs*, ii. 395–406; Burke, *Works*, (1812), ix. 316–22, 'Letter to the Chairman of the Buckinghamshire Committee, 13 April, 1780.' The counter-activity of Shelburne and his followers is illustrated in letters from Lord Mahon to Shelburne, 1, 4 and 7 April 1780 in the Stanhope Papers at Chevening, and from Shelburne to Mahon, 7 April, in Fitzmaurice, *Shelburne*, iii. 74–5; cf. H. Walpole to Rev. W. Mason, 13 April 1780, in *The Letters of Horace Walpole*, ed. Toynbee (1904), xi. 157.

HENRY VIII AND SCOTLAND

By Professor J. D. Mackie, C.B.E., M.A.

Read 11 May 1946

Henry VIII was a great king, and great things were done in his day. The story of his reign has been told by more than one famous historian, and in that story Scotland, as a rule, plays only a small part. Generally she appears as the ally of France used to embarrass England from time to time, as a sort of Highland dirk threatening the back of stout King Hal as he faced south—a dirk little used in fact, and in use very ineffective; witness Flodden and Solway Moss! If we may judge by the standard histories, Scotland had little to do with the action and the movement of a stirring period.

The attitude of the historians reflects truly the spirit of the Englishmen of the time. To a country dazzled by Henry's active policies in Europe, by his quest of the Empire, by his creation of an island Papacy, excited by the splendours of his court and interested, if at times perhaps confused, by his matrimonial adventures, the affairs of Scotland must have seemed distant and unimportant. In these days of rapid travel and the 'Industrial North' it is hard to realise how remote Scotland was from London. Henry VII, it is true, came up to Newcastle in August 1487, after Simnel's rebellion, and 'taryed the remnaunt of the somer',[1] and in 1541 Henry VIII came to York, partly to meet James V, who failed to keep the appointment. But except on these occasions the north of England saw nothing of the Tudor sovereigns. Mary once thought of going to York, but I do not know that Elizabeth ever seriously thought of undertaking so dull an adventure. I may misread Leland, but I have a feeling that even that hardened itinerist felt that the north was an alien sort of place and found himself more at ease when he had recrossed the Trent.

It is idle to pretend that the English government ignored the north. There was a Council at York long before its organisation was completed and its jurisdiction fixed in 1537. The defence of the Borders was organised, and Berwick was a fort of the first magnitude. Yet it must be remembered that in 1489 Northumberland was murdered in trying to collect a

[1] E. Hall, *Chronicle* (1809), p. 436.

tax voted by parliament, that in 1521 there were no sheriffs for Cumberland and Northumberland, and that in 1522 the new Bishop of Carlisle reported a terrible state of affairs—'more theft, more extortion by English thieves than by all the Scots of Scotland'.[1] The Pilgrimage of Grace was only a supreme expression of a preference for the old days and the old ways, and the great 'liberties' of the north continued in their turbulence until after the 'Rising of 1569'.

When the north of England was thus far removed from the busy life and the active development of the south, how remote was Scotland from the centre of English power. To the average Englishman, and even to most men about the court, she must have been little known and her history little worth the telling unless, as by Skelton, her woes were recorded

> 'But for the special consolation
> Of the most royall English nacion'.[2]

Skelton was the flower of English poesy in his time.

Something, no doubt, was known. Although Ayala's flattering description was primarily written for the information of the most Catholic rulers of Spain, it was evidently known to the author of the *Italian Relation* and presumably to others in London. Again, John Young, Somerset Herald, who accompanied the Princess Margaret when she came north to marry James IV, did full justice to the splendour of her reception, though he was plainly surprised by the amount of civilisation which he found in Scotland and especially by the fine clothes.[3] It was Liebig, I think, who said that you could measure the amount of civilisation in a country by the amount of soap used. The Englishman is—or before the days of coupons he was—apt to judge by the quality of the clothes worn; and judging by this standard the Englishman of the sixteenth century rated Scotland very low.

A few instances may be given from the account of Somerset's expedition to Scotland written by William Patten, a military judge, which abounds in the truculent boasting of the non-combatant and in contempt of the beaten adversary. To this author the miserable apparel of the Scots is the subject of frequent remark. Speaking of the garrison which came out when Dunglass surrendered he tells of 'twenty-one sober soldiers, all so apparelled and appointed, that, so God help me, I never saw such a bunch of beggars come out of one

[1] K. W. M. Pickthorn, *Early Tudor Government*, ii. 33–5.
[2] *Skelton Laureate against the Scottes.*
[3] John Leland, *De Rebus Britannicis Collectanea*, iv. 258.

house together in my life '.[1] In describing the stricken field of Pinkie he comments upon the mean appointments and foolish armour of the Scots, and justifies the needless slaughter on the ground that all were so badly dressed that the honest English could not know who was worth taking prisoner ;—' their armour among them so little differed, and their apparel was so base and beggarly ; wherein the Lurdein was, in a manner, all one with the Lord, and the Lounde with the Larde '.

His portrait of the typical Scot is a classic. Not so far from Hailes Castle, Somerset

> had happed upon a fellow like a man, but I wot not of what sort ; small of stature, red headed, curled about and shedded afore, of a forty years old, and called himself KNOCKES.[2] To say somewhat of his haviour, his coat was of the colour of a well-burnt brick (I mean not black) and well worth twenty pence a broad yard. It was prettily fresed, half with an ado : and hemmed round about very suitably with pasmain lace of green caddis. . . . How far soever he had travelled that day he had not a whit filed his boots ; for he had none on. Harmless, belike, for he wore no weapon. He rode on a trotting tit, well worth a couple of shillings ; the loss whereof, at his taking, he took very heavily : yet did my Lord's Grace cause him to be set on a better.
>
> I take it his learning was but small, but his utterance was great, sure, for he never leaved babbling, very moist mouthed, and of nature disposed to slaver, and therefore fain, without a napkin to wipe his lips, to supp at every word. Some said it was no fault in the man ; but the manner of the country. Indeed they have many moist mists there. No lack of audacity or store of wit ; for being taken and brought in for a spy—

he could give no clear account of himself and

> —it was hard for any there to judge whether they might count him a foolish knave or a knavish fool. At whom my Lord's Grace and others had right good sport.

To Englishmen, then, Scotland appeared as a country which they must patronise, a poor shabby sort of place whose ill-clad inhabitants turned a dishonest penny by robbing one another, harrying the Borders, and making dishonourable raids upon England in the interest of France. That so beggarly a people should be avid for French crowns was axiomatic. Everyone

[1] Reprinted in *An English Garner : Tudor Tracts, 1532–1558* (ed. 1903), pp. 86, 94, 127.

[2] John Knox was born near Haddington, and was by descent an adherent of the house of Hepburn of Hailes (J. Knox, *The History of the Reformation in Scotland*, ed. Laing, ii. 323). He was a prisoner in France in September 1547.

knew they did that. In *Utopia* Raphael Hythloday, in expounding the policy of France, remarks ' therefore the Scots are to be kept in readiness to be let loose upon England on every occasion '. He adds that ' some banished nobleman is to be supported underhand (for by the league it cannot be done avowedly) who has a pretension to the Crown, by which means that suspected prince may be kept in awe '.

There speaks the Englishman. More was thinking perhaps of Perkin, or of more authentic scions of the White Rose who found support overseas ; it does not seem to have occurred to him that among the banished noblemen to receive French aid was Henry of Richmond, whose son was ' Henry VIII, the unconquered King of England, a prince adorned with all the virtues which become a great monarch '—according to the first sentence of *Utopia*. Nor did it occur to him that the practice of supporting exiles, so reprehensible in the French, was part of the regular procedure of the English in their dealings with Scotland.

Enough has been said to show that Scotland was but lightly regarded by the ordinary Englishman of the sixteenth century, and it may be remarked in passing that the patronising attitude of the English was one reason why their policy in Scotland, often wise in itself, was so often unsuccessful. Yet the assumption of superiority was not altogether justifiable. A glance at the history of Scotland will show that she experienced a true Renaissance, a glance at English history will show that English politics were often intertwined with those of Scotland, and a glance at the *Letters and Papers* will make it evident that Henry VIII and his councillors were much occupied with Scottish affairs. The truth is that in most of the great matters of Henry's reign—in his European adventures, in his matrimonial alliances, in his dynastic designs, and in his ecclesiastical Reformation—Scotland was closely involved, and if she has been kept in the background by historians it is not because her affairs were unimportant to England, but because there were so many other things of great importance that Scotland has been in a manner ' crowded out '. The relations between Scotland and England during the reign of Henry VIII are not unworthy of examination.

The diplomatic basis of these relations was the treaty of perpetual peace made between James IV and Henry VII in January 1502. At first sight it is not remarkable. In general appearance it follows the common form of treaties, and in some respects it resembles closely those wearisome ' truces ' which punctuated the fifteenth century in an uneasy sequence. It is

plainly only the culmination of a definite policy pursued by peace-loving Henry VII. Despite Scotland's support of Perkin, which was contrary to an existing truce, Henry availed himself of Ayala's mediation to conclude, in 1497, the truce of Ayton,[1] which was to last for seven years. In 1499 the truce was extended to cover the lives of both kings, and one year beyond the death of the longer liver.[2] Now, in January 1502, came the treaty of perpetual peace and friendship,[3] flanked by a treaty for the redress of Border grievances and by a marriage treaty whereby James was to receive—with a very modest dowry—the elder daughter of the thrifty English king.[4]

In all this there was much that was significant. This was the first 'peace' as opposed to a 'truce' between England and Scotland since the treaty of Northampton in 1328. Peace was to be perpetual and provision was made for renewal within six months of the death of either king. Remedies were provided against the inevitable 'incidents' on the Borders and at sea, and it was carefully arranged that local infringements of the treaty were not to become *casus belli*. The usual array of allies and confederates *pro parte* of either king was included, and it was stipulated that if an ally of one of the contracting kings were at war with the other contracting king, then that king should aid his ally only in the ally's own land. Each king, that is to say, was to abstain from a direct attack upon the territories of the other king to whom he was now contracted in the bonds of perpetual peace.

Two points call for special notice. The two contracting kings bound themselves to render mutual aid if either were called upon to wage a defensive war, sending such aid as was asked, at the expense of the asker, 'notwithstanding whatsoever contracts friendships leagues and confederations, in whatever form of words, and however ratified, already concluded contrary to this arrangement'. This clause was plainly aimed against the 'Auld Alliance' between Scotland and France, which had been renewed in 1491–2. It is significant that six months later, in July, James undertook not to renew this alliance—as he ought to do, since Charles VIII was dead and Louis XII had succeeded him—until he had spoken with Henry.[5] It is remarkable that in his first oath to keep the English treaty James gave Henry the title of King of France, and that later, in December 1502, he took the oath over again,[6] this time omitting the title of King of France, which he formally declared had been included in his former oath only by in-

[1] *Foedera*, xii. 673. [2] *Ibid.*, xii. 722. [3] *Ibid.*, xii. 793.
[4] *Ibid.*, xii. 787, 800. [5] *Ibid.*, xiii. 12. [6] *Ibid.*, xii. 804; xiii. 43, 44.

advertence. There had been inadvertence on his part, no doubt. Had there been inadvertence also on the part of the English negotiators? Perhaps we may acquit Henry of sharp practice; but he was sly.

The second point worthy of special notice is that the treaty was put under papal sanction. (This was a not unusual precaution.) Each king was to obtain the Pope's approbation by 1 July 1503; thereafter any breach of the treaty would be punishable by excommunication as well as by interdict, and the two monarchs promised not to use any existing special privilege in order to claim exemption. Later they undertook not to seek from the Pope any dispensation or relaxation from their oaths, and not to use any such dispensation or relaxation if it were asked by others upon behalf of either.[1]

The formalities were completed by December 1502, and next year the princess, a girl of fourteen, came up to Scotland with a gallant train. She was gallantly welcomed and on August 8, in the Abbey Church of Holyroodhouse, the Thistle was wedded to the Rose.

Telling how Dame Nature chose the kings of beasts and birds and flowers, Dunbar wrote,

> Than callit scho all flouris that grew on feild,
> Discirnyng all thair fassionis and effeiris;
> Upon the awfull Thrissill scho beheld,
> And saw him kepit with a busche of speiris;
> Concedring him so able for the weiris,
> A radius croun of rubies scho him gaif,
> And said, In feild go furth, and fend the laif.

She advised the new-crowned king about the choice of a mate, commended the lily, but concluded in praise of the rose

> Not hald non udir flour in sic denty
> As the fresche Ros of cullour reid and quhyt;
> For gife thow dois, hurt is thyne honesty,
> Conciddering that no flour is so perfyt,
> So full of vertew, plesans, and delyt,
> So full of blisfull angeilik bewty,
> Imperiall birth, honour and dignite.[2]

Perpetual friendship under papal sanction, a royal marriage, provision for redress of grievances, abundance of oaths—the pact was as firm as cautious Henry VII could make it. Some,

[1] *Foedera*, xiii. 50.

[2] A comparison between the poetry of Dunbar and that of Skelton is instructive. Dunbar was probably the author of the famous 'London, thou art of taines A. per se'. If he were not, Scotland must have had at least two poets who make Skelton look very small.

appraising Scotland in the traditional way, may have thought that it was too firm. What would happen if issue failed to the royal house of England? 'Then the kingdom of England would fall to the king of Scotland, which might prejudice the monarchy of England. Whereunto the king himself replied; that if that should be, Scotland would be but an accession to England, and not England to Scotland, for that the greater would draw the less: and that it was a safer union for England than that of France.'

The words are Bacon's and it is from its occurrence in the *History of King Henry VII* that the story gained a general currency. It has been pointed out that Bacon wrote in 1622 when the union of the crowns was a *fait accompli*, but that, at the time the words were supposed to have been uttered, the royal house of England was far better secured than that of Scotland and that no one could have foreseen a result like that of the famous *Erbvertrag* between Luxemburg and Habsburg in 1364. The conclusion is that Henry's fame as the architect of Union between England and Scotland rests on mortal foundations.[1] Yet the story does not occur first in Bacon. It is found in Book 26 of Polydore Vergil's *Historia Anglica*, as published in the second edition (which contains the additional Book 27). This was printed in 1555 and was presumably written sometime before this date, as the author died about 1555. It was quoted by Bishop Leslie, whose book *De Origine, Moribus et Rebus Scotorum* was published in Rome in 1578 and was evidently widely known before the Union of 1603 gave it an *ex post facto* value.[2] It may have some basis of fact. Henry may have envisaged a distant possibility. England and Scotland were part of the same island or group of islands. The two people used, in the main, the same language; readers of Patten will observe that certain archaic forms, which must be explained by an English editor, are still in common use north of the Tweed, in spite of the advance of 'Cinemese'. There had long been affinity of blood between the ruling houses, and with the marriage of 1502 the affinity was become very close. The constitutional development of the countries was not as different as used to be supposed when the English parliament was regarded as having been, throughout all its life, solely the expression of the representative idea. Moreover, as appears from Dunbar and other writers, some Scotsmen

[1] See A. F. Pollard, *The Reign of Henry VII from Contemporary Sources*, i, p. lx, for a criticism of Bacon.

[2] Scots translation by Father Dalrymple (1596) in *Scottish Text Society*, ii. 118. The story does not appear in the first (1534) edition of Polydore. I quote from the 1574 edition, p. 608.

were well-disposed towards England. Why should not the two countries become one?

Certainly much Gaelic was still spoken; James IV could speak some. But it is plain from Dunbar that the men of letters, or some of them, held it in contempt. James V denounced as 'ane trateur' one of his subjects whom he heard 'knap suddrone', and Knox's opponents rallied him on his anglified language, but these references are to Scots, not to Gaelic. There is a curious letter to Henry VIII in favour of union by 'John Elder, Clerke, a Redshanke', of date 1542,[1] and it appears not only from Dunbar but from the patriotic Lindsay of Pitscottie that there was an English party in the Scottish court even in the days of James IV.

Whether or not he looked forward to a future union Henry VII had done his best to establish perpetual peace, and the treaty of 1502 was solemnly renewed, under the oath of both kings, soon after Henry VIII succeeded in 1509. During the long reign of Henry VIII the fortunes of England and Scotland were indeed closely bound together, yet the intimacy was not as a rule one of friendliness. True, there were periods of cordiality, or seeming cordiality, but broadly speaking relations grew worse as the years passed. Flodden was a bloody battle, yet not without its chivalry; but towards the close of Henry's reign there was evident a brutality seldom, if ever, equalled in the annals of war on British soil. What was the cause of this steady deterioration?

Many causes might be urged. It might be said, in these days when we try to explain all by economics, that the two countries were rivals for the Netherlands trade. It is true enough that, despite certain commercial advantages which Scottish merchants possessed in France, Scotland looked much to the Low Countries. There was something like a Scottish staple at Bruges more than a century before the staple was finally established at Veere (1541), and during the intervening years experiments had been tried at Antwerp and Middelburg. It is obvious that in any controversy the old-established and much more valuable English trade would inevitably prevail, and that Anglo-Scottish relations would not be improved by this circumstance. But, perhaps because Scottish trade was not large enough to excite a serious quarrel, economic differences do not appear to have been a very important factor in the Anglo-Scottish quarrel. The economic explanation does not in this case take us very far. The religious motive is more important. It is clear that after Henry's rejection of papal

[1] *Bannatyne Miscellany*, i, p. i.

authority, and especially during those times of stress when the shadow of the great crusade—it was never more than a shadow—fell over England, Anglo-Scottish relations necessarily became very tense. For good or for ill the King of Scots had come to believe that the fortunes of his house were bound up with those of the old church, and although he may have been tempted by Henry's suggestion that clerical wealth was his for the taking, he would not, in the crisis, abandon his established policy. In the end the quarrel between England and Scotland took on a religious, or at least an ecclesiastical, complexion.

Again, emphasis may be laid on purely personal factors, and with justice, for this is the period of the Renaissance when the character of 'the Prince' played a great part in determining the fate of his country. It may fairly be said that the personalities which dominated politics on both sides of the Border were not of a temper which made for peace. James IV was not the animated sword-blade of popular belief. The Scottish monarchs had not dominated their nobles; they relied much on the church, which had a preponderant share of the national wealth; the best of their advisers had been clerics, and their 'administration' was largely paid from clerical revenues. James IV really believed in the crusade which other European monarchs included in their programmes *pro forma*. He hoped to serve as Admiral. In view of the startling advances made by Islam in the sixteenth century, it is possible that he was wiser than his intelligent critics. But he was an incurable romantic; he was of martial disposition; he was fond of display, and loved to hold the centre of the stage. His wife Margaret, who might have promoted good feeling between the two kingdoms, was a rather silly woman who married Archibald Douglas, sixth Earl of Angus—the Earl of Anguishe to some of the English and Cheeping Archibald to some of the Scots—a man younger than herself, less than a year after James's death at Flodden. She soon quarrelled with her new husband, whom she succeeded in divorcing in 1526 in order to marry another young man (Henry Stewart, later Lord Methven), and her matrimonial indiscretions were such as to bring down a severe rebuke from her correct brother Henry. James V was a spoilt boy, raised to real power when he was far too young, and his head was turned by the adulation he received when the whirligig of Reformation politics gave Scotland an importance far beyond the normal. He was popular and had great qualities; but of these prudence was not one and his brilliant psychology was rather brittle. He died at the age of thirty, leaving as his heir

an infant girl and as his political successors a wife from France, or rather from Lorraine, an ambitious cardinal, and a ' swithering ' Hamilton with a claim to the crown if the baby queen should die. In the Scottish personalities was no great hope of peace, and England, a nursery of high Renaissance tempers, did not produce at this time a peaceloving race of men. Henry, who summed up in himself many of the great qualities of his people, was well fitted by his physical and mental gifts to rule in a period when the king must needs be the mainspring of the state. He was in his youth an athlete and, as Holbein's pictures show, there was royalty in his presence even after grace had left his body. He was a good musician, something of a scholar, and something of a theologian. If he was something of an exhibitionist too he had high courage, great abilities, and beneath a bluff exterior a cold-blooded competence. His arrogant self-confidence extended into spiritual affairs. This was a king ' whose conscience would not suffer him to do wrong ' ; it always told him that he was right. Underneath all he was the true son of his father ; pageantry, scholarship and religion, they must all serve his ends in a practical way. Take him for all in all, he was a true prince of the Renaissance.

His servants were not unworthy of him—the able Wolsey, the valiant Howards, the industrious Cromwell, and the hard-working members of his council. Courage they all had.[1] For all of them peace and war were to be sought according to advantage, and for some of them perhaps war was more attractive than peace because it was more adventurous. Henry and his administrators were no believers in ideal pacifism.

Along with the question of personality must be considered the question of dynasty. The long minority of James V invited English interference, and when James died, leaving only a baby girl as his successor, Henry was presented with an opportunity exactly similar to that offered to Edward I when Alexander III ' brak's neck-bane ' on the cliff near Kinghorn in 1286. Henry who regarded himself as heir to the Plantagenets, and who added to the tradition of the Middle Ages the realism of the Renaissance, would have been less than his ancestors if he had failed to seek his profit in the occasion, and less than himself if he had failed to identify his own aggrandisement with the welfare of both realms.

[1] I do not forget Cromwell's abject letter after his condemnation. Possibly not being gentle-born he dreaded a death worse than simple decapitation ; possibly he thought that ' anything was worth trying once '. It seems that he died bravely enough.

All these factors taken together, and taken along with the old tradition of national antipathy, are sufficient to account for the failure of Henry VII's project of an enduring peace. It is however possible to suggest two specific reasons of a purely political kind why this project, despite its essential wisdom, contained within itself the seeds of its own defeat, namely, the Auld Alliance between Scotland and France and the English claim to suzerainty over Scotland. These two matters may be considered separately but they were closely related; it was fear of English domination which drove Scotland into the arms of France, and, incidentally, fear of French domination which led the English crown and the Scottish protestants to act together in 1560, though Elizabeth hated rebels and the Scots knew the risks attached to English interference.

The Auld Alliance, though it had its results in culture, art, architecture, learning and religion, was in origin and in essence a political thing. It did not, as was claimed, go back to the days of Charlemagne, but it had its beginnings in the twelfth century when both Scotland and France were threatened by the rising might of the Angevin monarchy. William the Lion, to his discomfiture, made common cause with Louis VII in supporting the rebellion of Henry II's sons in 1173–4. Both Alexander II (1239) and Alexander III (1285) married French brides *en secondes noces*. The first formal expression of the alliance was the treaty of 1295 between John Balliol and Philip IV, but, Balliol being regarded as an interloper by later dynasties, the first treaty usually cited was that made by Robert Bruce and Charles IV at Corbeil in 1326. The alliance was inherited by the Stuarts. Hardly was Robert II installed upon his throne when he renewed the treaty in 1371, and thereafter it was renewed, generally speaking in the same terms and to some extent in the same words, by each successive King of Scots.

This Auld Alliance was definitely directed against England. It was primarily defensive, but it could easily become offensive, and the proviso—always included—that the existing truces between Scotland and England must be ended or somehow broken by English action before a *casus belli* arose, was plainly but a slender safeguard. Truces had time limits and were very brittle things. The blunt fact is that, in the Auld Alliance, renewed as late as 1491–2, England was regarded as the great enemy of Scotland. In the treaty of 1502, as already noted, she was regarded as the great friend. James IV was pledged to both countries, and as long as Henry VII was at peace with both Scotland and France, the incompatability of his commit-

ments might remain latent. But if France and England quarrelled ? . . . *Impasse !*

The English claim to suzerainty over Scotland was of old standing. It was professedly based on transactions of the kings of Alfred's house with early Scottish kings, and had been given a historical justification in the mythical history of Geoffrey of Monmouth. It had been made good in 1174, when William the Lion was captured, and although Richard I had sold Scotland back her independence in 1189 it had been reasserted, though not admitted by Scotland, in the days of Alexander III. Edward I, thwarted in his design of peaceful acquisition by the death of the Maid of Norway, had revived it (with the aid of selected evidence) in 1291, and in spite of the long War of Independence and the Treaty of Northampton (1328) the claim had been renewed again by Edward III, who appointed Edward Balliol his vassal king in 1334 and in 1356 took the superiority into his own hands. Even the weak Henry IV had found it politic to advance the claim in 1400 [1]; as late as 1482 Edward IV had returned to the attack and had signed treaties with James III's rebellious brother Albany, whom he recognised as king under his suzerainty. It is true that latterly the claim had not been seriously urged; rather was it used, along with inevitable rebel noblemen, as a sort of ' aweband ' over the King of Scots. Nothing was said of it in the treaty of 1502. But it had never been renounced, and coupled with the *de haut en bas* attitude of England already noticed, it remained a constant menace to Anglo-Scottish friendship.

It is in the light of these considerations that the events which led to the battle of Flodden must be examined. A common Scottish explanation was that the disaster was due to the gallant levity of the adventurous James, who lost his life and ruined his kingdom by taking up the challenge of the French queen's ring.[2] The common English account represents the Scottish king as the victim of his own overweeningness and of French persuasion, attacking England when her main army was overseas, beaten by a sort of *ersatz* force, justly excommunicate by reason of his broken oath, and granted the right of Christian burial only upon the request of the triumphant Henry. ' He has paid ', wrote the English king, ' a heavier penalty for his

[1] *Foedera*, viii. 157–8.

[2] The story of Queen Anne's ring is told by Lindesay of Pitscottie (*S.T.S. Edn.*, i. 256), who was very critical of James. George Buchanan, though he mentions English provocation, was critical too. The ' supernatural ' warnings which preceded the march into England may be taken as evidence of a strong feeling in Scotland against the venture.

perfidy than we would have wished ', and a very great English historian comments : ' There was some justice in the charge. James was bound by treaty not to go to war with England ; he had not even waited for the Pope's reply to his request for absolution from his oath ; and his challenge to Henry, when he was in France and could not meet it, was not a knightly deed.' [1]

This is in essence a paraphrase of the view of Henry VIII himself, as stated by Hall, though expressed in more moderate terms. Two points in Hall's version, however, are worthy of note. According to Hall,[2] Henry said to the Scots herald (Lyon) who visited him in his camp before Thérouanne,

> Nowe we perceyve the kyng of Scottes our brother in law and your master to be the same person whome we ever toke hym to be, for we never estemed hym to be of any truthe and so now we have founde it, for notwithstandynge his othe, his promise in the woord of kyng, and his awne hand and seale, yet nowe he hath broken his faith and promise to his great dishonour and infamie for ever, and entendeth to invade our realme in our absence which he dirst not ones attempte, our person beynge presente, but he sheweth him self not to be degenerate from the condicions of his forefathers, whose faythes for the most parte hath ever ben violated and ther promises never observed, farther than they liste. . . . But thus saye to thy master, that I am the very owner of Scotland, and he holdeth it of me by homage. . . .

It must be admitted that Henry was in a bad temper, and that he did not repeat his claim of suzerainty—somewhat incompatible with his professions of sincerity in regard to the treaty of 1509—in the formal letter which he wrote to James in reply to the herald's message. But, temper or no, Henry had made his own attitude quite clear, and in the preamble to the subsidy acts in the parliament of February 1512 the King of Scots is described as the ' very homager and obediencer of right to your Highness '.

The case of James must now be regarded. Henry had sworn oaths too. He was to be a good friend to Scotland and to redress complaints speedily. In fact he had refused to hand over to Margaret some jewels which her father had left her,[3] and he had failed to arrest two borderers who had slain a Scottish Warden at a day of law. In August 1511 his admiral

[1] A. F. Pollard, *Henry VIII*, p. 66.
[2] Charles Whibley's edition, i. 76.
[3] Brodie's edition of Vol. i of the *Letters and Papers* of Henry VIII (henceforth cited as Brodie), 1767.

had killed one of James's favourite captains, Andrew Barton, in the Downs and taken his ships into the Thames, and to Scottish complaints he had replied contemptuously that kings did not concern themselves with the affairs of pirates.

The Bartons, however, were not pirates;[1] they were privateers. In the reign of James III a ship of John Barton had been plundered by a Portuguese fleet off Sluys, and as the King of Portugal would grant no redress even the peace-loving James III—*princeps togatus* as his son called him—had at last been forced to grant letters of reprisal, which had been, however, *minime executas*. James IV had tried for some years to avoid ratifying these letters, but, failing to secure any satisfaction from Portugal, had renewed them, apparently in 1494, and had advised Maxmilian, whose ports were sought both by the Portuguese and by the Bartons, of their existence and of the limited terms in which they were to be operative. No doubt, like other privateers, the Bartons had taken a wide view of their rights, and the disturbance they caused may have interrupted the Netherlands trade which was so important for England. But they seem to have been blamed for depredations committed by others, and there is no proof that they had so far attacked English ships;[2] the Scottish story was that Barton was surprised by a treacherous attack of the ships of an allied nation in superior force. At all events, by the treaty of 1509, it was Henry's duty to consider the Scottish king's complaint, and in this matter his oath seems to have sat lightly upon him.

The oath to Scotland, moreover, was not the only one which Henry had taken. In March 1510 he had renewed the peace with France,[3] made by his father, for the lifetime of the two contracting kings and for one year after the death of whichever king should die first; the two princes had solemnly sworn not to attempt anything one against the other. This treaty, too, had been placed under the sanction of papal excommunication, and indeed the pope had been included *pro parte* of both Henry and Louis. It had been duly confirmed by the pope.[4] Yet Henry, at the persuasion of cunning Ferdinand, and in his desire to shine as the paladin of the church, joined the Holy

[1] The story of the Bartons appears from letters in the *Epistolae Jacobi Quarti, Jacobi Quinti, et Mariae Regum Scotorum*, published by Ruddiman in 1722 (henceforth cited as *E.R.S.*); cf. i. 89, 91. In the reign of Henry VIII these letters are noticed in Brodie.

[2] Brodie, 484. The caveat of Denmark (Brodie, 1056) proves nothing, and list of depredations committed by the Scots (Brodie, 1262) begins at a date after the death of Andrew Barton.

[3] *Foedera*, xiii. 270.

[4] Brodie, 587 (7).

League on 13 November 1511, and four days later made a definite treaty with Ferdinand against Louis.[1]

The work of Henry VII was undone, and James was in an impossible position: France and England were soon to be at war, and he was pledged to both. In December 1511 he wrote to the pope, explaining that in view of Henry's conduct, whereby 'pax in perniciem versa bello nobis gravior fuit', he must suppose that both he and Henry were released from their oaths and from the penalty of censure attendant upon breach of oath.[2] But he was not allowed thus to escape from the toils.

James had seen the approach of the crisis and had done his best to avoid it. He had sent Andrew Forman, bishop of Moray, on a peace mission to Italy where, excluded as it now appears from the realities of the situation and allowed to believe that England too was working for peace, he had industriously ploughed the sand during a great part of the year 1511. Even after his return in the spring of 1512—he reported to Henry *en passant*—James continued to hope. He wrote to the Pope explaining his efforts to induce France to peace and urging that the Christian princes should sink their quarrels in a grand crusade against the Turks.[3] Somewhat naïvely he endeavoured to maintain peace by enlisting the good offices of Ferdinand, who was in fact the main architect of the war. France also continued to hope, and it was only after the failure of the mission of de Rieux about Easter 1512 that she reconciled herself to the inevitable.

Until this date France, for her own ends no doubt, had endeavoured to use the Auld Alliance not to engage Scotland in war against England,[4] but to hold England, Scotland and herself together in a Triple Entente. She and Scotland, in fact, tried to maintain the system of Henry VII; it was Henry VIII who destroyed it. Certainly, after she saw that war with England was unavoidable, France tried the other tack. In March 1512 the Auld Alliance was formally renewed, on the usual terms; in July it was renewed again, but this time with the omission of the clause about the ending or breaking of existing truces between England and Scotland before the *casus foederis* arose.[5] The truces, said France, had already been broken by Henry; to all intents, England and Scotland were already at war. James, for his part, apparently suggested that the money hitherto paid to England under the

[1] Brodie, 939, 945.
[2] *E.R.S.*, i. 122; see *Flodden Papers* (S.H.S., 1933).
[3] *E.R.S.*, i. 135, 179; Brodie, 1110, 1615. [4] *Flodden Papers*, 20.
[5] I obtained from Paris rotographs of the treaties of 16 March and 10 July. A comparison is instructive.

renewal of the Treaty of Etaples in 1510 should now be paid to himself,[1] and wrote to Denmark to see what his kinsman there would do in the event of his being forced into a war with England.[2] Plainly the Auld Alliance was now becoming an instrument of war.

But it is not unfair to argue that the war was of England's seeking. Henry's actions are worthy of remark. Throughout 1511 he allowed Moray,[3] James's envoy to Italy, to believe that England too was working for peace, although his own representative, Cardinal Bainbridge, steadily impeded the negotiations. He continued to accept payments from France, under the renewed Treaty of Etaples, and was evidently expecting an instalment due in November 1511.[4] Yet next month he recalled some artillery which he had lent to Margaret of Savoy,[5] Governess of the Netherlands, ' à cause de son expédition contre les Ecossais '. At the same time he provided by indenture that Dacre should continue Warden of the East and Middle Marches till Easter, ' or later at the king's pleasure ' if the peace continued,[6] and authorised his officer to make reprisals on the Scots if they would not be contented with reason. Between 4 August and 27 October he kept on foot an ' army against Scotland ' [7] under the command of Surrey, to whom he delivered the banner of St. George and other standards, and though this was only a skeleton force it served as a full-dress rehearsal for the mobilisation of the host which fought at Flodden. This was no *ersatz* army, and not like an *ersatz* army did it behave on the day of battle. Meanwhile the pious English monarch kept himself right with the pope. Despite his French treaty and its accompanying oaths he was able to attack France with impunity in 1512 ; [8] he deliberately prevented the dispatch of Moray to the Pope upon another peace mission,[9] provided in advance for James's excommunication if he broke the treaty of 1502, and was at pains to see to it that the death of Julius and the succession of Leo X did not interrupt the preparations for launching papal censures without delay.[10]

[1] Brodie, 1380 (Sept. 1512).

[2] *E.R.S.*, i. 146 ; Brodie, 1155 (April 1512) ; cf. Brodie, 1523, and *Flodden Papers*, Introduction, xxiv.

[3] For Moray see J. Herkless and R. K. Hannay, *The Archbishops of St. Andrews*, vol. ii. esp. p. 43, where it appears that Moray was allowed to think that he voiced the opinions of Henry as well as James (cf. *E.R.S.*, i. 136, and *Flodden Papers*, 17.)

[4] Brodie, 924, 34. [5] *Ibid.*, 992. [6] *Ibid.*, 984.

[7] *Ibid.*, 1317, 1450, 1451.

[8] *Ibid.*, 1533. Julius granted plenary indulgence to those who would join Henry's expedition against Louis.

[9] *Ibid.*, 1340, 1499, 1539, 1615, 1706–7. [10] *Ibid.*, 1735, 1769, 1775.

The luckless James tried in 1513 to keep himself within the bounds of his treaty by limiting his help to France to the giving of aid outside England, but France insisted on a direct invasion of England by the Scots if she herself were invaded by the English. In the summer of 1513 Henry crossed the sea with what must have been one of the best dressed armies ever to leave the shores of Britain. The sending of the Lyon King to Thérouanne to urge Henry's return was James's last effort. His overture was contemptuously spurned, and on 22 August he crossed the Border. Censure had been pronounced at Rome in advance on 13 August.[1]

On 9 September the King of Scots was killed at Flodden. He died excommunicate, and the pious Catherine did not know what to do with his body. Henry obtained from the pope the privilege of Christian burial and meant to inter his dead brother-in-law at St. Paul's with magnificent ceremony, wherein he no doubt would have played the part of the magnanimous —and appropriately dressed—chief mourner. But his mind turned to other things, perhaps, or he needed the money for other purposes. James's body was never properly buried, and his head afterwards met the fate described by Stow in his *Survey of London*.[2] James, no doubt, was hazardous and rash, but it is impossible not to feel some sympathy for him. He was a good churchman ; and in view of the subsequent advance of the Turks his desire to bring about a grand crusade cannot be dismissed as absurd ; the romantic was more of a realist than the realists themselves. But the attitude of the pope was impossible ; he, who should have been the architect and the maintainer of Christian peace, became an active participant in war. If a homely analogy be permitted, it was as if the referee at a football match donned a jersey and took a hearty part in the game, at the same time retaining his whistle and declaring his opponents off-side whenever they became dangerous.

The story of Flodden reveals certain principles in the light of which the course of Anglo-Scottish relations during the reign of Henry VIII may be clearly understood. The English claim to suzerainty over Scotland and the Auld Alliance were alike threats to peace, but they were not always actively dangerous. The claim to suzerainty could sometimes be conveniently forgotten, and the alliance between Scotland and France might serve upon occasion to draw England and France together. But between them they produced an inflammable atmosphere, liable to burst into flames when a random spark blew in from the European bonfire, and Europe at this time was always

[1] Brodie, 3617 (p. 1528).

[2] In the section on Cripplegate Ward.

smouldering, and often ablaze, with war. The blunt truth is that Scotland was not equal in might to England or to France; either of the greater powers would normally prefer an alliance with the other to an alliance with Scotland, and Scottish interests were apt to take second place. If England and France were at peace, Scotland might prosper in quietness; if England were a suitor for French friendship, French influence would prevail north of the Tweed; if France were in need of English help she would be careful not to prejudice her position by affording ill-judged aid to the Scots. Witness the story of Albany. He is usually, and rightly, reckoned as having been the representative of France in Scotland, but it is plain enough that his missions to Scotland were governed by the exigencies of French policy and that as long as there was a chance of gaining or keeping English friendship he was detained in France. This is but one instance of a general truth. Scotland had not, in herself, the means to pursue a quite independent policy, and she reacted so much to outside influence that it would be possible for one who knew little of Scottish affairs to deduce her diplomatic history from a knowledge of the diplomatic history of western Europe.

Certainly personal factors entered also. Henry was, after all, Margaret's brother, and provided that he could get his way in Scotland he was content to keep his high-sounding claims in abeyance, seeking his ends by gentle means.[1] In 1524, when he was not sure how the quarrel between Francis and Charles would go, and when he had no heir save Mary, he seems to have thought seriously of giving his daughter in marriage to his nephew. A peaceful union would be secured, and it would be all in the family. 'As touching mariage' wrote Wolsey to Margaret in August 1524, 'if the King your son, Your Grace and the Lordes of Scotlande procede directly, lovingly and nobly with the Kinges Highnes, it may fortune that such a mariage may be founde for your said son as never King of Scottes had the like.'[2]

Proceeding 'directly, lovingly and nobly' meant doing what Henry said, and at this very moment Henry was projecting a treaty with France[3] and the Empire in which, he insisted, Scotland should be included only as a fief of England. The Scots may not have known of this, though possibly the story leaked out through France; but they may have had their suspicions of Henry's benevolence, and certainly France cannot

[1] He did not press his claim to be 'Protector of Scotland' after Flodden (Pollard, *Henry VIII*, p. 88).

[2] *Letters and Papers*, IV, i. 551. [3] Pollard, *Henry VIII*, 406 and n.

have wished to see Scotland pass completely into the control of the ambitious English king.

Henry, as it happened, soon moved into line with France,[1] and he also discovered soon, if he had not discovered already, that he was entitled to have a son of his own ; hence, although a Spanish account alleges that the Scottish match was popular in England as late as 1527, it never came near completion and perhaps it was never entirely to Henry's mind.[2]

A new turn was given to Anglo-Scottish relations by Henry's quarrel with the Pope. Now it was England which sought the friendship of France. Determined to secure and keep this, the English king was content to let Scotland be, and for a while she was free from outside interference. When, however, he failed to carry France with him into open revolt from Rome, Henry became extremely anxious for Scottish support. In 1534 he made a treaty of peace to last till the death of one of the two kings ; he courted James, sent him the Garter, and tried to lure him into the path of reform by talk of the spoils of the Church. He even disguised the disappointment he must have felt at the two successive French marriages of the Scottish king, even although the second of the brides, Mary of Lorraine, was on his own list of ' possibles '. In 1541, when the temporary reconciliation of Francis and Charles brought the danger of a grand crusade against England uncomfortably close, he actually came up to York in order to meet the King of Scots in person.

James, yielding to clerical persuasion and a perhaps not unnatural fear that it might be easier to get into England than to get out, failed to keep his promise to appear, and, partly for that reason, war broke out. Henry insisted that it was the Scots who invaded, though the dead on Haddon Rig gave silent witness that it was his own men who had crossed the Border. Haddon was a reverse, but it was soon made good. The Protestant cause was already strong north of the Tweed, and many of the nobles distrusted their priest-led king.

Henry, as was usual with him, met opposition with increased violence. He prepared a fresh expedition under Norfolk, and at the same time wrote to the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of Durham bidding them search their archives for proof of his suzerainty over Scotland. The fruits of his researches appear in the manifesto which he issued instead of

[1] To restore the balance upset by the battle of Pavia.

[2] *Letters and Papers*, IV, i. 571. Wolsey represents the marriage project as of Margaret's initiation.

the declaration of war to accompany Norfolk's attack. This 'Declaration conteignying the just causes and consideracions of this present warre with the Scottes . . .' is printed *in extenso* by Hall. The English expedition was a failure; beyond the burning of Roxburgh and Kelso it effected nothing. But the Scottish counter-attack was a disaster; it failed miserably at Solway Moss on November 24, and James died partly of melancholy on December 14, leaving as his heir a daughter who was but a week old.

Henry's opportunity was come. He had no thought of surrendering his claim of suzerainty; it formed the basis of the secret arrangements which he made with the released prisoners of Solway Moss who undertook to serve him; and it appears that he regarded the appointment of Arran as regent without reference to himself as a breach of his suzerainty. But, for the moment, he made no public assertion of his right, because he hoped to get all without discussion.

The ball was at his feet. Francis and Charles were at loggerheads once more and there was no longer any danger of invasion or indeed of any serious interference from overseas. He had a marriageable son; Scotland had a baby queen who was his kinswoman; 1286 was come again. Using his advantage with skill he secured, in August 1543, the treaties of Greenwich whereby Mary was pledged to Edward. It seemed that he had won the game. The influence of the Roman Church, however, was still powerful in Scotland, and its leader Cardinal Beaton was able and resolute; many Scotsmen felt doubtful about a match wherein England provided the lad and the Scots the lass, and Henry's high-handed conduct awakened apprehension. Even before the treaties were signed he was speaking of his rights as superior of Scotland, and hardly was the ink dry before he seized the cargoes of Scottish ships. French influence reasserted itself, and in December the English treaties were denounced by the Scottish parliament on the ground that Henry had broken the peace which was the object of the proposed marriage alliance.[1]

Henry was furious. Little was left now of the Tudor Rose except the thorns—courage remained with him always. The claim to the suzerainty of Scotland was at once revived in formal terms. In the preamble to the Act for the Subsidie of the Temporaltie [2] passed in the session of January–March 1544, 'the Kinges moste loving and obedient subjects, the Lordes spirituall and the temporall and the Commons in this present parliament assembled' categorically asserted that 'the

[1] *A.P.S.*, ii. 431. [2] *Statutes of the Realm*, iii. 938.

Kinges Majeste our moste naturall and dreade Soveraigne Lorde hathe good juste tytle and interest to the Crowne and Realme of Scotlande'. They based the claim upon authentic records, old homages and the forfeitures of vassal kings who had rebelled against Henry's predecessors, declaring that, although the actual exercise of the title 'hathe been spared and forborne by the king and his father in respect of marriage and proximity of blood', such forbearance did not prejudice the title in any way, and that now the time was 'apt and propyse' for its vindication.

Henry launched his armies north with the most brutal instructions ever issued by an English council[1]: to burn and to waste, and in case of resistance to slay man, woman and child. The tale of ruined abbeys, towns and farms shows that his commanders did their best to carry out their orders. He bargained with Scottish Protestants, with discontented nobles and with the Lord of the Isles, and became party to a scheme for the murder of Beaton, though it was stipulated that he must not appear in that business openly. But his power was not equal to his malice. He was soon at war with France; he was ageing; dissensions began to appear in his council; and though he destroyed much in Scotland he gained little. Beaton was murdered in May 1546, but a few weeks later all that remained of the English party in Scotland was the small body of desperate men, the 'Castilians' who held the castle of St. Andrews until July 1547, when, Henry being dead and his ships withdrawn, it was reduced by the skilled gunners brought in French galleys.

Such was the end of Henry's enterprise of Scotland. He had awakened an antipathy which begot the brutalities noted by the French soldier de Beaugué,[2] and in spite of Somerset's victory of Pinkie and a partial occupation, French influences prevailed in Scotland. Indeed, between the years 1550 and 1560, Scotland was in some danger of becoming a French province.

The idea of a union between England and Scotland was good, and despite Henry's failures the countries showed signs of coming together during his reign.[3] A common interest

[1] Cf. *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 326, 360. It is fair to remark that the English hosts included foreign mercenaries.

[2] *Histoire de la guerre d'Ecosse* (Maitland Club, 1830). Jean de Beaugué was a gentleman who served with the French army in Scotland 1548–9. He alleges that the Scots bought English prisoners from the French and made them the targets of their lances.

[3] See the curious letter of 'John Elder, Clerke, a Redshanke' of 1542. (*Bannatyne Miscellany* (1827), i. 1.) It may be noted that Sir Walter Scott who, without the evidence of the *Letters and Papers*, did not know the whole

in Protestantism, a common dislike of French domination, common blood and many common interests all worked towards union, and it is possible that if the English king had shown more restraint he might have achieved a better result. As it was, Henry, as Andrew Lang said, was like the giant in the fairy-tale, always deceived by the little men. His violence brought him nothing. The people of the north were ill to drive ; they were conscious of their long history, of their dear-bought independence, of their own nationality. If Scotland was to take up house with England it must be as a sister, not as a bondswoman. Henry never understood that.

of the English design, considered that Henry's plan of uniting the two kingdoms by marriage alliance was ' equally moderate and sagacious ' (*The State Papers and Letters of Sir Ralph Sadler, Knight-Banneret*, i, p. x).

WOODROW WILSON: AN INTERPRETATION

By Prof. Dexter Perkins, M.A., Ph.D.

Read 16 June 1946

A traveler to England in 1946 is speedily made aware of the immense admiration of the British people for the late president of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt. It is probable that no other American statesman has evoked quite so warm a regard in the British Isles. Roosevelt early understood the issues of the war which Britain was forced to take up in 1939, and quickly responded when the collapse of France put that country in imminent peril. His intimacy with that great Englishman, Winston Churchill, dramatized the close association of the two English-speaking countries in the struggle that came to a close only a year ago. It would have been strange if he had not been appreciated by the British people. There was, however, another great American president who led his country into war, and stood by the side of Britain in critical days. His name was Woodrow Wilson, and he seems in general to have won far less affection and regard in Britain. Yet he, too, was a great man. It is the object of this paper to make him, as the author hopes, a little better understood, and to demonstrate why he deserves a place amongst the most eminent of the presidents of the United States.

It should be said at the outset that the admirer of Woodrow Wilson need not be, and ought not to be, the depreciator of his great successor. The place of Roosevelt in American history is a secure one. And it may be, indeed, that he will, in the long judgment, tower over the American leader in the First World War. Roosevelt came to office towards the end of a great depression, and presided with buoyancy and confidence over the process of partial economic recovery. He early sensed, and eloquently stated, the peril that faced the world with the rise of German and Japanese nationalism. He responded gallantly to the challenge which these nationalisms presented to Western society. He led the United States through a great war, and died when victory, if not yet at hand, was certain. He did not have to face the difficult problems of reconstruction, the disillusionment, the tensions, the reactions, that usually follow on the heels of war. He died at the moment most happy for his fame. Most presidents have retired from high office into relative obscurity; many have seen themselves shrink in

stature in private life. But Roosevelt's death was mourned all over the world, and it came when he was at the height of his career.

By contrast Woodrow Wilson lived too long. In the midst of the first World War, he made himself a true world leader, and his words were listened to all over the globe. He came to the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919, as the embodiment of the hopes and yearnings of a great part of mankind. He stood for a great idea, the idea of international organization of the League of Nations. But before long he was cast down from his pedestal. The making of peace found him caught, as any statesman must be caught, in the revival of national rivalries and the clash of national ambitions. Compromises that seemed to many of his admirers shameless surrenders to expediency (just and necessary though many of them were) shook the foundations of his fame. At home a bitter partisan opposition began to revive. The treaty which he had negotiated was defeated. America repudiated the League of Nations, which the president had done so much to bring into being. And Wilson, broken and humiliated, and embittered, lived on for more than three years, the object of devotion by a small group of admirers, but for many merely the man who had failed, the impractical idealist who had fallen short of the goal. Whether the judgment was a just one or not, we shall have a little later in this paper to examine, but at least it was a widespread one, and it illustrates vividly indeed the contrast between the circumstances of Roosevelt's death and those of his predecessor.

There is another respect in which the comparison of Roosevelt and Wilson must be unfavorable to the latter. The social reforms of the Wilson period were important, as we shall see; but they were by no means so far-reaching as those that were brought about under the New Deal. Both the one president and the other were in the line of the great liberal tradition of American politics; but the constructive accomplishments of Roosevelt's period of domestic reform are far more impressive than those of the years 1913–14.

Finally, in the personality of the two men, there is a contrast that must be regarded as in favor of Franklin Roosevelt. Few men, indeed, in American history, have had quite the capacity that Roosevelt had for winning the loyalty and the affection of countless multitudes. The gallantry with which he overcame a severe physical handicap, the buoyant confidence with which he faced all his problems, the gusto with which he confronted the most difficult trials, the humane sympathy that

sounded in his vibrant voice, and radiated from his whole personality, these things all made him one of the best-loved of American presidents. In Wilson there were many great qualities. But there was also a certain austerity which repelled all but those who were equally austere, an intellectual aloofness which was mistaken for snobbery, a kind of self-assurance which had none of the attractive quality of Roosevelt's boyish and self-confident egotism. To his intimates, and the testimony on this point is explicit, Wilson was often an attractive and a winning figure; but his intimates were few. Even in the days of his greatest fame, he was more respected and admired than loved.

Notwithstanding all these things, Wilson was a very great president of the United States; indeed in the judgment of those who have given the most intensive study to American history, he ranks higher than any other, save only Washington, Lincoln, F. D. Roosevelt, and perhaps Jefferson. And if his career be seriously studied, the reason for such a judgment will become clear. Wilson was an important figure in the history of American education; he was one of America's most important political theorists; he was a leader in the work of domestic reform in his first years in national office; he was a wise guide in the trying years of American neutrality, from 1914 to 1917; he was a remarkable war executive; and he was the prophet, and in a sense the builder, of a new international order. These are great achievements, and they deserve to be fully analysed.

Wilson's academic career is a most distinguished one. There are few American college presidents who have left their mark deep upon the educational system of the country; but he is one of them. It is the glory of the American university that it ministers to enormous numbers of students, and by so doing, provides that career open to talents that is the very life-blood of social democracy. But the very scope of the enterprise exposes it to a profound danger. In the instruction of masses of students the personal contact between teacher and student is often lost. Young men, as every teacher knows, have a great capacity to learn from older men when they respect their judgment and honor their motives; and to make such learning possible is one of the first objectives of university education. No man saw this fact more clearly, or insisted upon it more vigorously, than did Wilson in his years as president of Princeton. He instituted, there, what was known as the preceptorial system, by which college teachers met with small groups of students in an intimate and personal relationship.

And what he did there has been imitated, in one form and another, in many other institutions of learning. This sense of intimacy he desired to carry over, also, into graduate study. His plans for the Graduate School at Princeton were based upon this same principle of close association ; and here again he was close to the heart of the problem. It was not his fault that he was not able to realize these plans and that opposition and rivalry led him to resign the presidency of Princeton and run for governor of New Jersey, the office which proved, for him, to be the stepping-stone to the presidency.

One other service Wilson performed as college president that needs to be emphasized. He insisted that a university should be a seat of learning, not a place for polite and relaxed young men to enjoy themselves in an agreeable atmosphere. Perhaps the danger of transforming the American college into a country club has never been very great. Most American college students, in my judgment, are grimly determined to get something out of an education. But there is always a danger of social snobbery in the most prosperous and lavishly supported universities, and always a possibility that superficial cleverness and readiness in discussion will be mistaken for the serious work of learning. In stressing the latter Wilson called attention to a matter of considerable importance.

During his academic career, moreover, Wilson developed and matured a political philosophy which went to the very heart of the American system of government, and which has had a substantial influence. As a young graduate student at the Johns Hopkins University, he had written a doctor's thesis that, far from being a barren examination into the dry minutiae of scholarship, was a work of very real and permanent significance. It was entitled *Congressional Government*, and it contrasted the diffuse and ill-coordinated process of legislation and the formation of policy in the United States with the well-centred and well-directed process of parliamentary government in Britain. How was the ineffectiveness of the American system to be remedied ? Almost twenty years later Wilson gave the answer in what is, in my judgment, the greatest piece of political thinking done in America since the Federalist Papers, the course of lectures entitled ' Constitutional Government in the United States ', delivered at Columbia University in 1907. The answer to the problem of responsible government was to be found, these lectures insisted in the presidency itself. The president was the only officer who spoke for the whole nation. The members of the House of Representatives, it was insisted, represented local interests, and perhaps inevitably represented

such interests in a country as vast as America. The senators represented their states. Only the president could speak for all, could fuse, if he would, the congeries of local and sectional views, into something that might reasonably represent national well-being. He could do this effectively, moreover, only if he were the leader of his party as well as the leader of the nation. And if he *did* do it, he could make the American political system truly representative of the whole people, and competent to operate for the benefit of all.

This theory is absolutely fundamental, in my judgment, to a correct understanding of American political life. Our system works well when there is strong leadership from the White House; it works ill when such leadership is lacking. On the character of the president of the United States depends the whole trend of national policy.

That Wilson saw this and taught it was a great political service; but it is important to note that he also practised it when he became president of the United States. For example, he revived a practise that had been abandoned for more than a hundred years, and instead of sending long and diffuse written messages to Congress, as every president had done since Jefferson, he addressed Congress in person. He often devoted these addresses to a single subject, to a single objective in the legislative field, and thus dramatized and aroused popular interest and support. Moreover, he conferred frequently with the leaders of his party in Congress, and brought about in this fashion a close cooperation between the executive and the legislative branch. In the first two years of his first term of office, indeed, he saw enacted into law a program which he himself had resolved upon, and which embodied reforms of very real significance, and reflected the greatest credit on his administration.

These measures deserve to be outlined in this paper. As the leader of the Democratic party Wilson was pledged to the lowering of the tariff. His predecessor, President Taft, had entered office committed to revision of the customs schedules, but he had not known how to bring his influence to bear effectively upon Congress, and the result had been a fiasco which resulted in the defeat of the Republican party in the Congressional elections of 1910. Much earlier, another Democratic president, Grover Cleveland, had attempted to secure a low tariff measure, only to run afoul of the special interests that have so often played a part in tariff legislation. But the Underwood-Simmons bill of 1913, enacted under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson, was an honest fulfillment of a party

pledge. The new president, from the outset, took a hand in the framing of the measure. He made his views known as to the most important schedules; he issued a blistering statement against the lobbyists who infested Washington and worked against the measure; and he secured what was undeniably the best measure of its kind, in its balanced regard for the interest of both producer and consumer, that had passed the American Congress since the Civil War. The achievement was, it is true, to be undone by the administration of Warren Harding in 1922; but the moral victory was an important one, and those who still believe that low duties are essential to the wise conduct of American policy will find much reason for admiration in connection with this achievement.

More important, no doubt, was the Federal Reserve Act, also enacted in 1913. For a long time it had been recognized that reform of the country's banking system was in order; but little had been done under Theodore Roosevelt and his successor. The Democratic party had, from the viewpoint of conservatives, a most unsavory record on financial matters, being naturally associated with the free-silver 'heresy' of 1896. Yet Woodrow Wilson, with the cordial support of Bryan, the free-silver advocate of twenty years before, secured from the Congress a statute that has served as the foundation stone of the nation's financial organization ever since. The measure provided for federal control of the major banking resources of the United States, combined that control with a wise measure of decentralization through the establishment of twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, gave greater fluidity to the country's resources, and proved to be of the very greatest value in the critical period of the First World War. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that no measure of equal significance had been enacted by the national legislature since the Homestead Act of 1862.

The president also made an effort to deal with the problem of monopoly. The Clayton anti-trust law attempted by legal prohibitions to check the tendency towards the concentration of capital. More important, the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibited 'unfair competition' and set up an administrative tribunal which was empowered to take action against those who violated the statute. This Commission has played a not unimportant role in raising the standard of business ethics in the United States, and in bringing to end a variety of objectionable practises by which large businesses maintain an unreasonable advantage over small ones. While it cannot be said that the problem of the misuse of power by great aggregations of

capital has been solved, it is fair to credit Woodrow Wilson with a constructive effort to deal with it.

The list of Wilson's legislative achievements might easily be lengthened. But enough has been said to make clear the fundamental point. Wilson was a great liberal leader; he had a distinguished record in the field of domestic reform; this record alone would entitle him to a place among the more eminent American presidents.

The Executive elected on a program of domestic reform was, however, before his administration was less than a year and a half old, compelled to deal with the most far-reaching problems of foreign policy. In August of 1914 came the outbreak of the World War. What should be the position of the United States?

The administration decided, as indeed it had to decide, for neutrality. And a proper understanding of this decision, and of the events that followed, of American diplomacy from 1914 to 1917, is essential to a reasonable judgment of Woodrow Wilson himself.

There is still a certain type of Englishman who expects the United States to react to events in Europe as if the Atlantic were the English Channel. What is called isolationism in American history seems, and in fact is, out of date today. But it is useless to resort to merely emotional condemnation of it. It had its roots deep in the history of the United States, and it helps to explain why neutrality was the only conceivable course of action for the American government in 1914. For a hundred years prior to the outbreak of the Great War, the gaze of the American people had been directed westward, not eastward. Their energies had been preoccupied with the settling of a continent, and with the exploitation of its immense resources, and the affairs of Europe had, on the whole, little concerned them. They had neither the knowledge nor the tradition for an excursion into trans-Atlantic affairs. And in addition, the mixture of races which made up the population of the country, the existence of elements of very divergent views and national sympathies, made it highly desirable not to rupture the national unity and jeopardize the public peace by a premature espousal of the cause of one or the other sets of belligerents. That neutrality was the only proper course of action, the only feasible action politically, is best illustrated by the fact that even Theodore Roosevelt, belligerent by nature, and soon aware of the moral implications of the struggle, supported at the outset the policy of the administration. In the political climate of the summer of 1914, any other course

than that which the president and his advisers chose would have been out of the question.

It is not to be thought, however, that Woodrow Wilson was ever indifferent to the larger issues of the war of 1914–1918. It is very clear that from the beginning he was aware of the peril involved in a German victory. He told his intimate friend, Colonel House, as early as August 1914, that if Germany won it would compel the militarization of the United States, and alter the whole course of our civilization. And he clearly showed his profound sympathy with the cause of the Allies in an interview with Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the British ambassador at Washington, at about the same time. The two men had been discussing English poetry, and the Ambassador quoted from the great sonnet of Wordsworth, ' It is not to be thought of that the flood of British freedom . . .' ' There were tears in his eyes,' reported Spring Rice, ' and I am sure we can, at the right moment, depend on an understanding heart here.'

Nor was the policy of the administration unaffected by this attitude. Quite the contrary. There can be little question (and indeed the isolationist interpreters of American foreign policy have made great play of this fact) that in its policy of neutrality the American government applied a very different standard to the democratic nations than it applied to the Central Powers. Indeed, this fact has been made the basis of a formidable indictment by such publicists as Professor Edwin M. Borchard of Yale University, who accuse the president of having unnecessarily involved the country in war by the partiality which he displayed for the democratic nations. The view expressed by Borchard has been given further currency by such books as Walter Millis's *The Road to War* and by Charles C. Tansill's *America Goes to War*.

The *fact* of partiality is one that ought not to be denied by the candid historian. There can be no doubt that the first violations of international law that affected the United States came from Great Britain. The measures taken by the British government to interrupt neutral trade with Germany were certainly such as might have justified the sharpest protest. But the administration never really put its heart into such protests. Indeed, on at least one occasion, the Counselor of the Department of State, Robert Lansing, with the approval of the president himself, actually suggested means by which the British naval authorities could attain their objective, and yet keep out of trouble with the American government. A first note of protest against British naval practises was

thoroughly watered down by the president and Colonel House. A second, despatched towards the end of 1914, while stronger in tone, spoke sympathetically of 'the manifest necessities' of a belligerent, and by other phrases indicated that the representations of the State Department were, to say the least, half-hearted. On the other hand, when, in retaliation, the German Imperial Government launched the submarine campaign in the winter of 1915, the attitude of the administration was unequivocal. It declared in a note that was dispatched almost at once after German notice of the new type of warfare had been given that it would hold the Reich to 'strict accountability' for any loss of American life caused by its new policy, and to this point of view it adhered from that time forward.

It is difficult for an Englishman, at any rate for an Englishman who shared in the passions and patriotism of the years 1914–1918, to understand that it was by no means inevitable that the American government should take this position. What the Wilson administration did was to insist upon the right of American citizens to travel not only upon American ships, but upon *belligerent* ships. There are plenty of international lawyers who think that this was by no means an inescapable decision. As time went on, moreover, the administration's attitude became even more rigid. In the winter of 1916, after the Allied governments had, quite understandably, resorted to the arming of their merchant ships against the submarine, a movement arose in the American Congress to warn American citizens off the *armed merchant ships* of the Allies. There was certainly something to be said for the viewpoint which this movement represented, and here again the legal brethren have been by no means convinced that any right to travel on such ships existed. But in the situation of the moment, the president acted with great decision. He demanded that the resolution warning American citizens off such ships be brought out onto the floor of Congress, and voted *down*. And this was done. There could not be a better illustration of the rigid attitude assumed towards Germany as compared with the rather complacent attitude assumed towards violations of international law by the democratic nations.

Are we to censure Wilson for this difference in policy as between the two sets of belligerents? The strict legalist, it seems to me, is bound to do so. But if we believe, as many persons do believe, that there was something more at stake than neutral rights, strictly defined, in the war of 1914–1918, we may well take a different view. And we can say one thing

more. In the partiality which he showed toward the democratic nations, the president, there seems little doubt, was, on the whole, interpreting the public opinion of the United States. We cannot be quite so sure of this as we are that President Franklin Roosevelt correctly interpreted that opinion in 1940 and 1941, for our means of measuring public sentiment are far more imperfect for the period of the first World War than they are for the relatively recent period. But if an examination of the press has any value, it seems fairly clear that the president had the country behind him in the position which he assumed in February 1915, at the outset of the submarine campaign, and that he continued to have it behind him even in the armed ship controversy of the next winter. Indeed, the press support for the president in this latter period is so wide-spread as to be almost unanimous. If it be the business of the chief executive of a democratic people to interpret the will of that people, it may fairly be contended that Wilson's neutrality policy was sound.

The same thing may be said with regard to another aspect of that policy which was, at the time, and very understandably, much criticized in Britain. I refer to the so-called 'note-writing' which deferred the decisive clash on the submarine issue from 1915 to 1917. Let us examine this matter in some detail.

The first great crisis with regard to the under-sea warfare came in the spring of 1915, with the sinking of the British merchant ship, the *Lusitania*, and with the loss of more than 100 American lives. At the same time when this episode occurred, congress was not in session ; it had adjourned in the previous March ; and it had not, in these first months of the war, taken any steps to enlarge the American military or naval establishments or to prepare the country for armed conflict. In the administration itself sentiment was divided, and the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, next to Wilson the most influential member of his party, was strongly opposed to any direct challenge to the Reich. The president might, in theory, have called the national legislature together and demanded a declaration of war. But it seemed far more reasonable, if the thing could be done, to demand reparation for the wrong done, and to try to prevent a repetition of such an affront to American dignity. And it is to be remembered that on the central issue, the right of Americans to travel on *belligerent* merchant ships, it was possible to take more than one view. The administration did, then, resort to a diplomatic exchange, and not an ultimatum. It stood firm on the principle

which it had asserted in February, that American lives must be respected; it committed itself to the viewpoint that they must be respected even on enemy vessels of commerce; but it gave the Reich an opportunity to alter its point of view. And what is not perhaps generally realized is the fact that it was successful in bringing about first the modification and then the temporary abandonment of the German submarine warfare. After considerable correspondence, which was naturally harshly judged in Great Britain, the German Imperial Government, in September 1915, announced that it would no longer sink 'liners' without warning, and in fact it substantially abated its submarine campaign. After a new episode in the following March, and after a new American note which threatened a severance of diplomatic relations if the U-boat warfare were continued without regard to the safety of passengers on merchant ships, the German government entirely desisted from such warfare. From May 1916 to February 1917, no American life was lost, and Wilson could claim with some reason that he had won a substantial diplomatic victory.

In his policy of preserving peace, if the thing could be done, consistent with the announced principles of the American government, Wilson probably was acting in accordance with the desires of the majority of Americans. We have not, I repeat, the means of measuring American public opinion for the Wilsonian period that are available to us later. But we have fairly clear evidence of the state of the American public mind in the election of 1916. The president went into that campaign after his temporary diplomatic victory over Germany. His supporters, again and again, rang the changes on the campaign cry that he had kept us out of war. And, largely on the basis of this appeal, the Democratic party came through to victory. Every state west of the Mississippi, except Oregon and South Dakota, cast its electoral vote for the Democratic candidate. So, too, did the normally Republican states of Ohio and New Hampshire, and, of course, all the South. Certainly a very substantial part of the American people approved the foreign policy of the administration.

It is not to be thought that Wilson himself was, in any degree, disingenuous in the campaign of 1916. He stated more than once that while he had preserved peace so far, he could not guarantee to preserve it. He had by this time accepted the necessity of military preparedness, and had rallied the nation to such a program. He made no wild promises or prophecies. His personal campaign was remarkable, indeed, for its dignity. He was acting upon a deep personal conviction,

the conviction that if indeed it should prove necessary to lead the country into war, it should be under circumstances when public opinion was united, not divided. And when this harsh necessity in fact befell him, as it did, of course, in the first months of his second term of office, he had the nation behind him. It is certainly arguable that such would not have been the case if he had sought to take similar action in 1915, with a country unprepared, and with sharp differences of viewpoint on foreign affairs extremely evident. Dogmatic judgments are not and certainly ought not to be too easy for the historian; one can appreciate the point of view expressed by Winston Churchill in his writings as to the lives that might have been saved by earlier American entrance into the war; but there is much to be said for the policy that Wilson pursued, and an historical certainty that he pursued it from motives that do credit alike to his candor and his courage.

There can be little question of the distinction which Wilson brought in his role as the chieftain of the American people in time of war. Whether we regard him from the point of view of administrative chieftain, or from that of political leader, we are compelled to admire him. His executive qualities, indeed, were far higher than those of the most universally admired of all American presidents, Abraham Lincoln, and, though the task accomplished was smaller than that of a quarter of a century later, compare favorably with those of Franklin D. Roosevelt. His capacity to appeal to the best American instincts, and the deepest American feeling, and to represent America worthily in world affairs, was certainly of the first order. It is a truism to say that in the nineteen months between April 1917 and November 1918, the president had the confidence of the vast majority of Americans, and the attentive ear of hundreds of thousands all over the world.

Politics—in the lower sense of the term—spread its trail all over the conduct of the American Civil War. It not only affected military appointments, but it sometimes affected the conduct of the war itself. But Wilson, from the outset, thrust politics almost completely aside. No sooner was war determined upon than he called for universal conscription, and before two months had gone by Congress had answered his appeal. The administration of the selective service law in the first World War was an innovation, an immense step forward towards efficient military action, and the fact that it was taken so soon is highly creditable to the President himself. It is worth observing, indeed, that it took more than two years of war before Great Britain, infinitely nearer to the seat of

the struggle, and in far greater peril, came to the same decision. Once it had been decided to raise an army by conscription, it was necessary to select a competent general to command it. Wilson thrust aside some of those who might, on the basis of pure seniority, have had a higher claim, and conferred the high command on John J. Pershing. When he had named him, he backed him up unreservedly. Pershing himself has testified to the free hand which he was given, and the loyal and unfailing support which came from Washington. Yet in one respect Wilson went further than Pershing. He saw clearly the necessity for a single unified command if the armies of the Reich were to be beaten. In the dark days of the late winter of 1918, when the German forces seemed everywhere to be pressing back the soldiers of democracy, the president made his views clear, and the appointment of Marshal Foch as Allied Generalissimo owes something to his courage and his vision.

There is, as is well known, one criticism frequently levelled against the administration on the ground of politics. It is the refusal of the government to let former President Theodore Roosevelt lead abroad a division of his own choosing under his own command. But the criticism falls to the ground once the documents have been examined. For it then becomes clear that General Pershing was by no means favorable to this enterprise, and that he was filled with justifiable apprehension at the idea of having to deal with the ebullient Rough Rider as one of his subordinates. And, indeed, if one reflects upon the matter, one can readily understand such apprehension, and respect the resolute will of the president in refusing to take what would undoubtedly have been a highly popular act.

The upshot of American military policy in 1917 and 1918 was certainly a major factor in the victory of the latter year. In nineteen months the United States raised an army of over 4,000,000 men, carried over 2,000,000 across seas, intervened, perhaps decisively, in the battle of the Marne in May and June of 1918, and at Saint-Mihiel and in the Argonne played an important part in the final rout of the Germans. Measure the time involved against the achievement, and it is difficult to render any other than a favorable judgment. The mistakes of detail that hamper every military program are submerged in the magnitude of the final result.

Part of the success of American military administration in the First World War was due to Wilson's wise selection of a Secretary of War in Newton D. Baker. And part of the success

of American naval administration was due to another man of high capacity, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York. Of course, before the United States entered the war, the German surface fleet had been driven from the seas. But in the putting down of the submarine menace the American navy played an important role. There were days filled with evil omen in the spring of 1917, and German sinkings attained in the month of April the portentous total of nearly a million tons. By the use of convoys and patrols, and later by an ambitious project initiated in Washington by which a gigantic net closed the North Sea to the U-boats, losses were steadily cut down, an immense force transported to France virtually without loss, and the way prepared for the final victory.

In the meantime, exacting domestic tasks which war makes necessary were competently carried through. In a bold and imaginative stroke, the President appointed Herbert C. Hoover as National Food Administrator, and a great program of food-saving was successfully carried through. A National War Labor Board, on which William Howard Taft and Frank P. Walsh were the most important members, adjusted innumerable industrial disputes, and was able indeed to maintain peace in the world of labor with a success that can truly be described as unparalleled. When the railroads, unable to forego the habits of competition of peace-time, got into a snarl, they were taken over by government, and under the administration of William G. McAdoo competently performed the task assigned to them. The shipping shortage, created by the submarine menace, was met by a ship-building program which, in combination with other measures, raised American shipping from 1,000,000 tons to 10,000,000 tons in the course of the war. It is easy to minimize some of these achievements, having regard to what was accomplished a quarter of a century later. But in true historical perspective, they appear nothing short of remarkable, on the basis of the conditions then prevailing. Certainly nothing like them in the way of national effort had ever been seen before.

But important as such matters were, they were less significant than the political leadership of the president. A war for neutral rights, a war against the submarine, Wilson saw as an inadequate basis for the great national effort over which he presided. In his speech of April 6, 1917, in which he asked Congress for the declaration of war, and in many speeches which followed, he enlarged and ennobled the issue of the struggle. It was not enough, he declared, to ensure the defeat of German

militarism. The way must be found to organize the world for peace, to ensure that the sacrifices that were being made should not have to be made again. There can be no question that many Americans thrilled to this appeal. There can be no question that Wilson evoked hopes and roused aspirations that played their part in bringing about victory then, and have had a mighty influence ever since.

The further examination of Wilson's role in connection with the League of Nations must be reserved for a later part of this paper when we examine the president's role at the Peace Conference. But there are two aspects of this war diplomacy that deserve especially to be emphasized. The first is the distinction that Wilson drew, from the outset of the war, between the German government and the German people. There are many persons who will find this distinction artificial. Perhaps it was. But there can be little doubt that it served two very important public ends. In the United States it helped to reconcile the large German–American population of the country to the prosecution of the war. And in Germany it helped to arouse in the German masses discontent with their government which materially diminished their enthusiasm for the conflict. Wilson, I believe, was wholly ingenuous in his position; his faith in the democratic process was profound, perhaps too profound; and, whatever his critics may say, it served the nation well in 1917 and 1918. Whether it served the world no less, whether the presidential policy was wise in so far as it aimed at a political revolution in Germany, and at the destruction of the First Reich, is a question that cannot be examined here. There will be many who will enter a caveat on this score.

But the president was never more in command of the situation than in the latter days of the war. It was to him, as is well known, that the German government made its appeal, when it was obvious that resistance could no longer be effectively continued. This was in the first days of October 1918. And then, in a series of notes which deserve the most attentive study, the American Chief Executive pushed the beaten militarists and the feeble government of Prince Max of Baden from one position to another; compelling before surrender the evacuation of all occupied territories, the abandonment of the submarine warfare, the acceptance of the terms of peace outlined in the speech of the Fourteen Points, and finally, the overthrow of the imperial régime. Of course, all this would have been impossible without the triumphant advance of the Allied armies; but rarely was the

diplomatic arm more effectively united with the military than in the correspondence that brought the war to a close.

And so, in November 1918, the victory was won, and Woodrow Wilson, as it seemed at the peak of his career, went abroad to fight for a peace that should crown his efforts and the efforts of his people. What are we to think of this closing chapter in his political life? What does it add to or subtract from the sum total of his personality?

It is probably impossible to make a universally acceptable judgment upon the treaty of Versailles. There are some, today, who would say that it was not rigorous enough; there were many, in the late twenties and the early thirties, who were ready to maintain that it erred by excess of severity. Perhaps it is at least possible in the year 1946 to agree upon this; the powers assembled at Paris *did* make peace; they made it in the short space of half a year; and that peace was followed by world recovery. Is it necessary to blame upon Versailles the events of the thirties, the depression that brought Hitler into power, the curious inertia of France and Britain in the face of the recrudescence of German militarism, the succession of diplomatic errors that led to the Second World War? Or is it perhaps true, as the late David Lloyd George maintained with his accustomed political complacency, that it was not Versailles, but the statesmen who came after Versailles, that were responsible for the wreck and the ruin of the years from 1939 to 1945? And may it not at least be said, that, on the basis of the record today, the men of 1919 are entitled to a more charitable judgment than has always been accorded them?

It is, at any rate, worth while to suggest these things. But in so far as the judgment on Woodrow Wilson is concerned, it is possible to say much more than this. Wilson, speaking broadly, was true to the political principles on which he had taken his stand, and which he came to Paris to defend. Take, for example, the territorial settlements of Versailles. The president had laid down, as the basis on which these settlements should rest, the principle of self-determination. And for this principle he fought at Paris, on more than one occasion. Together with Mr. Lloyd George he opposed the French proposals to detach the Rhineland from Germany; more vigorously than the British prime minister, he insisted upon a solution of the question of the Saar that gave Germany an opportunity to regain control of this important region, after a fifteen-year period of internationalization; and he finally took his stand with his British colleagues not only in favor of the inter-

nationalization of Danzig, but in favor of plebiscites by which a large part of the German–Polish frontier was finally determined.

With much the same viewpoint, he contended for what was at least a mitigation of the old-fashioned imperialism. The mandatory system set up by the treaty of Versailles for the control of backward peoples at least was based upon the principle of international responsibility, and upon a measure of international supervision. It was based upon the sound concept that when a nation undertook to regulate the affairs of a less advanced or simpler people, it had a duty to the whole international community in this regard.

It is not to be contended that the Wilsonian record at Paris on the principle of self-determination was perfect. The giving of the Upper Tyrol to Italy was a blunder, and must be recognized as such, and part of the responsibility was the president's. The provision of the peace treaty by which the union of Austria and Germany was made dependent upon the assent of the Council of the League, a body in which either Italy or France might exercise an effective veto, was an error in which Wilson acquiesced.

All in all, however, it seems true, as Professor Birdsall has so cogently contended, that in its territorial terms the treaty of Versailles was a better treaty than it would have been if Wilson had not participated in the making of it.

On the reparations question, too, Wilson was in many respects more far-sighted than most of those at Paris. He had, from the days of war itself, insisted that there must be no ' punitive indemnities '. At the Peace Conference, he contended for the fixing of the total reparations bill, and wished to see its payment limited in time. And it is to be remembered that he asked nothing for the United States. One blunder he did make. The sophism by which pensions were included in the reparations account under the general caption of ' damages done to civilians and their property on land and sea and in the air ' was an unworthy one. It was not Wilson's invention; but that he allowed himself to be persuaded to accept it by General Smuts is not at all to his credit. None the less, his attitude stands out in striking contrast with the demagogy and unwisdom of those who were clamoring to make Germany pay the whole cost of the war. Comparatively speaking, it was the most rational and the most defensible position taken by any one of the Big Three at Paris.

Painful concessions and compromises the president did make at the conference. None cost him more mental suffering than

the grant to the Japanese of economic rights in Shantung. But as the days of the conference lengthened, Wilson came to believe with increasing intensity that where the treaty deviated from sound principle, the League of Nations would set things right. And for the incorporation of the League Covenant in the treaty no one strove more earnestly and more intelligently than he. The Covenant typified something in which he deeply believed, the necessity for the creation of appropriate machinery by which international disputes might be settled peaceably rather than by force, and by which some kind of collective action might be taken against an aggressor.

Taking the picture as a whole, Wilson at Paris is not only a respectable, but also a noble, figure, not always right, of course, but striving sincerely, courageously and tenaciously for some ideal of justice and peace in a disordered, jealous and violent world. The tragedy of his career lies not in what happened at the Peace Conference, but in what happened when he returned to America. He had made an initial blunder before he entered upon the complex negotiations in the French capital. In the congressional elections of 1918, he had appealed to the American people to elect a Democratic Congress, although almost all of his advisers counselled against such action. The result was not what he had hoped; on the contrary the Republicans secured a majority not only in the House but, by the narrowest of margins, in the Senate. And this majority they proceeded to use in a manner to hamper and thwart the president in his great ambition to constitute a League of Peace. The partisan struggle that ensued was not creditable to either side. It is not true, as sometimes alleged, that Wilson proved completely rigid and inflexible from the outset. He accepted and got incorporated into the Covenant modifications which were intended to allay American opposition, and which came from Republicans, from such men as William Howard Taft. But when he came back to the United States in July, 1919, he insisted (as had many negotiators before him in similar circumstances) that the treaty he had signed be ratified without alteration in its form. 'Interpretative reservations', as he called them, reservations which should form no part of the instrument of ratification, he was willing to accept, but beyond this point he would not go. As time went on, as the summer of 1919 lengthened, it became clearer and clearer that this position was untenable. Wilson decided to appeal to the country. He began a speaking tour that carried him as far as the Pacific Coast. He was met by vast crowds, and aroused great enthusiasm, though critics commented upon the somewhat

apocalyptic tone of many of his addresses. But as he turned eastward again he collapsed, and shortly after his return to Washington suffered a stroke which severely paralysed him.

It is a matter for the physician or the student of medicine to judge to what degree from that time forward there was a pathological element in the obstinacy with which the president clung to the position that he had assumed. But cling he did. The parliamentary situation in the Senate in November 1918 was such that the treaty of Versailles could have been ratified with reservations. No one can state with definiteness that these reservations would have been acceptable to the other principal ratifying powers. But there are few persons, even among the admirers of the president, who do not think that the wise course was to act affirmatively on the treaty, reservations and all, and see what would happen. Wilson thought otherwise. He advised the defeat of the treaty, and his Democratic followers combined with the irreconcilable foes of the pact to ensure its rejection. In March a new vote was taken, but this was even more decisive. In the meantime the stricken Executive had taken a step even more unwise. He had advised his Democratic followers to take the League into the electoral campaign of 1920, where it was sure to become the subject of equivocation, evasion and confusion. No one can say that there was a clear-cut division in the political struggle that followed. The Republican candidate for the presidency, Warren G. Harding, managed to straddle the issue effectively. Many eminent Republicans urged his election as the surest way to bring about adhesion to the Covenant. But Senator Harding, when triumphantly elected by an amazing majority, put the League issue behind him. It seemed as if Wilson had been repudiated. Broken and embittered, he lived on till February, 1924, seemingly having failed to rally the nation to his own ideal, or to give to that ideal practical effectiveness.

Yet, as Wilson himself said in the campaign of 1916, the judgments of a political campaign are often ephemeral. The idea for which the president stood was more powerful than anyone could have suspected from the electoral decision of 1920. The notion of collective security took deep root in the American mind. It influenced men of both parties. It was associated with the growth of the conception that aggressive warfare was a wrong against mankind. And as time went on, this repugnance to the invocation of armed might more and more affected American policy. It brought about the somewhat academic Kellogg Pact of 1928, by which the nations of the world renounced war as an instrument of national policy. Far more

important, in the Roosevelt administration, it influenced the judgment of the American people. As the power of Hitler grew, as Japanese militarism extended its sway in the Orient, the American people began to respond to ideas which were in essence Wilsonian. President Roosevelt made use of this fact. In the struggle that opened in 1939, the United States was never neutral in thought, and not for long neutral in action. The destroyer-bases deal, lend-lease, the patrol of the Atlantic against the submarine, all in a time of what was technically peace, gave eloquent testimony to the fact that a new attitude with regard to wanton aggression had sprung up in the United States. The entry of America into the war confirmed this attitude. As victory drew near, President Roosevelt took the lead in drawing up plans for a new international organization, the United Nations, to take the place of the now virtually defunct League. At San Francisco, in 1945, the Charter of the new agency of peace was drafted, and sent to the various governments for ratification. It was approved by the Senate of the United States by a vote of 87 to 2. The memory of Woodrow Wilson was thus triumphantly vindicated.

No one can say what the United Nations will become. If it lacks the support of public opinion, if it is made the instrument of nothing higher or nobler than power politics, if it is subject to bitter internal struggles which undermine its authority and shake its prestige, it may prove, like the League itself, a vain hope in the long battle to substitute reason for force, and to limit aggression. But, on the other hand, there may be in this new organization something that is vital, something that will grow under the pressure of the time, and in the face of the increasing destructiveness and folly of war as an instrument of national policy. And if it develops into an important agency for the preservation of peace, men will look back to Woodrow Wilson and to his leadership of nearly thirty years ago with a new admiration ; they will hail him as the pioneer in a great and noble work, as one of the first architects of the noble temple of international Good Will. If, on the other hand, it fails, as fail it may, Woodrow Wilson, to men who cherish this great ideal of international concord, will still be the prophet and seer, whose failure lay, not in the invalidity of the principles for which he strove, but in the pitiful unwillingness of smaller men to follow the path he sought to illuminate and along which he trod.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE SCOTTISH CHURCH IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY

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It is well known that organisation of bishoprics and parishes came late to the greater part of Scotland, beginning probably with the gradual spread of Norman influence in the late eleventh century and becoming marked in the time of David I. Before that time the Celtic church was predominant in the region between Forth and Spey, which was the main seat of the monarchy, and there were strong Celtic influences in the Highlands, Clydesdale and Galloway. The church was mainly monastic and missionary with religious communities serving wide areas; though in addition Skene has hinted at the existence of tribal churches in the north-east lowlands.[1] Lothian, a part of the ancient kingdom of Northumbria, was peculiar, for it resisted Celtic influences and looked, ecclesiastically, towards Durham;[2] but any parochial organisation it may have had was rudimentary. In general it can be said with truth that ecclesiastical Scotland was completely transformed by the coming of the Normans. Owing to lack of sources twelfth-century Scottish history is obscure; but something at least may be discovered from the charters, which have been in print for over a hundred years and still remain unexplored. And it was in the hope that a reconstruction of church organisation during the transition period might help to illuminate the social history of Scotland that this paper was undertaken. I have concentrated on one subject: the structure of parishes and the relation of local lay and ecclesiastical authorities, because it is a crucial one: and one region, southern Scotland, because there Norman influence was strongest. If in the absence of special studies on the subject my conclusions must remain tentative, they may at least indicate the problems and provoke wider discussion from which the truth will emerge.

Norman influence was unevenly distributed over Scotland. It appeared first in Lothian, but spread rapidly through central Scotland and the north-east lowlands. How slowly it

[1] J. de Fordun, *Chronica Gentis Scotorum*, ed. W. F. Skene (Edinburgh, 1871–2), ii. 445–9.

[2] *Statutes of the Scottish Church, 1225–1559*, ed. David Patrick (Scottish History Society, 1907), pp. xii–xiii.

penetrated in the wilder regions of Galloway and the Highlands is shown by the fact that as late as 1220 the inhabitants of Caithness burned their bishop for attempting to collect tithe.[1] But in parts of the south it was so strong that churches rapidly took on many of the characteristics of the Norman churches elsewhere. And it will be remembered that the Norman attitude to the parish was crudely proprietary. Whether in Normandy where the dukes handed out ecclesiastical offices and every spiritual privilege as readily as lay fiefs,[2] or in England where manorial surveys dispassionately list among a lord's holdings, '10 hides of land . . . eight villeins . . . a church with a priest, and three serving maidens,'[3] the assumption was that there were no spiritual rights a lay lord might not bestow. The result was that ecclesiastical gradually adapted themselves to temporal boundaries[4]—bishoprics to provinces, parishes to vills or manors; that the gift of a manor usually carried the church with it, churches could be subdivided, and tithes given away indiscriminately at will. There is no need to dwell on the rights of appointment and investiture claimed by patrons in churches of their foundation—rights which underlay the investiture contest and were only slowly defined and restricted during the twelfth century. The problem is how far the Normans carried the proprietary conception to Scotland with them, and continued in practice to confuse temporal and spiritual powers after agreements—open in England and tacit in France—had separated them in theory.

Evidence comes first from the language of the charters. If there was no general assertion of the rights of patrons in Scotland there was silent assumption behind every charter. Lay lords built and endowed churches on their estates: charters of Thor Longus describe how, when King Edgar gave him Ednam as a waste land, he peopled it at his own expense, built a church in honour of St. Cuthbert, and endowed it with a carucate of land.[5] From the time of the earliest records they distributed tithes at will,[6] and sometimes even the oblations of their households.[7] There seems little doubt that a grant of

[1] *Vetera Monumenta Hibernorum et Scotorum*, ed. A. Theiner (Rome, 1864), no. xlix.

[2] Cf. J. F. Lemarignier, *Étude sur les privilèges d'exemption et de juridiction des abbayes normandes* (Archives de la France monastique, 1937), pp. 72, 107–8.

[3] Bibl. Nat., MS. Lat. 5650, fo. 27 v.

[4] Lemarignier, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

[5] *Early Scottish Charters*, ed. Sir Archibald C. Lawrie (Glasgow, 1905), nos. xxiv, xxxiii, xxxiv. Cf. C. Innes, *Sketches of Early Scotch History* (Edinburgh, 1861), pp. 11–12.

[6] Lawrie, *op. cit.*, nos. lxii, lxxvii, lxxviii and *passim*. [7] *Ibid.*, no. cxcv.

land carried any church already built with it unless the church was specifically withheld. King Edgar granted Swinton and Fishwick to the monks of Durham, and a later confirmation shows them holding the churches of both vills ; [1] the monks of Kelso held the church of Bowden although all early royal grants merely specified the land of Bowden.[2] As for the appointment and removal of dignitaries, proprietary lords normally appointed rectors to hold their churches for life, though I know of no case of a rector being deposed. They assumed a similar right to select abbots : Walter FitzAlan's foundation charter to Paisley, which baldly states his right to appoint and remove priors, was confirmed at the time without apparent question by the prior of Wenlock and abbot of Cluny.[3]

There is little doubt that this assumption of lay rights was predominant for a time. However, in each grant the rights of the bishop, shadowy at first, were never entirely neglected and gradually became defined. By one means or another he was associated with the permanent alienation of any church. Even though at first his consent might simply be appended to the lay charter and might, as in Normandy, be purely formal,[4] at least the appearance of the bishop's cross on a royal diploma [5] implies a passing glance at his claims. Stage by stage this consent was developed ; first a distinct clause appeared in the lay charters,[6] then separate episcopal charters were produced.[7] By the middle of the twelfth century the bishop's confirmation usually followed hard on the lay grant. Especially instructive is the charter of Robert, bishop of St. Andrew's, confirming certain churches to St. Cuthbert's, Durham, in 1150.[8] It was granted, not at the patron's request as was normal, but by the advice of clergy gathered in a provincial synod at Berwick ; and it included confirmation of the churches of Swinton and Fishwick—two vills granted by King Edgar fifty years before. Presumably the grant of the vills had carried the churches with it, unless they were built later ; and bishop Roger's charter is the first indication of Scottish clergy debating the expediency of additional episcopal confirmation in such

[1] *Ibid.*, nos. xx, xxii, ccxiii.
[2] *Liber Sancte Marie de Calchou* (Bannatyne Club, 1846), pp. 6, 13, 229.
[3] *Registrum Monasterii de Passelet* (Maitland Club, 1877), pp. 1–3.
[4] Lemarignier, *op. cit.*, p. 72, n. 1, p. 85.
[5] Lawrie, *op. cit.*, no. lxxiv ; *Registrum de Dunfermelyn* (Bannatyne Club, 1842), p. 4.
[6] *Liber de Calchou*, p. 5, ' et in Sprouistona unam carucatam terre . . . et ecclesiam eiusdem ville et terram ecclesie pertinentem, domino Johanne episcopo Glasguensi similiter dante et episcopali auctoritate confirmante '.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 149.
[8] Lawrie, *Early Scottish Charters*, no. ccxiii.

cases. Within twenty or thirty years confirmations by bishops and popes of all church grants were almost automatic, and interest lies not so much in their existence as in their formulæ.

Broadly speaking, there is one marked change in the formulæ of lay charters during the century. At first they were concrete in imagery, describing a real ceremony—the act of endowing a church and marking out the boundaries of its land. 'Know that I have granted', runs a charter of Uctred son of Liulf to St. Mary's, Kelso, 'the church of Molle with its adjacent land as I Uctred and Aeldred the dean perambulated it. . . . I grant also the common pasture of my vill of Molle with all its rights.'[1] Foremost in the donor's mind and therefore in the language of these early charters were the buildings of the church, the carucate or two of land or possibly toft and croft with which it was endowed for the sustenance of a priest, and all rights of common and pasture pertaining to the kirklands as to any village holding; next came the tithes and dues from the lord's men in the vill.[2] Sometimes the grant might add 'cum tota parochia sua'. Gradually a more general and comprehensive, but also more abstract, formula was achieved: 'cum terris et decimis et oblacionibus et obvencionibus omnimodis et omnibus aliis iustis pertinenciis sius',[3] or perhaps 'cum omnibus ecclesiasticis rectitudinibus ad eandem ecclesiam iuste spectantibus, cum terra et cum decimis'.[4] Whatever form of gift, early or late, was adopted in the lay charters, the episcopal confirmations normally followed them word for word. Sometimes a bishop might add 'quantum ad episcopum pertinet', or a rare layman say 'totum illud donationis quod videbar habere in ecclesia';[5] but this was quite exceptional.

Noteworthy too is the fact that similar confirmations might not always have the same meaning. The churches of the bishop of Glasgow are confirmed in an impressive series of papal bulls which recognise possession in the most sweeping terms.[6] Yet as documents become more common in the thirteenth century it appears that the bishop had lost some churches, held others

[1] *Liber de Calchou*, pp. 144–5.

[2] For instance, Lawrie, *op. cit.*, no. ccxxv, p. 182; *Liber de Calchou*, p. 281. This form of wording persists sometimes into the late twelfth century, especially in reference to churches of recent foundation.

[3] For instance, the charters of William the Lion in *Antiquities of the Shires of Aberdeen and Banff* (Spalding Club, 1843–62), ii. 27, 119.

[4] *Ibid.*, ii. 19.

[5] Lawrie, *op. cit.*, no. ccxiv.

[6] *Registrum Episcopatus Glasguensis* (Bannatyne Club, 1843), nos. 32, 51, 57, 62.

fully appropriated and served by chaplains and others as rectories served by vicars, and in one at least—the church of Dryfesdale—possessed no more than the right of collation.[1] Half the truth is hinted at in the bull of Honorius III on Dryfesdale church: 'in quadam parte Glasguensis diocesis barbare quedam sunt gentes minus quam oportet in lege domini erudite'—or indeed, one might add, in any kind of law. Behind the calmly uniform language of the bulls was a state of society in which law was still imperfectly defined, and possession might be at times nine-tenths of it. And besides that, conveyancing was still imperfectly developed in the twelfth century. An extra confirmation did no harm and it was safer to grant too much than too little: patrons and bishops both included everything, temporal and spiritual, for fear that they might omit the one vital thing.

Yet from the point of view of ecclesiastical reformers, an advance had been made. At the beginning of the twelfth century there had been little that patrons had not granted to churches of their foundation, and the bishop's right of confirmation if recognised had been obscure. Quietly the church developed its theory and superimposed it on lay practice. The change came just after the middle of the century, and it may be no coincidence that at the same time the *Decretum* of Gratian, with its strict limitation of lay rights in churches, was becoming sufficiently widely-known to be influential.[2] Whilst there is no evidence of the Scottish bishops ever resisting the transfer of a church, by patiently and persistently confirming every grant they established the principle that their consent was necessary for the valid transfer of the spiritualities, and therefore also for the appointment of parsons who should be responsible to them for the spiritualities. Legal language was conservative, and the crudely proprietary language of lay charters, which the bishops deliberately echoed in their own, persists so long that it is difficult to know when the grant of a church by a layman came to mean only the advowson and temporal lands.[3] By the mid-thirteenth cen-

[1] *Ibid.*, no. 151. The bull of Honorius III (1226) granting the church *in proprios usus* to Glasgow refers to the bishop's right of collation and reserves the right of the present incumbent during his lifetime. Cf. also the tenure of Rutherglen church by the monks of Paisley (*Origines Parochiales Scotiae* (Bannatyne Club, 1851–5), i. 62.

[2] *Decretum*, II, xvi. 7. An important series of papal bulls to bishop Jocelyn of Glasgow (1175–99), answering his questions on points of canon law, show that the Scottish church was closely in touch with the development of ecclesiastical law by at least the last quarter of the twelfth century (*Reg. Epis. Glas.*, nos. 58–61, 63–5, 67, 68).

[3] For instance, a charter of Duncan, earl of Mar, granting Braemar church to Monymusk (1214–34) and confirmed by Gilbert, bishop of Aberdeen (1228–

tury even the language of charters was more acceptable to canon law,[1] and the bishops had only to guard against their legal rights being violated.[2] At least the canonical formula 'sacerdotes episcopis de spiritualibus, patronis vero de temporalibus debeant respondere',[3] had acquired general acceptance and substantial meaning in Scotland.

Yet the legal status of churches and the exact share of patrons and bishops in spiritualities and temporalities is only one side of parochial development. The Normans did not write their customs on a blank sheet: how far, it may be asked, were parishes shaped in accordance with the social structure of the country or its ancient ecclesiastical organisation? In England the growth of parishes had been a long slow process: Domesday Book reveals a coincidence of parish and manor or vill that was spreading in the south and east, but was sometimes recent and by no means universal.[4] This development was accompanied by a change in the proprietary conception of a church. The early canonical theory that the church owned its own lands had not been able to survive, and as early as the seventh and eighth centuries churches were beginning to be treated as private property that could be given, sold, or bequeathed. Finally, during the eleventh century, they came to be regarded as feudal *beneficia*—a conception not clearly put forward in early theory but rooted deep in the practice of hundreds of local lords, inevitably developing both before and after the Norman conquest as an integral part of feudal development.[5] Scotland has no Domesday Book and indeed almost no eleventh-century sources at all, but the state of the church in the twelfth century may give a clue to earlier

39), grants 'ecclesiam . . . cum ovencionibus et oblacionibus et omnibus aliis justis pertinenciis suis' (*Antiquities of the Shires of Aberdeen and Banff*, ii. 86). A confirmation of Wiston church to Kelso *c.* 1220 (*Liber de Calchou*, pp. 270–2) repeats a mid-twelfth century formula, which even in 1260 had only been softened into 'dictam advocacionem et ius presentandi ad ipsam ecclesiam seu vicariam eiusdem, cum terris, decimis, possessionibus et libertatibus ad ipsam ecclesiam spectantibus'. Cf. the conclusions of Professor Stenton in *Transcripts of Charters relating to Gilbertine Houses* (Lincoln Record Society, vol. 18), p. xxiii.

[1] See *Cartularium de Levenax* (Maitland Club, 1833), pp. 19, 30–1, 35–6, for grants of land with the advowson only of churches.

[2] Thirteenth-century statutes show that churches were still being built and endowed in places without episcopal consent (*Registrum Episcopatus Aberdonensis* (Spalding Club, 1845), ii. 6–7).

[3] The bulls of Celestine III, 1195 (*Antiquities of Aberdeen and Banff*, iv. 501–3), and Honorius III, 1226 (Theiner, *op. cit.*, no. lviii), give examples of a common formula.

[4] Cf. William Page, 'Some remarks on the churches of the Domesday survey', *Archaeologia*, lxvi (1914–15), 61–102.

[5] The best short account of this development is in D. Knowles, *The Monastic Order in England*, pp. 562–8.

ecclesiastical organisation and also to the social organisation inseparable from it.

In one region of Scotland the archaeological foundations for further study have been firmly laid by the first volume of the *Origines Parochiales*. Here is collected the early evidence relating to one hundred and twenty-six ancient parishes in the deaneries of Lennox, Rutherglen, Lanark, Peebles and Teviotdale. The area is a good cross-section of the country, including four distinct natural regions; moreover it extends from the region of strong Celtic influences round the mouth of the Clyde right across Lothian with its peculiar Northumbrian institutions. It omits the north-east lowlands, where the possible existence of ancient tribal churches presents specially obscure and difficult problems.

In the first, lowland region of upper Clyde and its tributary Douglas, where parishes were small and the land lent itself to a more truly manorial structure than in many parts of Scotland, it is not uncommon to find parish and manor co-extensive, and the advowson of the church vested in the lord of the manor. Indeed of the thirty parishes [1] between Eaglesham and the watershed of Clyde and Tweed seventeen were probably of this type,[2] and six more were royal demesne.[3] Of the remainder divisions occurred in East Kilbride and Wandal because the church of Glasgow early possessed the church of the first and land in the second; the early history of Crawford is obscure and it is impossible to tell whether the canons of Holyrood acquired the church from the lords of the manor or not. The lordships of Dunsyre and Thankerton were divided, and in both cases the lords who shared the property combined to bestow the churches on Kelso Abbey. Symington and Roberton, originally chapels dependent on Wiston, developed as separate parishes only in the thirteenth century and the churches remained in the patronage of Kelso, which held Wiston. Nevertheless these two parishes show ecclesiastical tending to conform to lay divisions: for the originally large parish of Wiston broke up into four parishes corresponding to four lordships, and in one at least—Crawford John—the lay lords

[1] *Origines Parochiales*, i. 98–178.

[2] Eaglesham, Glasford, Strathhaven, Stonehouse, Carstairs, Carnwath, Dolphington, Walston, Biggar, Liberton, possibly Quothquhan, Covington, Wiston, Douglas, Crawford John, Lamington, Culter; though the churches of Carnwath and Wiston were early granted by their patrons to the see of Glasgow and abbey of Kelso; and Crawford John, originally dependent on the parish of Wiston, only reverted to the manorial lords after it became independent.

[3] Hamilton with Dalserf, Lesmahago, Carluke, Lanark, Pettinain, Carmichael.

recovered the church from the monks of Kelso. There are too in this region other examples of lay influence shaping parochial divisions: William the Lion's gift of Carteland to Lanark church drew a region on the fringes of the parish within its boundaries.[1] And the assumption that an estate carried with it some share in the church or chapel of the district is unusally explicit in one charter of Robert of Carmichael respecting the rights of the church of Lanark.[2]

Indeed this region provides as perfect a group of manorial churches as we are likely to find in Scotland. There are irregularities: to take the most conspicuous examples—chapels like Glegern on separate estates that never grew into independent parishes; divided parochial territories in Dunsyre and Thankerton; the estates of Symon Lockard cutting across the parochial division of Thankerton and Symington: and the early possessions of the church of Glasgow rigidly retaining their primitive shape in a changing society. More striking perhaps, certain characteristics of English manorial churches are not to be found at all. There is no evidence that lords of several manors had one church only, and that on their demesne at the place of their usual residence;[3] indeed the lords of Bothwell had churches at both their adjacent manors of Dolphinton and Walston, and there were churches at Thankerton and Symington, the two manors where Symon Lockard held land. Nor do we find any tenures of halves or other fractions of churches. In Dunsyre and Thankerton, where the lands were divided, difficulties were avoided by the two lords jointly bestowing the churches on Kelso, in language which implies that each lord gave the whole church.[4] On the rare occasions when the term *medietas ecclesie* appears in the Scottish records it has a limited and temporary sense: a life interest in half the revenues of a church secured to the last independent rector after the church had been given to a monastery.[5]

[1] *Liber S. Marie de Dryburgh* (Bannatyne Club, 1847), no. 46.

[2] In recognising that the chapel of Glegern was subject to the mother church of Lanark, he declared 'si qua autem advocatio vel quod jus aliud mihi competiit vel competit ratione dominii quod habeo in territorio de Glegern . . . illud . . . concessi et quietum clamavi' (*Liber de Dryburgh*, no. 233).

[3] W. Page, *op. cit.*, pp. 98–101, shows that this was common even in the period just before the Norman conquest.

[4] In the gift of Thankerton the wording is as follows: (Symon Lockard) 'Noveritis me dedisse . . . ecclesiam que dicitur Wudechirche cum terris et omnibus ad eam iuste pertinentibus . . . cum pascuis et aisiamentis ville mee communibus aliisque pertinentiis eiusdem ecclesie; (Anneis de Brus) 'Sciant tam presentes quam futuri me dedisse et concessisse et hac mea carta confirmasse ecclesiam de villa Thancardi scilicet Wudekyrch cum omnibus pertinentibus que ad eandem ecclesiam de iure pertinere debent' (*Liber de Calchou*, pp. 227, 272).

[5] See *Liber de Calchou*, p. 233; *Liber de Dryburgh*, no. 62.

Nearer to the Clyde estuary sweeping grants to the earl of Lennox and Walter FitzAlan, the high steward, are a complicating factor. Almost all the churches in these wide areas were formally included in the grants. Some passed to sub-vassals with the vills where they stood : many were given to monasteries. The Steward's own monastery of Paisley acquired from him and his vassals the lion's share of the churches in and around Strathgryfe : it received Cathcart, Eastwood with Pollock, Paisley, Erskine, Kilallan, Kilbarchan, Kilmacolm, Innerkip, Lochwinnoch and Mearns in the twelfth century, and acquired Houston and Neilstown early in the thirteenth century and Largs a hundred years later. Only three churches resisted its attraction, and not one of them remained for long in lay hands. Renfrew and Inchinnan had been given by David I to Glasgow and the Knights Templars respectively before the coming of the Steward ; Kilbirnie, by some process for which the documents are lacking, was acquired by the monastery of Kilwinning.[1] Here at least the movement towards widespread monastic appropriation of churches followed so rapidly upon the growth of parochial divisions that there was no time for a close alliance between parish and manor to harden. Nor indeed, in the great moorland parishes between Largs and Clyde, with their divided territories, can we speak of manors in any true sense of the word.

Except that it did not include Glasgow or Kirkintilloch, the Earldom of Lennox coincided with the rural deanery. A region bordering on the Highlands, containing a number of churches of ancient foundation, it conforms as might be expected to no pattern. The early history of Buchanan, Kilmarnock, Balfron and Fintray churches is obscure ; Kilpatrick church was granted by the earl of Lennox to Paisley in the thirteenth century, carrying most of the parish with it ; [2] four other churches passed to monasteries or the see of Glasgow, the parochial territories remaining mostly in lay hands.[3] At Bonhill, Drymen and Strathblane where the earls of Lennox retained considerable territory in their own hands they seem to have held the churches also ; at Luss, Killearn, Kilsyth and Baldernock they granted the churches to vassals, in each case with a part only of the parochial territory.[4] The most striking feature of ecclesiastical development is not strictly parochial : it is the coincidence of earldom and rural deanery. Whilst the evidence does not prove conclusively that the deanery was

[1] *Origines Parochiales*, i. 65–97. [2] *Infra*, pp. 17–19.

[3] Dumbarton to Kilwinning, Cardross and Campsy to Glasgow, Rosneath to Paisley.

[4] *Origines Parochiales*, i. 20–48.

hereditary in the twelfth century, an early thirteenth-century charter conveys land to Maldowen, dean of Lennox, and his heirs ; [1] and the dean, though conforming more strictly to ecclesiastical standards as the century advanced, seems to have been closely associated with the earl's household, a common witness to his charters, and sometimes a tenant of his land.[2]

The last region, Tweeddale and Teviotdale, is a part of Lothian. It includes wide areas of mountain and waste as well as arable valleys, and illustrates more than one kind of parochial organisation. There are cases of small manors like Kilbucho, where the lord of the land was patron of the church ; [3] more often parishes straggle along an extensive river valley served partly by dependent chapels. Some of these districts bear unmistakable traces of a more primitive form of parochial organisation : Stobo, with its dependent chapels of Lyne, Broughton, Kingledoors, Dawic and Drummelzier and probably also Glenholm at one time,[4] is plainly a mother church for the whole of upper Tweeddale. Old Jedburgh, with its dependencies of Crailing, Nisbet and Spital has too the aspect rather of a *plebania* [5] than a parish church. In both the mother church is associated with an ancient ecclesiastical establishment, for Stobo was an old possession of the church of Glasgow and Jedburgh was an ancient monastic church fallen into decay when David I revived it as a house of Austin canons. In both the territorial holding of the church was small, and the dependent district divided amongst many different lords. Whether the original occupiers of the soil had merely been confirmed in their rights after the Norman penetration or new settlers had taken their place, the ecclesiastical divisions had never been completely transformed. And throughout the whole region, though at times the wide parishes roughly correspond with a lay or ecclesiastical barony, often the territory is divided amongst several lords, or a property cuts across the parish boundaries. The divisions were further complicated by the existence of considerable property, probably ancient, of the church of Glasgow, widespread royal demesne, especially in the region of

[1] *Cartularium de Levenax*, pp. 96–8. But, whatever may have been the case in the twelfth century, in the thirteenth the descendants of Maldowen became lay lords of Luss (*Ibid.*, p. 23), whilst the deans appear carrying out their normal ecclesiastical functions (*Reg. Epis. Glas.*, p. 173).

[2] *Cartularium de Levenax*, pp. 12, 27, 53, 85 ; *Reg. Epis. Glas.*, pp. 120, 146, 159.

[3] *Origines Parochiales*, i. 178.

[4] *Ibid.*, i. 196–200, 180–1.

[5] The term *plebania* is not used ; and its one occurrence in Scottish records has been dismissed by Bishop Dowden as a late affectation (*The Medieval Church in Scotland* (Glasgow, 1910), p. 137). But the characteristics of a *plebania* exist, if the expression does not.

Ettrick forest, and the great ecclesiastical lordships of Jedburgh, Kelso and Melrose. Even less than in Lennox is there any clear pattern ; the traces remaining suggest that the church had much in common with that of Northumbria.

From the whole survey, however, some conclusions emerge. First, the close connection of ecclesiastical with social and economic structure. This subject, in Scotland, awaits further investigation ; but at least it is plain that the more strictly proprietary church was more firmly rooted in those districts that lent themselves to manorial development : in particular the lowlands of Clydesdale. In the Highland regions, represented by Lennox, Norman penetration was slower. And there is some indication that Lothian had its peculiar institutions and, like the English part of the Northumbrian kingdom, preserved for a time its own non-feudal social and ecclesiastical organisation.[1] Next, the speedy and abundant endowment of monasteries followed so rapidly on the erection of parishes that in extensive areas the church found itself contending with the peculiar problem not of lay patronage but of monastic appropriation. Lastly, the organisation of the primitive church, though its resistance may have been slight, was not at once obliterated by the new Norman model.

It is not merely that in Lothian such *plebania* as Stobo or Jedburgh survive ; here and there are traces of extensive church endowments that are certainly ancient. The early possessions of the see of Glasgow are outstanding. Their extent has come down to us in an obscure and traditional form, as they are described in the document known as the 'Inquisition of David'.[2] It is the first document in the register of the see of Glasgow, and claims to record a ceremony at which David, when earl of Cumbria, held an enquiry into and confirmed the early possessions of the see of Glasgow. Diplomatically it defies classification ; for it is a narrative including a list of the territories claimed, and ending with an impressive catalogue of all the most reputable witnesses of the day. As Sir Archibald Lawrie points out,[3] it is obviously not an authentic act of confirmation, but at best a careless and probably incomplete summary of what may have taken place ; and was written down later by a scribe who added a list of witnesses, no doubt in good faith, but without increasing the value of the document as a title deed. Yet when all this has been said, the *Inquisition* is not

[1] Cf. J. E. A. Joliffe, 'Northumbrian Institutions', *English Historical Review*, xli (1926), pp. 1–42.

[2] *Reg. Epis. Glas.*, no. 1.

[3] *Early Scottish Charters*, pp. vi, 299.

wholly valueless as a source of history. It may not prove the exact limits of the possessions of the see of Glasgow at any precise date ; some may have been acquired about the time the *Inquisition* was written down (that is, later than its supposed date) ; [1] some of the unidentified districts may have been lost ; but it is a valuable and probable indication of the location of the church's lands in the centuries after St. Kentigern. And it includes certain lands that do not conform to the normal parochial pattern of their region. The lands of Wandal are a striking example : they remained subject to Glasgow after the lords of Hertshead had acquired most of the manor with the church. These and other scattered groups of lands along the valleys of Clyde, Tweed and Teviot and in Dumfriesshire, which often lay in parishes held by others, have the stamp of long-established church holdings. They suggest a general basis of truth underlying the *Inquisition* : more than that, they show that some of the endowments of the Celtic church resisted for a time the reshaping of ecclesiastical boundaries in conformity with feudal territorial holdings.

These lands of Glasgow are not the only ancient endowments surviving into the twelfth century : the church lands of Kilpatrick, whose history fills fifty pages of the Paisley register, are perhaps even more remarkable. Kilpatrick emerges from obscurity when Maldowen earl of Lennox bestowed its church on the monks of Paisley ' cum omnibus pertinentiis suis ' early in the thirteenth century. Shortly afterwards the monks, complaining that it had been despoiled and its lands unjustly occupied, initiated judicial proceedings which revealed that the ' pertinents ' of the church included almost the whole of the parochial land. This is startling : even allowing for the remarkably generous endowment of Scottish parochial churches during the twelfth century it is unusual to find a church that carries the whole parish with it.[2] Further, the inquest leaves no doubt about the terms on which the lands were occupied. The oldest men of the village swore that sixty years or more

[1] For instance, as Lawrie points out, Kinclaith (Conclud) was granted to Glasgow by Malcolm IV. Although this grant may have been intended to supplement a defective title for land traditionally belonging to the see, the wording of the charter certainly suggests a new gift ; moreover the bishops of Glasgow successfully retained many of their possessions without, as far as the *Register* indicates, troubling to secure any new charters for them.

[2] *Registrum de Passelet*, pp. 158 ff. A similar example is the gift (*c.* 1160) of Holy Trinity Church, Dunkeld, which carried extensive territory with it, to Dunfermline by Andrew, bishop of Caithness. Dunkeld was an ancient Culdee monastery, and it seems probable that these lands represent Culdee territory that had been acquired with the church as the hereditary possession of a noble family (Lawrie, *op. cit.*, no. cclxii ; date amended in the annotated copy in H.M. Register House, Edinburgh).

previously the lands of the church had been divided between Bede Ferdan and three other men who held them for the sole service of receiving and entertaining pilgrims coming to the church,[1] who bequeathed their holdings to their sons, and were exempt from all temporal dues. Here, twisted into feudal idiom, are customs exactly similar to those observed by the Culdees of St. Andrews about the middle of the twelfth century ; [2] and since Kilpatrick was a village of ancient sanctity, traditionally hallowed as the birthplace of St. Patrick, it is not improbable that a small community had lived there in the obscure period before the twelfth century. Certainly the lands have all the marks of very ancient endowments, possibly enlarged by the earls of Lennox : and there is no reason to suppose that the charters of the earl, even though they declare the property to have been given by their ancestors, were not merely securing the title of the church to lands which it claimed by ancient right. But by the time of the abbey of Paisley's intervention the family of Lennox was in the process not of augmenting but of whittling down the abundant possessions of Kilpatrick church. Dufgal, brother of Maldowen earl of Lennox, who was rector, had tried by forging charters to secure hereditary title to the lands and distribute them among his relatives because, as he frankly stated, he did not like to offend his family.[3] Even after the monks of Paisley had won their case Dufgal's predatory grand-nieces continued to pursue them at law, and it was only after prolonged legal proceedings and not inconsiderable expense that the monks successfully established their claim to the lands of Kilpatrick. But for earl Maldowen's gift to Paisley there is no doubt that most of the lands of the church would have been quietly absorbed by the patron's family ; for men like Bede Ferdan who, as the inquest baldly states, was killed defending the right and liberty of the church, could not have stood up to the powerful house of Lennox. In a few decades the endowments might have disappeared, leaving no trace of their existence in the documents except a tradition of the antiquity of the church. Even more instructive, perhaps, is their fate after the claims of Paisley had been vindicated. Dufgal was allowed to hold the church of Kilpatrick for life with half a carucate of land only, and this presumably remained the normal glebe of the church from that time. The remainder of the lands were added to the

[1] 'Nullum aliud servitium faciendo pro dicta terra nisi tantummodo recipiendo et pascendo hospites illic venientes' (*Registrum de Passelet*, p. 166).

[2] William Reeves, *The Culdees of the British Islands* (Dublin, 1864), pp. 37–8.

[3] *Registrum de Passelet*, pp. 164, 167.

temporalities of the abbey; and much later a charter of James II shows Paisley holding the lands in barony and free regality.[1] All irregularities in the early development of Kilpatrick church and its endowment had been smoothed away; in their place was a church with its half-carucate of land whose patron, a great monastic house, held the land of the parish by a recognised form of feudal tenure. A hundred to a hundred and fifty years were necessary to fit the early church into orthodox feudal theory; by that time it had been neatly done. If the feudalisation of southern Scotland was only superficial, on the ecclesiastical side at least it was very nearly as deep as the written documents.

These developments are not isolated from the main movements of European history. They are one aspect of the struggle to disentangle the spiritual side of church government from encroachment by a feudal theory and organisation that threatened to become all-pervasive. This struggle, common to most of western Europe during the eleventh century, is known as the investiture contest. In Scotland it took a peculiar course, for there the reconstruction of the church and its establishment on an episcopal rather than a monastic foundation was the work of the twelfth century.[2] Later than in other countries except Ireland, it was also more revolutionary. Scotland never experienced the slow secularisation of parish and episcopal churches which produced the great reaction of the eleventh century. Certainly all available evidence suggests that the ancient Scottish church by that time was decayed and corrupt, but it was without powers of resistance. If for a time it influenced the shape of parishes and the endowments of churches it left no legal or institutional heritage, and within a hundred years had been, outside the Highlands, superseded by the new model. Consequently it would be anomalous to speak of an investiture contest in Scotland had not the Normans imported many of the old corruptions with the new model. The general issue of episcopal investiture was raised once only, when the aged Eadmer of Canterbury was made bishop of St. Andrews in 1120, and Alexander I attempted to invest him with ring and staff: [3] a compromise was quickly reached and the matter made no great stir—indeed it was approximately

[1] *Registrum de Passelet*, pp. 255–7.

[2] See W. Reeves, *The Culdees*, pp. 28 ff., J. Dowden, *The Medieval Church in Scotland*, pp. 111–12; W. F. Skene, *Celtic Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1876–80), ii. 365–6.

[3] Eadmer, *Historia Novorum*, in Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, clix. 513 ff.; J. Dowden, *op. cit.*, pp. 42 ff.; A. R. MacEwen, *History of the Church in Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1913–18), i. 181.

settled before it was raised.[1] But in the parish the proprietary church, condemned already by every ecclesiastical reformer, took root. The close association of manor and parish was modified by the geography and social organisation of Scotland and by the rapid spread of monastic appropriation : but the unspectacular struggle of twelfth-century Scottish bishops to whittle down the influence of lay—and monastic—patrons in their parishes is in a true sense a continuation of the investiture contest. The establishment of a distinct sphere of spiritualities in the parish, which took a hundred years to accomplish, is their not inconsiderable achievement ; the persistence of some forms of feudal control in a country where it was rather an importation than a deep-rooted practice is a measure of the tenacity of the institution they were fighting.

[1] Later episcopal controversies in the twelfth century concern the subsequent problem of free election. See J. Dowden, ' The Scottish Crown and the Episcopate in the Medieval Period ', *Scottish Historical Review*, vii (1909), 130–40.

THE CORPORATION OF BEDFORD, 1647–1664

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The limiting dates of this paper are those of the first surviving minute book of the Corporation. Though Bedford is a borough by prescription and its earliest charter, granted by Henry II, confirms the privileges enjoyed under Henry I, there is evidence in the muniments of the Corporation generally, as well as in the character of the first minute book itself, that its beginning marked a significant stage in the evolution of the governing body. It certainly marked also the opening of a period of constitution-making which may fairly be described as eventful, even in comparison with other English boroughs of the seventeenth century, for between 1649 and 1660 the rules for the election of the Common Council were comprehensively revised four times. Antagonisms which belong to national politics are clearly involved in these short-lived reforms, but there are also others, local in origin, which cannot well be understood without some knowledge of the relations between the governing body and the freemen in the reigns of the first two Stuarts.

The evidence surviving in the Town Hall is unfortunately fragmentary, so that it is impossible to reconstruct the course of events as a connected narrative ; the most that can be done is to describe the documents, and to summarise the conclusions as to the general character of the struggle which may reasonably be based upon them.

First in point of date is a parchment document [1] entitled ' Constitutions and Ordynances made and confirmed by the Maior, Baylyffes, Burgesses and (by the whole) Comminaltie and Freemen of . . . Bedford . . . att the Courte Leete there houlden . . .' on 20 August 1610. It consists of three clauses, the purport of which is that thirteen persons named, ' being all freemen and principle men of quality ', who have never served as mayor, bailiff or chamberlain, shall be of the Common Council, to join with the mayor, aldermen, bailiffs and burgesses in granting leases, making ordinances and in all other public affairs. Vacancies among the Thirteen are to be filled from qualified persons by the survivors and ' the rest of the free Commons ' who have not borne the specified offices.

Two years later, in the mayoralty of Peter Bamforth, the

[1] Bedford Corporation Muniments, Box 8, no. 1.

Constitutions or by-laws of the town were apparently revised and codified in the leet by the mayor, aldermen, bailiffs, burgesses and Common Council, with the rest of the commonalty and freemen. The copy of these constitutions preserved in the Black Book of Bedford [1] contains forty-one entries. Their subject-matter is very varied, as one would expect, but in those which touch upon the composition, election and powers of the governing body, there are some points of interest. No. 1 requires that the mayor and bailiffs shall be elected at the anciently accustomed time and place by common and free election of the mayor, aldermen, bailiffs and the rest of the burgesses and freemen and by no foreign person. No. 2, dealing with the penalties for refusal of the mayoralty, provides that members of the Thirteen may lawfully refuse until they have served as chamberlain and bailiff. No. 6 prescribes that Constitutions, by-laws and ordinances, or alterations or repeals of any ancient by-law, shall be made only at a court leet, by the mayor, aldermen, bailiffs, burgesses and selected members of the commonalty called the Common Council [2] (i.e. the Thirteen). No. 26 provides that the burgesses shall meet at the Guildhall at 7 a.m. on the Friday before each leet to consider Constitutions; by a later amendment the meetings are to take place at 6 a.m. on the leet day.

The constitutional structure suggested by these two documents has two features of some importance when compared with that recorded in the minute book of 1647–64. The first is the close connexion between the court leet and the governing body of the Corporation; the second is the distinction between freemen and burgesses. Even from the evidence already cited it is reasonable to deduce that power was being concentrated in the hands of the newer, distinctively municipal, council, and that the attempt to preserve the superior authority of the court leet was also an attempt to safeguard the interests of the general body of freemen in the management of the town. These inferences are fully confirmed by documents relating to disputes of the years 1648–9. That less than a year divides the first entry in the minute book of 1647–64 from the earliest dated document surviving from those disputes is one reason for suspecting that the minute book is the first of its kind in Bedford, and that its institution corresponded with some

[1] Fos. 67 v.—72 v.

[2] In this period the term Common Council is usually applied to the whole governing body, the elected representative being called The Representative, The Thirteen or The Council of the Commonalty. Common Council is sometimes used of the representative, as here; an alternative name for the whole assembly is the Council Chamber.

fresh start in the development of the corporate government, with which we may perhaps associate the removal of the Parliamentary army from the town in July 1647.[1]

The apparently contemporary title of what I have termed the minute book is 'Communies Aule, Communia Consilia et Curie Aldermannorum', and this exactly describes the three types of entries found in it. The book opens with a heading, in Latin, for the year 23–4 Car. I, followed immediately by a list of the Council (similar lists precede the entries of each subsequent year). The list falls into two unequal parts, headed respectively 'Collegium Burgensium' and 'Consilium Communitatis'. The College of Burgesses consists of the mayor, twelve aldermen, two bailiffs, two chamberlains and sixty-five others; the Council of the Commonalty of thirteen persons. The sixty-five 'others' in the College of Burgesses include the earl of Cleveland and his son Thomas, Lord Wentworth, seven knights, six armigers, eight gentlemen and one clerk, Theodore Crowley, extruded rector of St. John's, Bedford. Among these landed gentry such notable royalists as Sir Lewis Dyve and Sir Francis Crawley appear in company with equally prominent supporters of the Parliament, such as Sir Oliver Luke, Sir Beauchamp St. John and Sir Samuel Luke. A well-attended meeting of the College at this time would clearly have promoted stimulating discussion, but it does not require the knowledge that the earl of Cleveland was a prisoner of Parliament until 1648 to convince us that the list is just one more illustration of the lawyer's obduracy in the face of facts. These men had been duly made burgesses; they were not dead and had not been deprived of the burgessdom; therefore they were members of the College and must be listed as such. Somewhat thus, one supposes, the town clerk would have argued, but we must not take it for granted that all or even most of the men whose names appear in the list were in practice perpetual absentees from meetings. Attendances are nowhere recorded in the minutes, but the names of those fined for absence, for attendance without gowns, and for departing without leave are entered with considerable regularity after 5 November 1649. Among those so fined in 1649–50 are twelve who, though neither aldermen nor members of the Council of the Commonalty, are listed as burgesses. Even if, therefore, we assume that the nobility and gentry, to whom the burgessdom was granted as a compliment, were not expected to attend and did not in fact do so, there remains a body of what we may perhaps call working burgesses, some

[1] *Victoria County History, Bedfordshire*, iii. 4.

forty in number, and the governing council is seen to consist all told of about seventy persons, made up of the mayor, two bailiffs, twelve aldermen, two chamberlains, about forty burgesses and the Thirteen representatives of the freemen.

The minutes of the years 1647–8 and 1648–9 yield no evidence of local friction, except an ordinance [1] of 20 April 1649 ' For certifying to the Committee of Parliament . . . the case of Samuell Gibbs the yonger, an Intrudor [into] the Towne Freedome '. We shall return to this later. On the first Monday of September in 1648 and again in 1649 the Common Hall met and elected the mayor and bailiffs ; the record shows nothing of the constitution of the Hall or of its procedure. The minutes of meetings in 1648–9 and 1649–50 are preceded by the usual lists of members of the Council ; in each the outgoing mayor is added to the list of aldermen ; in each one of the previous year's Thirteen is listed as one of the chamberlains ; and one new name appears as of the Thirteen in 1648–9. How these changes were effected is not recorded here, but immediately following the Council list for 1649–50 there is the following note :

> Memorandum : That at the first Councell of the abovesaid Maior, the Comon Councell was regulated (as to Burgesses) to consist of persons qualifyed and certayne other regulations made of votes, as appeareth here following.[2]

The first meeting of that year was held on 10 October 1649 and the first ordinance recorded is that to which the memorandum refers. It limits the Common Council or Council Chamber to consist of the mayor, the recorder and his deputy, the aldermen, bailiffs and chamberlains, such other burgesses as have served the offices of bailiff or chamberlain ' or shall hereafter by Act of Councell bee taken into ' the Council, and thirteen freemen or commoners, having never served in the chamberlainship, ' to bee taken and deemed to represent the universalitye of the Freemen '. Only those resident in the town are to have votes at assemblies, and the ordinance imposes fines for absence from meetings, for appearance without the prescribed dress and for quitting a meeting without leave.[3]

The succeeding ordinance deals with the mode of electing the mayor and bailiffs. This is to take place at a Common Hall and the freemen or commoners, ' according to the auntient custome ', are to make their election of the Mayor from two candidates, nominated, one by the mayor's ' house ' (consisting

[1] Minute book, p. 9. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 15. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 15–17.

of the mayor, aldermen and bailiffs) and another by the burgesses' 'house'.

The novelty of these arrangements appears to lie in the restriction of the burgesses on the Council to those who had served as bailiffs or chamberlains; and perhaps also in the limitation of voting rights to residents in the town. In both provisions we may suspect an intention to exclude the influence of the country gentry, numerous among the burgesses but only exceptionally resident in Bedford.

Only three months later, at a Common Council on 16 January 1650, the arrangements just described were superseded by a more extensive 'new establishment' of the Common Council.[1] The preamble to this ordinance explains that certain members of the Corporation had petitioned Parliament for redress of grievances supposed in the government of the town, and their petition had been referred to a Committee on 28 November 1649. The petitioners had submitted to the Committee particulars of their complaints and of their proposals for reform. During the Common Council meeting of 16 January it had been agreed to hold a conference of eight, four from each party. The report of the conference follows and the ordinance then enacts the proposals contained in it and goes on to lay down the procedure for the election of officers and representatives.

The new establishment substantially reduced the power of the burgesses, but the aims of the opposition are fortunately set out at length in two other documents preserved in the corporation archives,[2] namely, a summary of the petition of the aggrieved freemen with notes for answers, apparently a draft for the counter-petition, and a copy of 'New proposals' of the complainants. Before examining these documents, we must note a third, an Award concerning the election of the Thirteen,[3] which, dated 23 August 1648, belongs to an earlier stage of the same dispute. The award is made by a body of six, three burgesses and three freemen. It states that at the leet on 15 December 1647, a body of thirteen freemen who had not served in the chamberlainship had been chosen into the Common Council by the mayor and the rest of the Common Council there assembled. A controversy had then arisen on two points, first as to the claim of the freemen to elect their own representatives, and secondly as to whether the election should be annual or not. The agreement reached by the referees is that the Thirteen shall hold office *durante bono gestu* and that in future vacancies the mayor and Common Council

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 22–5. [2] Box 8, no. 2. [3] *Ibid.*, no. 1.

shall at the leet choose one of two candidates nominated by the universality of freemen.

The petition of 'Certaine well affected freemen'[1] adorns the dispute with an appeal to popular political theory. The Parliament, it says, have avowed all just power to be originally in the people and that the people represented are the supreme power of the nation. The petitioners, being a peculiar and entire body incorporated, have for divers years languished under the usurped power of an inconsiderable number of persons very much disaffected to the Parliament and present Government, who, although not elected by the freemen, claim an hereditary succession to the chief offices. The petitioners ask that the charter may be revised, that the free members of the corporation may yearly elect from among themselves twenty-four persons for a Representative or Common Council and may yearly elect the mayor, recorder, bailiffs, chamberlains, bridgewardens, town clerk, etc., from a double number of freemen or burgesses nominated by the Representative. They ask also to nominate and admit attorneys in the town courts, and to make constitutions; that no sheriff shall meddle within the town; that foreign maltsters, innholders and ale-housekeepers shall be inhibited; that these proposals and what else shall be for the petitioners' advantage shall be confirmed to them and their heirs by act of Parliament; and, finally, that only they and 'such as shall appear true to the Commonwealth now established' may vote for town officers and burgesses for Parliament.

'The Answer of the Counter-Partie', supported, so it asserts, by 'the maior part and better sort', including the mayor, the two bailiffs, nine of the ten aldermen, thirty-six burgesses and eighty-nine freemen, argues solidly from precedents, with numerous references to the town records. The petitioners are challenged to produce any one Act of the Common Council which may prove the present governors of the town to be disaffected to the Parliament or oppressors of the proponents. The distinction between burgesses and freemen is emphasised, and a reference to the Award of 23 August 1648 regarding the election of the Thirteen points out that Gibbs and Spenceley, 'two great Sticklers in the present differences', were two of the arbitrators for the freemen in the earlier one. Against increasing the number of the freemen's representatives and against their annual election the respondents say that these representatives are customarily exempt from such inferior offices as constable, headborough,

[1] Box 8, no. 2.

fleshsearcher and bucket keeper, which it would be difficult to fill if more freemen were exempted. If the recordership and deputy recordership, places hitherto supplied by persons of honour or worship, were subject to annual election, the present officers would probably resign and no others would accept, ' to bee yearelie subjected to the censure of vulgar votes onlie for 26/-8 per annum ' which is their fee. Finally comes a direct attack upon ' the cheef Sticklers against the present Government ' (i.e. of the town), named Easton and Gibbs. Both, it is noted, are unmarried, and neither is a housekeeper or shopkeeper, bearing scot and lot in the town. Easton had been of the freedom about a year and a half; Gibbs about seven years, ' and maynteines his brother (a forynor) to invade the Towne Freedome, which being opposed by the Magistrates hath bred this present stir '.

The minutes of the Common Council meeting of 20 April 1649 throw further light upon the last reference, in an ordinance,[1] already mentioned, for answering the complaint of Samuel Gibbs the younger before the Committee of Indemnity. Gibbs's case was that, having served an apprenticeship in London and then enlisted in the Parliamentary army, he was prevented from exercising his trade in Bedford, of which his father was a freeman. The corporation replied that Gibbs was only the younger son of a freeman and therefore a foreigner to the liberties of the town. They omitted to record that, if we may trust an ordinance of 31 October 1661,[2] the ancient custom of the town made all the sons of a freeman capable of the freedom, and that the restriction to the eldest son dated only from an act of 15 December 1647.

There is nothing to show whether the arguments of the ' well affected freemen ' prevailed over those of ' the maior part and better sort ' before the Parliamentary Committee on 28 November 1649, and it is to the Council's minutes of 16 January 1650 and later that we must return to follow the outcome of the dispute. The principal change resulting from the ordinance of 16 January 1650 [3] was the elimination from the Common Council of the College of Burgesses, that body of variable number, whose composition has been analysed above. In future the Common Council was to consist of the mayor, the recorder and deputy recorder, the aldermen, the two bailiffs and an annually elected representative, eighteen in number, chosen by the burgesses and freemen jointly from among themselves. Detailed rules for the election of the representative and of the mayor, bailiffs, chamberlain and bridgewarden are

[1] Minute book, p. 9. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 190. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 22–5.

set forth; the Eighteen were to be nominated and elected in and by an assembly of all members of the corporation other than those holding the higher offices; the mayor and bailiffs were to be elected by a similar assembly, from which the Eighteen were also excluded, out of a double number of candidates, one set nominated by the mayor, recorder, deputy recorder, aldermen and bailiffs, and another set nominated by the Eighteen.

The act of Council just summarised put freemen and burgesses on an equal footing in regard to the composition of the governing body, and thus stripped the burgessdom of its main privilege. The civic revolution was completed by a further act, passed by the reconstituted Council at its first meeting on 5 April 1650. The full title of this act [1] is 'For exalting all Members of the Corporation to the degree of Buregesses and abolishing the distinction betwixt Burgess[es] and Freemen', but it is interesting and suggestive that it is usually called 'The Levelling Act' in later references. The act provided that all who should in future be admitted to the freedom should take the oath of a burgess and go 'under that notion and title', and that all the then freemen should be accounted burgesses and enjoy the privileges belonging to that degree. Doubt arose later as to whether existing freemen were required first to take the burgess's oath, and this was settled affirmatively on 2 January 1651, the appropriate fees of sixpence to the town clerk and sixpence among the three sergeants-at-mace being duly safeguarded.[2] The effect of these ordinances, as may be deduced from the acts by which they were repealed after the Restoration, was to make possible the attainment of burgessdom by service, that is, by apprenticeship to a burgess. By the ancient custom of the town, according to the acts of 1661–3,[3] all the sons of a burgess born after the father became a burgess were entitled to the burgessdom, and freemen who, being chosen one of the Thirteen on the Common Council, subsequently bore office as mayor, bailiff or chamberlain, were afterwards reputed burgesses 'to all intents and purposes'. Part of this ordinance has been lost by damage to the manuscript, and it is possible that a third mode, by fine or purchase, was described in the missing passage. The conditions for freemen were the same in regard to birthright, but the freedom could also be attained by fine and—unlike the burgessdom—by apprenticeship served to a freeman. The first infringement of this custom appears to have been an act of 15 December 1647 (the minute book records

[1] Minute book, p. 28. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 47–8. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 189–91, 205.

no meeting of this date), by which both for burgesses and freemen birthright was restricted to the eldest son born after his father's admission. If this may be accepted, it is clear that the corporation had been pursuing a restrictive policy, and that the 'Levelling Act' of 1650 represented the swing of the pendulum.

If the structure of the corporation and its governing body in 1650 be compared with the proposals of the petitioners of 1649, it is clear that, as we should expect, a compromise had been reached; but it is no less clear that substantial concessions had been won by the popular party. In accordance with the provisions of the act of 16 January 1650, a new Representative was elected on 25 March following, and a comparison of the resulting Council list [1] with that [2] of the previous Michaelmas shows many changes. The mayor, fourteen aldermen, two bailiffs and two chamberlains are the same, but the sixty-two other members of the College of Burgesses in the first list are absent from the second. The Council of the Commonalty is enlarged from thirteen in the first to eighteen in the second and there are only four names common to both. Of the remaining fourteen in the second list only four are found in at least one of the earlier lists of the College of Burgesses, so that ten of the Eighteen must be presumed to have been freemen only. It appears that the representative Eighteen outnumbered by one the annually elected officers and the aldermen, for the two chamberlains are omitted from the Council lists in and after 25 March 1650. Remembering that the freemen were more numerous than the burgesses, and that the Eighteen were to be nominated and elected at a Common Hall composed of both, one might have expected that the changes effected in 1650 would have proved lasting and that the freemen would have maintained a predominating influence in the governing body, even without the further safeguards embodied in the 'Levelling Act'. It was not so, and it is remarkable that, although four of the nine displaced members of the Council of the Commonalty do not reappear in any later lists, three secured re-election at Michaelmas 1650.

The petitioners of 1649, as already mentioned, asked that the sheriff's authority should be excluded from the town, that foreign maltsters, innholders and ale-housekeepers should be inhibited, and that all their desires should be assured to them by Act of Parliament. Their opponents acknowledged the first two proposals to be good for the town, and it is probable

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 26. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

that the hope of securing some such privileges inspired the decision [1] of the Common Council, on 5 April 1650, to set about securing a renewal of the charter and to raise a sum of twenty pounds for that purpose by assessment upon resident members of the corporation. Nothing seems to have come of this project, and when, nearly three years later, on 3 January 1653, the Common Council resolved to raise fifty pounds by similar means and for the same purpose, the initiative came from the Parliamentary Committee for Corporations.[2] The Council further decided to petition for the confirmation of the existing charters, and also, 'upon information from the Solicitors that any hope of enlargement of privileges appears', to ask for a number of additional concessions, including the two suggested in the petition of 1649. Thomas Gibbs, one of the 'sticklers' who signed the petition of 1649, was now appointed to take charge of the negotiations in London.[3] What happened before the Committee for Corporations does not appear, but on 26 September 1653 the Common Council ordered that the sums raised for the renewal of the charter should be repaid to those from whom they had been collected.[4] At the same meeting Thomas Gibbs presented a bill for £4. 2. 3., laid out by him, not in negotiating for the charter, but in the suit of 1649. The Council acknowledged £3. 15. 3. as a debt due to Gibbs; [5] already, more than two years before, they had agreed to a similar claim for £4. 18. 2. from John Easton Jun., the other prime mover of the petition.[6] And so the incident was closed.

An interval of two and a half years separated the settlement with Gibbs from the opening of a new constitutional crisis. On 19 March 1656, William Butler, Major-General of the Counties of Bedford, Northampton, Huntingdon and Rutland, issued a warrant removing from office the mayor, one of the bailiffs and four councillors and ordered the remaining members of the Council Chamber to fill the resulting vacancies by nomination, although, as the minute book records, the choice constitutionally belonged to the commonalty.[7] The Council obeyed, and two months later, explaining that 'some inconvenience hath been lately discovered in the manner of election' of the Eighteen, repealed the act of 16 January 1650 and set up a committee of six, including John Easton and Thomas Gibbs, to devise a new method 'by Monday senight'.[8]

[1] Minute book, p. 29. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 73. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 75–6.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 87. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 84. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 51.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 108–10; *Thurloe's State Papers*, iv. 632.
[8] Minute book, p. 111.

The Council was adjourned to meet again on the day fixed for the delivery of the report, but there is no record of such a meeting and three months elapsed before the Common Council, three days before the customary date for the election of the mayor and other officers, resolved upon the new procedure. In the interval they had, under pressure from the Major-General, expelled from the burgessdom the son of the deputy recorder, declaring that his admission had been secured by the influence of the ejected mayor and councillors, and had admitted Butler and four others to be burgesses without fine.[1]

The amendment of the election procedure which followed on 29 August was the first step toward the reversal of the freemen's victory of 1650. Two changes were made, both of which had the effect of reducing the popular element in the Common Council. In the first place, the number of the elected representative was reduced from eighteen to fifteen; in the second, though the election was still left to the Common Hall or assembly of freemen and burgesses, the choice was to be made from a body of twenty candidates nominated by the mayor, aldermen and bailiffs.[2]

The election of the representative in 1656, held, in accordance with custom, on the Wednesday before St. Matthew's day—that is, less than three weeks after the passing of the act just summarised—was apparently uneventful, but a year later the opposition made their protest. The minute for the Common Hall of 16 September 1657 begins with a list of twenty persons nominated by the mayor, aldermen and bailiffs ' in order to the election of the Representative or Fifteen called the Council of the Commonalty '. It then states that on the publication of the names, twelve burgesses named ' did each protest against the manner of election as illegal and against law, being a restraint of the electors' free choice of their representative and also being grounded upon an Act of Council made by such as were not thereto elected according to the usage and constitutions of the Town ; and craved that their protestations might be entered and recorded '. Which being done, the election proceeded in accordance with the disputed Act.[3]

One would expect that this protest would have come from the freemen, but the twelve are expressly called burgesses in the minute and a study of the names in the three lists—the nominees, the protesters and the elected Fifteen—suggests that the ascendency was passing back into the hands of the more conservative group. Of the twelve protesters, three were

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 112, 113. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 115–16. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 135–6.

also among the twenty nominated and the fifteen elected, and all three were men removed from office by Major-General Butler in 1656. Among the other nine protesters were two who had served on the governing body before, and two more who were to serve on it after the Restoration. The reference to the irregular appointment of the Common Council is surely an echo of that body's own misgivings as to the filling by nomination of the vacancies created by Butler in March 1656, and it may be inferred from this, as well as from the known details of the protesters' careers, that the division between them and their opponents arose on national rather than on local issues. But the two were still intertwined, and it is striking that three of the more prominent leaders in the petition of 1649 were among the five unsuccessful candidates for the Common Council at this election. The petitioners had accused the burgesses of disaffection from the Parliament; they had extorted a concession of power for the freemen. In 1656 the Major-General had detected malignancy in the reconstituted Common Council and had reduced it to obedience, if not to servility; but next year three of his victims—all burgesses—were strong enough to head a protest against an electoral manipulation which looks like an attempt to shelter the Common Council from the wind of popular opinion, and in the ensuing election it was they who were returned and their opponents of 1649 who were rejected.

The first meeting of the Common Council after the restoration of the monarchy was held on 26 June 1660, and the regnal year duly reappears in the heading to the minute. Two months later, on 29 August, the Council enacted 'A new Establishment of the Representative with the manner of its Election'. This act reduced the number of the elected Council of the Commonalty from fifteen to thirteen, and increased from twenty to twenty-six the number of candidates to be nominated by 'the Mayor's house', that is, the mayor, aldermen and bailiffs.[1] Thus the counter revolution, which had won its first success in the reaction against military interference in 1657, restored the situation as it was before 1650, so far as the number of the representative was concerned. In one important respect, however, the compromise of 1650 seems to have survived; although the Common Council soon began to admit the nobility and gentry to the burgessdom,[2] the College of Burgesses, that large and indeterminate element in the Common Councils of 1647–8, 1648–9 and 1649–50, does not reappear, at least within the period covered by this paper.

[1] Minute book, pp. 172–3. [2] E.g., *ibid.*, pp. 187, 194.

Other means were found of securing to the burgesses a monopoly of municipal authority.

In this the first step, as one would expect, was to revive the earlier distinction between burgesses and freemen, and this was accomplished by an act of 31 October 1661, which supplies useful details of the local practice prior to the 'Levelling Act' of April 1650. All infringements of that practice were now repealed, and it was laid down that no person should be sworn and admitted a burgess, unless entitled by the ancient custom.[1] Next year a further act barred those who had attained burgessdom under the Levelling Act from transmitting birthright to their sons and forbade admission to this grade on grounds of service.[2] The Commissioners for Regulating Corporations took a hand in the game in 1662, and there are annotations in the minutes as far back as 1654, recording the expulsion of such 'political' burgesses as Bulstrode Whitelock and the reduction to freemen of less notable men whose burgessdom had been acquired by redemption (i.e., purchase).[3]

The distinction between burgesses and freemen having been re-established, and the body of burgesses having been purged, as far as possible, of unworthy intruders and fortified by the honorary admission of a number of the local gentlemen, the way lay open for a conclusive victory over the freemen. On 19 August 1663 the Council adopted an ordinance 'For the Representative to be chosen out of the Burgesses onlie'. After explaining that the Thirteen were, under the existing constitutions, chosen out of the burgesses and freemen promiscuously, the act ordained that at the next election and so onward they should be taken of the burgesses only, 'unless the Council being in the mean time satisfied out of the Town Records that the body of Freemen ought to have a Representative of their own degree, separate from the Burgesses, shall order the same to be and establish a certain number for that Representative with the manner of their choice; and then that Representative to be joined to the rest of the Chamber above established'.[4] 'And thus the whirligig of time brings in his revenges', and the thirteen 'freemen and principle men of quality' added to the Council by the leet in 1610 become the thirteen burgesses of 1663, and the Council can even question whether by precedent the freemen are entitled to any representatives chosen from their own body. At least seven aldermen, one bailiff, the two chamberlains and four councillors of 1663 had served on the Council in those years, between

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 189–90. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 205. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 94–5. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 222.

1647 and 1650, when the freemen were successfully fighting for representation, and if their memories were hazy, the town clerk, William Scott, having at hand the records which we have here examined (and possibly others now lost) must have been well aware of the facts of the case. But there is not, in this minute book, any act for the establishment of a separate representative for the freemen, and one must therefore assume that the elections of 1663 and 1664, the last here recorded, were conducted in accordance with the ordinance of August 1663, though the changes in personnel are not exceptionally numerous.

The action of the Regulating Commissioners of 1662 in expelling and degrading certain burgesses has been mentioned above, but their other measures require brief notice. There is no summary of their orders in the minute book, but beside the list of the Council for 1661–2 there is a note, in Latin, that John Easton and Robert Bell, two of the aldermen, were removed by the Commissioners on 13 August 1662.[1] As two of their other orders are dated 22 October 1662,[2] their enquiries appear to have taken a rather leisurely course. The Corporation voted four pounds to Paul Cobb, for his pains as clerk to the Commissioners;[3] the recipient lived to be the mayor who surrendered the charter to James II and was rewarded in 1688 by being removed from his aldermanship.[4] Both the men expelled in 1662 were aldermen in 1647–8. Robert Bell refused the mayoralty in 1649, but accepted it in 1651 and again in 1660. He was a man of substance, able to advance £100 to the Corporation, so that the fines which were laid on him for his frequent absence from Council meetings, even had they been collected, may not have troubled him. He had the distinction, while mayor, of being fined for appearing without a gown, but the minutes afford no clue to the offences which made him objectionable to the Commissioners. With John Easton Senior it is different; his son was one of the leaders of the freemen in 1649 and his connexions seem to have been with the Independents. He was mayor in 1650–1, the first chosen after the reforms of January 1650; it fell to him, as senior alderman, to act as provisional mayor on the removal of the elected mayor by Major-General Butler in 1656; and he served again in the troubled year 1659–60.

In Bedford, as in many other boroughs, the Restoration involved more than a return to the *status quo*; it meant the

[1] Minute book, p. 186.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 153.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 213–14.
[4] *Victoria County History, Bedfordshire*, ii, 58–9.

decisive reversal of a long-continued development which we may fairly describe as democratic in purpose. The Bedford corporation in 1664 was legally less amenable to the wishes of the freemen than at any time after 1610. The division of its citizens on local issues did not exactly coincide with their division on national ones, but the freemen's cause had flourished and withered according as the royalist cause had declined and revived. It seems as though the only bequest of the corporation of 1647–60 to its successors was an increased liability to the interference of the national government. Whatever may have been done to exclude royalist influence in the years before 1647, the forms of legality were scrupulously observed and the king's supporters were duly listed in the College of Burgesses. But the precedents set by the Parliamentary Committee for Corporations and the Major-Generals were applied by the restored monarchy through the Commissioners for Regulating Corporations. Before Bedford's first minute book closed, the ominous words *Quo Warranto* had been written in it and the Corporation were seeking one of the new charters, in which the approval of the recorder and the town clerk would be reserved to the Crown.[1] A new chapter was opening.[2]

[1] Minute book, p. 225 ; Charter 16 Car. II ; J. H. Sacret, ' The Restoration Government and Municipal Corporations ', *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, xlv. 242.

[2] I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the Corporation of Bedford, for permission to photostat and edit the minute book ; to the Town Clerk, Mr. H. Darlow, M.A., LL.M., for his interest and assistance ; to the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, and in particular to its Chairman, Mr. F. S. Manning, for whose publications the text is being prepared ; and to Miss Joyce Godber, Clerk of the Records to the County of Bedford, her assistant, Miss Crook, and the Assistant Solicitor to the Corporation, Mr. M. D. Gilmore, who together furnished the notes and transcripts of miscellaneous documents in the Corporation archives cited in my paper.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

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By Professor R. W. Seton-Watson, D.Litt., Ph.D., F.B.A.

Main Currents in Russian Foreign Policy

In my first Address from this chair I chose as my subject ' The Foundations of British Policy ', in the belief that its study is more than ever incumbent upon ourselves and upon the succeeding generation, and that neglect and incomprehension are among the major causes of the most devastating war in all our history. And if it is an urgent duty, in the interests of future peace, to study and discuss the workings of our own policy, it follows that we must also clear our minds as to the underlying motives of other Powers, both friendly and hostile. The price that we have all had to pay for neglect of German history is even to-day not yet fully understood. But to the plain man Russian policy, with its many shifts of extreme violence, is even more mysterious. Thus the events which brought us together in 1941, in an alliance of twenty years for which there is no precedent, ought to be, nay *are*, the personal concern of every one of us. These events, the result of Hitler's supreme blunder in invading Russia, represent a rebound from unreasoning isolation and appeasement to a policy first of guarantees, then of increasingly effective intervention, and finally of unswerving ' jusqu'au-bout-isme '. Are we to assume that that unconventional alliance was merely dictated by passing necessity and is in gradual dissolution, or alternately that it rests upon a solidarity of interests which far outbids ideological aims ?

At the outset there should at least be a brief reference to the catastrophic character of Slav history. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this is something inherent in the character and ' make-up ' of all the Slav races. Certainly Russia, so much the largest and most powerful of the Slav nations, shares this with all her kinsmen. For just as Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Bohemia, Poland, went down and suffered complete eclipse in different ways and at different times and for varying lengths of time, so Russia herself has twice disintegrated as a state—first under the stress of the Tatar invasion, then in the so-called ' Troublous Times ', when Poland aspired to swallow Muscovy. Needless to say, in all these long centuries wars of defence or recovery alternate with wars of conquest.

Another factor should become obvious in the course of this survey, namely, that despite many differences of psychology and tradition, there is none the less a closer affinity and mutual attraction between the Slavs than is the case between the Teutonic or Latin tribes, and that this has its very definite political consequences, notably in the much misunderstood and much-misrepresented idea of Pan-Slavism.

The foundation for any intelligent study of foreign policy in any part of the globe must be a grasp of the essential determining factors of geography: and there are no two countries of which this is more true than Britain and Russia. The fact that we are a group of islands in one corner of the Old World, detached from the Continent, yet never out of its reach, indeed so near that indifference to it has always brought speedy punishment upon us, has given us a certain hybrid status. For we are at one and the same time European and extra-European, looking constantly overseas and often relaxing our attention while vital things are happening at our very door, and thus creating the impression that as we have one foot on sea and one on shore, we must necessarily be 'to one thing constant never'. Russia creates a very different impression as we cast our eyes across the vast spaces of her map and see her in the early centuries of her history, remote and isolated, a country of giant rivers, endless forests, wide steppes as yet utterly unexplored, the soil merely scratched by the hand of man, like the prairies of the Middle West two centuries ago. If in the days of Elizabeth or the Stuarts Russia was almost as mysterious and unknown as the unreformed Japan of last century, this was above all because her geographical access to the outside world was very precarious. The merchants of the Russia Company reached her by the White Sea and Archangel, at a time when Russia had no outlet either westwards to the Baltic or southwards to the Black Sea. Her neighbours on the west were then the unwieldy but still powerful and aggressive Polish-Lithuanian state and Sweden, who occupied the East Baltic provinces till the days of Charles XII, and Finland till as late as 1808: to the south of them the loosely-knit Cossack Republic on the Dnieper and the Don, and the decaying Tatar state of Crimea, under Ottoman suzerainty. In the rear of both stood the Ottoman Empire at its zenith, in full possession of the Roumanian Principalities. It was not until 1552–4 that the Muscovite state acquired control of its greatest river, the Volga, by recovering Kazan, Astrakhan and the Caspian delta. From the second half of the seventeenth century onwards, when Russian and Turk come more directly to grips, it is becoming

obvious that Russia's first aim is, and must be, a double outlet to the Baltic and Black Seas—what is loosely known as a window on the west, or access to the warm seas.

The first serious steps in this direction were taken at the opening of the eighteenth century by Peter the Great, whose whole activities have something of the ruthless, irresistible onrush of a tidal wave. While Britain, France and the Empire are absorbed in the War of Spanish Succession—in other words, in essentially Western and Mediterranean objectives—Peter, in the so-called Northern War, breaks the back of Sweden as a Great Power, sows the seed of Polish Partition, founds the modern capital of St. Petersburg, and gives the first systematic challenge to Turkey's stranglehold upon the Black Sea coast, though here he suffered a serious setback and left fulfilment to his successors. Thus by the time that Britain has imposed peace upon Louis XIV and Austria has recovered Hungary from the Turks after an occupation of 160 years, Russia under Peter has been rapidly swimming into the ken of Europe, while Austria, who during the seventeenth century so often faced the Turks alone, now finds herself saddled with a partner in southward aggression, and moreover, one who is more and more a centre of attraction to all the subject races of South-Eastern Europe. This partnership may be said to begin with the Treaty of 1726, concluded by Peter's widow Catherine I, and to last for nearly two centuries, until 1914. It is sometimes in abeyance, sometimes in danger of changing to acute hostility, but it is none the less on many occasions one of the chief realities of what came to be called 'The Eastern Question'. In its essence it was the question how to hold advancing Turkey at bay, and when the Turkish flood at length began to ebb, how to fill the vacuum thus created. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Serbs, Bulgars, Roumanians and Hungarians had borne the brunt, and went under in turn: in the sixteenth and seventeenth the Habsburg Power—'Austria' for short—stood on the defensive and was prevented by the diversions of western politics and the religious conflict in Central Europe from concentrating its whole strength upon the expulsion of the Turks. Then in the eighteenth century Austria found herself no longer alone. Austria and Russia, the two great land powers of Eastern Europe, moved parallel or hand in hand, and fought jointly or severally four major wars without attaining their goal.

In 1710–11 Peter failed to evict the Turks from Moldavia and himself very narrowly escaped disaster. In 1716–18 Austria under Prince Eugene cleared the last Turk out of

Hungary and occupied large tracts of Serbia and Wallachia, but had to cede them back again after a twenty-years' tenure. The joint Austro-Russian War of 1737–9, which was to drive the Turks from Europe, ended disastrously for both Powers: Turkey recovered Belgrade and the river line which was still to be her boundary with Austria for more than a century and a half, and reaffirmed her hold upon the Principalities. In 1768–74 Russia fought one of her major wars against Turkey without Austrian help and made her first appearance as a naval power in the Mediterranean. But though the Treaty of Kütchük Kainardji was an important landmark, assigning as it did to Russia an undefined but none the less effective 'Protectorate' over her blood-brothers and co-religionists in the Near East and thus opening the door to every kind of interference and political intrigue, Turkey preserved her territorial integrity. In the next two decades Russia and Austria hatched elaborate plans for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, but when in the joint war of 1787–91 they attempted to translate their plan into action, they once more found that Turkey, despite many obvious signs of decay, still possessed remarkable powers of resistance, and once more preserved her integrity save for the fortresses of Orsova and Ochakov. The long Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars diverted the efforts of the Great Powers and gave Turkey a much-needed respite. At the turn of the eighteenth century, as a result of Bonaparte's famous Egyptian expedition, the maritime Powers for the first time took a direct part in the Eastern Question, which was to dominate European politics for over a century. The fifth Great Power, Prussia, only gradually interested itself in the Eastern Question, and then mainly for tactical reasons: while the sixth, Italy, can hardly be said to have taken a hand until the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and then only nominally on equal terms with her five colleagues.

To all this political strategy there is an obvious geographical background. The two Danubian Principalities and Bulgaria are seen to be in the sphere of influence of Russia, for the very simple reason that any Russian advance against Turkey must be across the Lower Danube and the Balkan range. In the same way Serbia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Morea, lie within the sphere of influence of Austria, who has succeeded the Venetian Republic on the eastern Adriatic, is interested in Bosnia as the hinterland of Dalmatia, and in Albania and Serbia as roads leading to Salonica and the Aegean. It is worth noting that while the eastern group is liable to undergo influence and pressure from Russia, the western group, though not marching

with any Great Powers save Austria, is partially open to the influence of Sea-Power and enjoys contacts with the Western Maritime Powers. Without attempting to outline these tendencies it must suffice to recall two special occasions when 'spheres of influence' lay at the root of policy. The first was the famous 'Greek Project' drawn up in 1784 between Catherine the Great and Joseph II—when to balance the new Dacian Kingdom to which her favourite Potemkin had aspired and the restored Byzantine Empire under her grandson Constantine, Austria was to acquire a hold upon the Adriatic coast and hinterland alike and to extend her sway to the Greek islands and mainland. The second was the secret Russo-Austrian understanding of 1876, when Serbia was to be kept as a kind of neutral buffer separating the two Great Powers entrenched upon the Adriatic and Black Sea respectively. In passing it is interesting to note that the Russian fleet, whose real founder was Peter's friend William Gordon, a Scottish Jacobite laird, was welcomed at Portsmouth when making its first voyage to the Mediterranean.[1] Choiseul wanted to attack it, but Britain warned France and Spain that she would regard any attempt to arrest the progress of the Russian fleet as an act of hostility towards herself. The voyage culminated in the sea-fight of Chesme, the greatest Mediterranean battle between Lepanto and Navarino.

Chatham, it may be noted, once wrote to Grenville 'I am quite a Russian', and that was the predominant mood in 1781, when Britain offered to Catherine a perpetual alliance and Minorca as a naval base. Throughout this period Russia was the source of essential supplies of timber, hemp and rope needed for the British navy, and this was indeed a permanent background to Anglo-Russian relations till well on in the nineteenth century. The unpopularity of the breach with England which Napoleon forced upon Alexander I was largely due to the fact that the Russian trading class and many noble families also were deeply interested in the profits of the Baltic trade.

Behind the geographical there was a psychological factor of the first importance, which favoured Russia at the expense of her Austrian rival. The Russians were Slavs, whose numbers and importance acquired added mystery from their remoteness: they were linked to the Slavs under Turkish rule—the Serbs and Bulgars—by ties both of blood and religion, and to the other subject peoples—the Greeks and Roumanians—by ties of religion though not of blood. From the very first it is possible to detect a strange blend of high idealism and self-

[1] Among its officers were an Elphinstone and a Greig.

seeking, of religion and imperialism, in which the perfectly genuine desire to liberate kinsfolk and co-religionists from a hateful yoke is offset by a tendency to regard them as useful tools in the long struggle for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. The Tsar is in a sense the spiritual heir of Byzantium, ever since the marriage of Ivan III to a Princess of the Paleologus family. Moscow is ' the third Rome ', the successor of Byzantium, destined to restore the Orthodox faith, to recover Santa Sofia, and to evict Islam : and of course it must so happen that Santa Sofia stands at the most crucial strategic point of the Near and Middle East, and its possession means the control of the Straits and of the Black Sea, and free access to the Mediterranean. Both Peter and Catherine, in their various challenges to Turkey, issued fiery appeals to the oppressed nationalities on the basis of kinship and religious faith : in a changed form this tendency persists throughout the nineteenth century, and even in our own century can be detected in the minds of such men as Isvolsky and Sazonov. Impartial study reveals the two currents, the idealist and the imperialist, as inextricably mingled, but always present : and the greatest blunders of foreign observers in their reading of Russian policy are to be traced to their failure to see that both motives are always in operation. The lesson still holds good in our own day, when both the idealist and imperialist currents have found new channels, but none the less remain essentially the same as before. Those who see in the Russia of Stalin nothing but a communist ideology are as wide of the mark as those who think that its reviving nationalism is a mere swing back of the pendulum to a vanished old order. But the foundations of policy remain curiously unchanged.

I am dwelling upon the eighteenth century because it contains the seed of all subsequent developments. At its opening and towards its close we see the two giants of constructive policy, Peter and Catherine. Peter, that most ruthless of all Russian autocrats, a savage thinly disguised, but a man of almost unique genius and drive—in Harold Williams' eloquent phrase, Peter's ' immense impetus ' was ' a symbol, the embodiment of the elemental, forward-rushing forces of the Russian people '. Catherine, who did not know the meaning of personal morality, yet never for one moment allowed her numerous lovers to assume control of Russian policy, and who found it expedient to counterbalance her quite genuine philosophical and rationalistic tastes by a well-advertised strict adherence to the elements of the Orthodox faith. Never, says Sorel very neatly, did Russia possess ' a sovereign so completely

Russian as this German woman', the daughter of a 'wee German lairdie'.

Between these two great figures we have the miscellaneous assortment so bitingly dismissed by Laveleye as 'four light-ladies, two children and two madmen' on the throne of Russia. As a background were visible the struggles of various German kinsmen, of Holstein and other lesser houses, to exploit Russian policy and resources to their own advantage, and of a relatively small number of German noble families, who had acquired land and come to monopolise power in the Baltic coastlands of Livonia and Courland. There are cases where a dynastic and a national policy are at variance with one another, and nearly always the national asserts itself in some highly explosive manner. Such a case was that of the degenerate Peter III, who succeeded the Empress Elizabeth in 1762 and at once reversed the policy followed by her during the Seven Years' War, thereby saving Frederick from desperate straits of isolation, to which the fall of Pitt and the peace policy of George III and Bute were reducing him. Peter was overthrown and killed in prison, but his widow Catherine, who thus inaugurated a memorable reign of thirty-four years, accepted accomplished facts and withdrew her troops from Prussia. The reversal of alliances in 1762–3 is one of the decisive diplomatic events of modern history, illustrating the utter artificiality with which policy was conducted in that ultra-unscrupulous age.

Catherine's political aims may be summed up under four main heads. Firstly, she sought to consolidate and extend Russia's position in the Baltic: this is the well-known policy of 'the western window'. Secondly, the parallel ambition to extend her frontiers to the Black Sea was signally realised through a long series of carefully planned aggressions. By the Treaty of Kütchük Kainardji (1774) Azov and Kertch were ceded by the Turks, the Dnieper thus becoming the frontier between Russia and Turkey: and at the same time Russia obtained the right of free navigation in the Black Sea. The Tatar Khans of the Crimea were made independent of Turkey, in the certain knowledge that they would not be able to stand alone: and sure enough, only nine years later Crimea was definitely annexed by Catherine. Then in 1791, as the solitary but very valuable booty from the war of 1787–91, she also annexed the key-fortress of Ochakov and reached the Dniester. Then and then only was Odessa founded and rapidly developed as the centre of the growing Black Sea grain trade. Thirdly, the same treaty of 1774 set up a Russian protectorate over the

Christians of the Near East : and the erection of an Orthodox Church on the hill above the Golden Horn was a symbol, in bricks and mortar, of that spiritual relationship to which Catherine and most of her successors attached so high an importance. Lastly, parallel with the widening of the older window on the west and the opening of this newer window to the south, went a much less justifiable policy of imperialist expansion at the expense of Poland.

The position in the last quarter of the eighteenth century may be summed up quite briefly, and provides the clue to much that follows, right on till our own day. When the conclusion of the Treaty of 1748 seemed to offer peace to ravaged Europe, the two Powers which blocked the way to Russian expansion, whether legitimate or otherwise, namely, Poland and Turkey, were in full decline : and both at St. Petersburg and at Vienna the view gained ground that Turkey's overthrow and partition was not far off. But this prospect was highly distasteful to Prussia, for it would have meant the aggrandisement of the other two Great Powers of Eastern Europe, Russia and Austria, without any corresponding gain for upstart Prussia. Frederick therefore strained every nerve to divert their appetite from Turkey to Poland, and as Catherine shared his complete lack of scruple, they were in the end able to prevail upon the more scrupulous but scarcely less hungry Maria Theresa to join in this crowning international conspiracy. The First Partition of Poland—in 1772—was the result. This had immense and permanent effects upon the whole political development of Europe. There were still two gulps to the cherry : and the Second Partition in 1792, concluded within a few days only of the execution of Louis XVI, revealed that the Eastern Powers, for all their show of horror at this challenge to the monarchical principle, were far more interested in games of grab and of balance near their own frontiers.

There can be no question here of a historical survey of these events : it must suffice to make it clear that from 1772 right on to 1914 there was a kind of unholy alliance between the three Eastern Powers, with the double purpose of retaining their ill-gotten gains at the expense of Poland (thus nipping in the bud any signs of reviving Polish nationalism) and of maintaining the conservative and autocratic principles personified in the dynasties of Romanov, Habsburg and Hohenzollern, as against ' The Revolution ' with a big R, as associated in their minds with the Western democratic Powers. (In passing be it noted that to the statesmen of the Holy Alliance and their immediate successors such conceptions as liberal, democratic, radical,

socialist, revolutionary were so many distinctions without a difference.) Thus the Polish question is intertwined with problems of internal policy and balance in Austria and Prussia, and above all with Russo-Polish relations, which were envenomed by the two later Polish insurrections of 1831 and 1863. Successive Tsars withdrew the inadequate but by no means negligible constitutional rights which had been granted by Alexander I in one of his liberal moods.

In view of present-day developments it may be well to disentangle two distinct threads of the skein—on the one hand, Catherine's deliberate action, often prompted by Frederick, to frustrate eleventh-hour reforms which might have made Poland once more strong and independent, on the other, the existence of a competition, almost equally imperialistic on both sides, for the legacy of those wide White Russian and Ukrainian lands which Poland had originally acquired as a result of the Union with Lithuania and which had remained behind under Polish rule when Kiev itself was recovered by Russia in 1654. Sorel, in his great work on *Europe and the French Revolution*, says of Catherine : ' The French Revolution deranges her calculations and she detests it : Polish anarchy suits her designs and she foments it.' It was Frederick the Great who wrote : ' Whoever possesses the source of the Vistula and the town of Danzig, will be more master of this state (i.e. Poland) than the King who rules it.' But to this may be added two sayings of Catherine from the beginning and from the close of her reign : ' My aim is to be allied with all the Powers and to keep on the defensive, in order to be able to take the side of the most oppressed and thus be the arbiter of Europe '—this when she was still feeling her way between Prussia and Austria. And in 1791 : ' I want to engage the Courts of Vienna and Berlin in these affairs, in order to have elbow-room. I have many enterprises unfinished, and they must be kept busy, so as not to embarrass me.'

When Catherine died in 1796, she left Russia still more formidable than she had found it, and perhaps all the more so because of its vast but untested and undeveloped resources. The five years that followed her death were in some degree a repetition of events preceding her accession. The conduct of her half-mad son Tsar Paul certainly seemed to prove his paternity, and created a situation from which the only obvious issue was a repetition of the fate of Peter III. The two events of 1762 and 1801 go to show that even in a despotically governed state the despot, if he pursues a personal foreign policy at variance with the nation's sentiments and interests, does so at his peril : and in that event it follows logically that the more

despotic the regime, the more drastic are the methods by which the despot is removed or eliminated.

With the accession of Paul's son Alexander I in 1801, the dynastic situation is stabilised : five Tsars, following each other in lineal succession, almost inevitably fill the foreground of foreign policy and have the last word. Incidentally it may be noted that not one of the ministers whom they employed ever outshone the Tsar of the day, even though such men as Nesselrode and Gorchakov rivalled Kaunitz and Metternich in long tenure of office.

Though only too conscious of my folly in attempting to cover so wide a field, I am tempted to inquire whether it is possible to detect a constant line in Russian policy, transcending personal issues. And indeed it may be claimed that certain dual conflicting tendencies do in fact run through and dominate the whole course of Russian history. During the nineteenth century the old contrast between Holy Russia, of ' the Third Rome ', and the crude materialism of Peter, lives on in a modified form. On one side is the Slavophil current, deriving from Orthodox mysticism, and resolutely turning away its face from what it calls ' the Rotten West '—an attitude with which will always be associated the names of two great publicists, Katkov and Aksakov, and that arch-reactionary of the Holy Synod, Pobyedonostsev. On the other side is the eastern current, welcoming on the contrary the revolutionary ideas of the West, and especially of the French Revolution, condemning autocracy root and branch and passing on through Herzen and Kireyevski to Proudhon and Marx—in the 'seventies and 'eighties outdistancing the Liberals and organising nihilism and terrorism on a scale more formidable than any till then attempted in any other country. It is unnecessary to point out that even the murder of Alexander II in 1881 was far from being the culmination of the movement, and that the opening decade of our century was marked by a long series of notable assassinations (Plehve, Grand Duke Sergius, Bobrikov, Stolypin, etc.). The tense situation that resulted helped to widen the gulf between St. Petersburg, the centre of the Court, of the bureaucracy and of foreign policy, and Moscow, the spiritual (in certain contexts, one might say, the emotional) capital, following ideals often quite at variance with official policy and highly distasteful to its directors.

In between these two extremes were the exponents of a more moderate and experimental liberalism such as Turgenev expounded in his novels. To them the ideal for Russia also was western constitutional and representative government, but

they saw that only by intimate contacts with the peasantry could they hope to achieve an alliance between the intellectuals and the masses against the forces of reaction. In the end, we know only too well, the Liberals proved too doctrinaire, too feeble amid the stress of war, for a task in which they might have succeeded in quieter times, when the pace was less breakneck and popular sentiment less strained. After all, even the Social Revolutionaries, who as the party offspring of the Nihilists never suffered from squeamishness, found themselves in their turn outbid by the Bolsheviks of the ' Weltkonjunktur ' of 1917.

You will not, I trust, expect from me the supreme folly of attempting a neatly docketed catalogue of Russian foreign policy, leading through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the great upheaval. All that I can hope is to examine, in the light of the five men in whose hands the reins of government lay, whether there has not been some compelling force that overrides their normal selfish ambitions.[1] This may help us to answer what is the most vital question of our own day—whether, or how far, the constants of Russian policy have survived all the changes of industrial progress and new communications, or alternately whether the new ideology that gave such a fierce impetus to the Second Revolution of October 1917 has replaced those seeming constants by other quite different and perhaps more expansive aims. For upon the answer to this question must to a very large extent depend our hopes of improved relations and the gradual removal of misunderstandings between our two countries.

It is certainly safe to affirm that there is a dualist trend in Russian policy. On the one hand we see sympathy for the oppressed kinsmen and co-religionists of the Balkan Peninsula, and on the other, inextricably blended with this, the Imperialist ' Drang ' towards the Straits and Constantinople. Looked at from one angle, and therefore unfairly, the subject races may seem the key both to Santa Sofia restored to Christian worship, and to Russian dominion in the Near East. Yet no critic living in the British glasshouse where plans for the prolongation of Turkish tyranny were so often hatched, is entitled to discuss these problems without frankly admitting that Russia, whatever may have been her errors and ulterior motives, has sacrificed more than any other Power for the cause of enslaved peoples. The Russian land war of 1828–9 finally turned the

[1] This is only one out of several points at which I should like to commend very specially to the reader's attention Mr. B. H. Sumner's *Russia and the Balkans* and his *Tsarism and Imperialism* (Raleigh Lecture, 1940).

scale in favour of Greece, while we were changing course not once but several times. In 1833 a Russian general promulgated the first modern constitution for the two Roumanian Principalities. In 1839 Russia upheld the constitutional cause against the arbitrary and corrupt Prince Milosh of Serbia, whom a British Liberal Premier and his emissary Colonel Hodges sought to retain in power. In the 'sixties we did what we could to maintain the Turkish garrisons in Serbia, not because one solitary Serb desired it, but mainly because Russia was on the other side. In 1876 Russian volunteers by the thousand fought for Serbia against the Turks, and a year later Tsar and people went to war for the liberation of the oppressed Bulgarians whom Britain sought to keep under the rule of the Turks. It is true that Russia marred the effect by annexing southern Bessarabia and by trying to impose her own soldiers and bureaucrats upon her newly liberated Bulgarian kinsmen. But these blemishes, and others that could be mentioned, do not alter my thesis that Russia outdistanced all other Powers in her idealism : whereas the list of British statesmen, of both political parties, who set themselves to prevent any rescue from the Turkish yoke is a formidable one. To take but a single point, it is humiliating to-day to remember that Disraeli and Layard did all they could to exclude Sofia and Varna from the new Bulgaria and to leave them in Turkish hands.

Under an autocracy, and more especially under one so untrammelled and exacting as that of Russia, the personality of the ruler must of necessity form a prime subject of inquiry : and I have been tempted to pass in review the characters and very varying reactions of the five Tsars whose reigns fill the nineteenth century, in the hope that they provide at least here and there some pattern or design, and not mere scratchings of black upon white. It may be that we shall merely endorse the judgment of Sorel, that ' Russia only thinks of the East and of Poland, and in the crises of Europe only seeks occasions for her own aggrandisement ' : [1] or it may rather be necessary to admit that the Slav problem and Slav affinities override all other considerations.

The first of these five sovereigns, Alexander I, is in many respects the most complex and enigmatic : and this has, with some plausibility, been traced back to the circumstances in which he succeeded his father and which gnawed at his conscience at intervals ever after. It was no other than Metternich who sought to explain the Tsar's incalculable shiftings from

[1] *L'Europe et la Revolution française*, i. 536.

liberalism to black reaction and back again, by a sort of ' periodicity ' varying from three to five years. According to him Alexander would take up a new project and pursue it with a ' positive glow ' of enthusiasm : then gradually this cooled off, when confronted by difficulties or dangers, till ' the fifth year showed a shapeless blending of the system nearing its eclipse with the new idea which began to germinate. This idea was often diametrically opposed to that which he was just abandoning.' This highly plausible theory may be tested by Alexander's attitude to the restoration of the Bourbons and his insistence upon Louis XVIII accepting the French ' Charte ' ; or again by the dreams of eastern conquest in which he indulged at the height of Napoleon's influence upon him, and the readiness with which he renounced them ; or yet again by his plans for the restoration of Poland, which assumed many contradictory shapes. Alexander is known to the casual student of history by two things, which often seem jumbled together in hopeless confusion. The one is the high-sounding ideology on which he hoped to build up the Holy Alliance, as an instrument for the governance of Europe. (Unfortunately Castlereagh was nearer the truth when he uttered his famous gibe about that ' piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense '.) The other is that medley of mystical and religious sentiment into which he was beguiled by Baroness Krüdener and her circle. The two streams may be said to have overflowed their banks and swallowed all that lay between them and the sea.

There was, however, one question on which he never really swerved, and where sentiment proved itself stronger than reason or calculation. When the first news of the Greek Revolution of 1821 reached him, he was actually conferring with his colleagues of the Holy Alliance at Verona, and at first shared their annoyance at this further complication introduced by the Greek rebels. Alexander had always been interested in the fate of the Greeks : his brother Constantine had already in his cradle been thought of as the future Emperor of a restored Byzantium, and Alexander had found it convenient to place Greeks in very high Russian diplomatic posts, and, like them, to close his eyes to the underground movements of the Greek Hetairia which took their origin at Odessa in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. It was the Turks themselves who by their savage reprisals upon the Greeks forced the Tsar not so much to *take* sides as to *change* sides. The hanging of the Oecumenical Patriarch and several of his suffragans outside the door of his Cathedral, and worse still the wholesale massacre of Chios, while leaving Metternich cynically indif-

ferent, provoked lively protests on the part of Alexander. Canning, Philhellene though he was, could not have turned the scale in favour of Greek independence without Russia's weight being thrown into the same scale as that of the Western Powers. In my search for a phrase or two that would sum up Alexander's dilemma in the Eastern Question, I found the following in an early diplomatic report of Stratford Canning, the future Ambassador.

> In speaking of the war in Greece, he (that is Alexander I) betrayed a mind divided between sympathy with a people of his own persuasion goaded into rebellion by their sufferings, and disapprobation of the revolutionary principles which had been mixed up with the causes of their struggle.[1]

When Alexander I died somewhat prematurely in 1825, events were steadily driving him towards open war with the Turks.

His successor, Nicholas I—I need not remind you—was the most uncompromising autocrat of all the Tsars since Peter the Great, and saw in an intimate alliance of the three Eastern Powers Europe's most effective bulwark against the forces of subversion and conspiracy : and it might have been expected that he would rely especially upon Francis and Metternich as the closest of colleagues. Yet by a peculiar perversity of fate Nicholas was on the worst possible terms with Metternich during the five critical years that were to decide the Greek problem. The shock of the July Revolution of 1830 brought them together again ; but by that time it was too late to arrest the process of disintegration of which Greek independence marked the first stage. The national currents had proved stronger than the imperialistic, though of course these latter always lurked in the background. Nicholas, victorious in the land war of 1828–9, showed a striking magnanimity towards the crumbling Ottoman state, and indeed saved the Sultan by force of arms from the menace of Mehemet Ali, at a moment when the other Powers were obviously unprepared to offer resistance. The Tsar's main purpose at this time was to re-establish the broken front of the three autocracies : and at Münchengrätz he went so far as to pay fulsome compliments to Metternich and to assure the Emperor Francis that Russia's armed strength would always be at the disposal of the Habsburgs in time of need. But all the time Nicholas, while seemingly swayed solely by ideological motives, found himself, as it were automatically, throwing his weight on to the side, not of the dynasts, but of his ragged and oppressed kinsmen of the

[1] S. Lane Poole, *Life of Stratford Canning*, i. 372.

Near East. And as Palmerston, so early as 1831, had pinned his policy to the preservation of Ottoman power, Britain and Russia found themselves at each fresh crisis taking opposite sides—in many cases, be it said in passing, to the no small discredit of our statesmen, who had to recede from one untenable position after another. Their respective attitude to the first feeble growth of constitutional and representative government in Serbia and in the Danubian Principalities would amply substantiate this theory, if I left myself the time in which to develop it.

In the long-drawn Eastern crisis (1839–41) which centred round the question of the Straits, Tsar Nicholas again showed great moderation, refraining from pressing for the partition of Turkey: and for the second time he saved the Sultan from Mehemet Ali's aggressive designs. Yet it is impossible to study the contemporary documents without realising that nothing could very well have then stopped him if he had chosen to push matters to the uttermost. No less certain is it that his eager overtures to Britain in the 'forties were sincerely meant, though of course his positive hatred of Louis Philippe and the Bourgeois Monarchy in France went hand in hand with the desire to prevent the growth of the Entente Cordiale. His letter of congratulation to Queen Victoria, on the fact that Russia and Britain alone, at the two ends of Europe, remained immune from the Revolution of 1848, reflects his quite genuine desire for friendship between the two countries. But he never learned the first word about constitutional or democratic doctrine, and failed to realise that western opinion saw in his armed suppression of the Polish and Hungarian Revolutions—to him an obvious fulfilment of duty towards his dead friend and ally Francis of Austria—nothing but a monstrous onslaught upon the cause of liberty throughout Europe. I dare not enter here upon the vexed question of Crimean origins, but I put it to you that fuller study of the details will reinforce my main argument, that in Russia nationalist sympathies proved, on the whole, stronger than imperialistic aims, and that Nicholas, for all his tyranny and personal prejudices, was in his judgment of Turkish rottenness nearer to the truth than the Western Allies. And in this connection I am tempted to string loosely together three contemporary expressions of opinion, coming from the most responsible quarters and necessarily only made public at a much later date.

The first is what Napoleon III said to the Prince Consort during a state visit to Osborne only two years after the war had ended: it provides the almost unique spectacle of one ally

suggesting to another that they should now abandon the third, in whose defence the war had so recently been waged, and should make friends with their late enemy. Speaking ' as a private individual ', Napoleon ' did not care for the continuance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire ', and again ' he could not muster up any sympathy for such a sorry lot as the Turks '.[1]

The second is what Lord Aberdeen wrote to Lord Clarendon, within three years of having been Prime Minister of a War Cabinet against Russia. ' Fortunately we are beginning to see the egregious blunder of which we have been guilty, and to appreciate at its true value the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.' [2]

The third is a phrase of Aberdeen to another colleague who survived him politically, Lord John Russell. ' Almost every Christian man, woman and child throughout the Turkish Empire must in their hearts pray for the success of the Tsar. This is the great original vice of our position.' [3]

Alexander II, succeeding his father Nicholas before the end of the war, set his face against a policy of foreign adventure and realised the need for domestic reform. By this time there were two clearly defined schools of political thought—the bureaucratic, centring at St. Petersburg, averse to war with any western Power, but attracted by the prospect of easy conquests in Central Asia, while the nationalist, recruited from many different currents, centring at Moscow, concentrated its interest and aims upon the liberation of the Balkan Christians, and was ready, in the process, to risk and to resist interference from the non-Slavonic world. Tsar Alexander was essentially unaggressive, and realising that recovery at home would require many years of husbanding resources, sought peace abroad in the renewal of the Three Emperors' League.

It may be said that the rivalry of St. Petersburg and Moscow reached its height during the mid-'seventies, when the Bosnian insurrection, the Bulgarian massacres and the Serbo-Turkish war diverted attention from Turkestan to the Balkans; when Russian volunteers flocked by the thousand to the aid of

[1] Martin, *Life of Prince Consort*, iv. 101–2.

[2] Maxwell, *Life of Clarendon*, ii. 166.

[3] Even more remarkable is the more general sentiment expressed by Aberdeen in a letter to Hudson Gurney in 1857 (Stanmore, *Lord Aberdeen*, p. 302): ' You are quite right in supposing that I look back with satisfaction to the efforts made by me to preserve peace. My only cause of regret is that when I found this to be impossible, I did not at once retire, instead of allowing myself to be dragged into a war which, although strictly justifiable in itself, was most unwise and unnecessary. All this will be acknowledged some day, but the worst of it is that it will require fifty years before men's eyes are opened to the truth.'

Serbia and Montenegro, and when ladies of the court demonstratively collected for the Red Cross in the streets of the capital. Alexander frowned upon the movement and its threatened derangement of alliances, yet even he was not able to prevent one of his own generals, Chernayev, from assuming command in Serbia and launching a premature scheme for the proclamation of Prince Milan as King. Serbia's defeat by Turkey was of course one of the main contributory causes of the rupture between Russia and Turkey.

It would not be difficult to show that Alexander II and his immediate advisers Gorchakov and Shuvalov worked earnestly to avert a major war with Britain or Austria, and while doubtless regarding the Turks as incorrigible and riding for a fall, would have preferred to avoid even a secondary war, in view of their anxious preoccupation with terrorists at home. It is the classic example of the way in which national sympathies for the oppressed Slavs overrode selfish territorial designs in other fields. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–8, if studied in sufficient detail, reveals itself as an outburst of Slavonic sentiment. (I avoid the word 'Panslav', not because it is inaccurate, but because its enemies have so long interpreted it falsely as to obscure the more idealist conception which I am here trying to trace.)

Much can be said in criticism of Russian policy in the newly liberated Bulgaria (which indeed was soon to bring its own revenge), but the statue of the Tsar Liberator erected to face the Parliament building of Sofia became a symbol of Slav solidarity such as its most inveterate traducers could not gainsay.

The circumstances under which Alexander III came to the throne inevitably affected his whole political outlook. In acknowledging the condolences of Francis Joseph (I read the original in the Hof-Archiv in Vienna: it has never been published) he wrote on 3 April 1881: 'Mon père a succombé sur la brêche, mais c'est la société chrétienne qui a été frappée en lui: elle est perdue si toutes les forces sociales ne s'unissent pas pour la défendre et la sauver.' This provides the keynote to the contradictions of the whole reign. Morose and difficult of access, he led an ideal family life, which often took precedence of public affairs. His deeply religious character blended with a passionate desire for the maintenance of peace: yet the Orthodox Church of his day was closely identified with Slavophil trends of opinion, which in their turn linked up with military ambition and dreams of expansion in Central Asia. And through all this ran violent personal likes

and dislikes, of which his treatment of his cousin Alexander of Bulgaria is the classic example. Moreover he had the typical Russian distrust of the foreigner, and in particular he utterly detested the Germans and suspected even Bismarck of designs for the conquest of the Baltic provinces. General von Schweinitz, next to Bismarck himself the ablest exponent of the Russophil orientation and for that reason kept for sixteen years as German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, has left on record the view that Alexander III had ' neither a character, nor a system, nor a directing will ', and thought so poorly of the Tsar's judgment as to say that ' he changes every minister as soon as he finds a less competent one ', adding that ' in two specific cases he has as yet failed to find such a man '. Without taking too seriously this outburst of a veteran and essentially sober observer, we may conclude that the fourth of these reactionary Tsars was, as it were half involuntarily, led along the path of nationalist rather than imperialistic policy. Torn between conflicting emotions, he put the defence of the social order highest and therefore set himself to the reconstitution of the Three Emperors' League, which had been put to so severe a strain by the crisis of 1877–8. And yet in the end forces beyond his power to control brought him, towards the close of his reign, to welcome the new Dual Alliance with the French Republic, and for reasons of overriding expediency to salute the Marseillaise, that symbol of an ally that he feared and detested.

There remains the somewhat dimmer figure of Nicholas II, who followed consciously and conscientiously in his father's footsteps in the promotion of World Peace and the Hague Convention, but was drawn into the fatal expansive policy which culminated in the Japanese war, the summons of the Duma and the final struggle for power between that infant Parliament and the so-called ' dark forces '. Russia's forced withdrawal from the Far East was inevitably followed by a concentration of interest and power in the direction of the Balkans. William II's attempt to beguile Russia into a league against Britain (and France also if she declined to renounce the Entente Cordiale in its new form) ended in failure, which can be traced in the ' Willy-Nicky ' correspondence and the German documents relative to the Björkö meeting. The contrast between the attitude of Edward VII and William II towards Nicholas II while the latter was involved in Asiatic difficulties, helped materially to create an atmosphere of confidence and good will, without which the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 could not have been built up.

It may well be that the two groups into which Europe was

now falling would have come to a durable understanding if there had been no Young Turkish Revolution in 1908: but this is surely to ignore the fact that if ever prolonged misgovernment led inevitably to widespread explosions, this was true of the thirty years of the Hamidian regime, which was in its turn the outcome of many years of corruption and misrule. Certain it is that Turkey's smaller neighbours had good grounds for believing that the final stage had been reached, and that a united front and a few determined blows would bring about the overthrow of their once-formidable overlord. No less certain is it that the initiative to the Balkan League and Wars of 1912–13 came from the free Balkan nations themselves, and that when the material help and political backing of a Great Power was needed, it should have been to Russia, and to Russia only, that they naturally turned. Of course to the few who still clung to the Turcophil faith of Palmerston and Disraeli, the Balkan League, with its secret clauses providing for the Tsar's arbitration in the event of territorial disputes, seemed to confirm their worst suspicions of Russian policy. From the angle which I have chosen for this rough and ready survey, it may be regarded as the supreme example of the triumph of Slav solidarity. And when the third Treaty of Bucarest, following the second Balkan War in 1913, ratified the expulsion of the Turks from all save a fragment of their European possessions, Crown Prince Alexander accompanied his Premier Nicholas Pashitch to St. Petersburg to express their gratitude for Russian support to Serbia. Nicholas II received them with the simple charm that was all his own and answered with the phrase, 'I only did my Slav duty.' Their world is a thing of the past, in which two of them met deaths of violence: but the Second World War, still more than that of 1914–18, was essentially a Slav war—the greatest Slav war in all history, in which the very existence of the lesser Slav nations was at stake, and whose victorious outcome has, for good or evil (who dare prophesy?), set back the frontiers of the German state to where they were six or eight hundred years ago.

At this stage I leave you abruptly, with a fragmentary survey behind you and rough seas ahead. I have tried to marshal certain sets of facts in such a manner as will enable you to pursue the inquiry more easily. But my main question remains unanswered. Is there any necessary conflict of interests between our two countries, or is either of the two likely to insist upon the extension of its own special ideology to the other? Surely only if some altogether new factor—abstract or personal—comes to the surface, bent on driving us

all to perdition. On a realist view of the facts, I fail to see any overwhelming reason for such a conflict arising. But I want to conclude on a warning note. Friendship between Britain and the Soviet Union, in which of course the United States must also play a hand, can only rest on a basis of good will and mutual comprehension : and this in turn demands personal contacts such as are almost non-existent at the moment and do not easily grow up in a controlled and self-centred society. How to overcome this difficulty and so diminish the danger of sudden conflicts is a question not to be answered in an address to this Society (especially when one is already perilously over time) : but it is a problem to which, even on purely academic grounds, we have no right to remain indifferent. It is in this belief, and in the conviction that only if the twenty-year alliance with Russia can be fully implemented will peace and normality return to this battered world of ours, that I have ventured upon this altogether inadequate sketch of the precarious foundations upon which earlier Russo-British relations rested. If it induces any of the audience to embark on this still largely uncharted sea, and to challenge either premises or conclusions, I shall feel that my time has not been altogether wasted.

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REPORT OF THE COUNCIL. SESSION 1944–45

THE Council of the Royal Historical Society have the honour of presenting the Annual Report to the Anniversary Meeting as follows :—

The Society has come through the war with its premises, its library, and the stock of its publications intact ; with its membership reduced by a net loss during the six years of no more than 115 Fellows, while the number of Associates has increased from 46 to 50 and of Subscribing Libraries from 289 to 305 ; having, though meetings were suspended in the autumns of 1939 and 1940, issued its *Transactions* without interruption ; and though with some of its other publications seriously in arrears, with funds accumulated to pay for their issue as soon as circumstances make it possible for their editors to resume their work.

In March, 1945, Mr. C. R. Cheney resigned the office of Joint Literary Director upon his appointment to the chair of Medieval History in the University of Manchester, and Mr. A. V. Judges placed his own resignation in the hands of Council in order to leave them free to review the whole question of the direction of the literary work of the Society. Having made this review, the Council found themselves in favour in principle of having a single Director and powerfully persuaded to the choice of this solution of their problem by the fact that the revenues of the Society do not permit of the payment of adequate honoraria to two persons. They agreed accordingly to reunite the office, and they approached Mr. Philip Grierson, of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, who was known to combine with his own medieval studies very strong contemporary interests. Mr. Grierson found it possible to reconcile his commitments in Cambridge with the work of the Society, and Council appointed him to the post of Literary Director as from 1 November, 1945. To Mr. Cheney and Mr. Judges the Society is deeply indebted for their successful co-operation and for the arduous work they have done in the difficult and abnormal years since their appointment in 1938. During that period they have been

responsible for the issue of twenty volumes of the Society's publications, and Mr. Cheney has himself been the editor of the *Handbook of Dates*. The provision of an uninterrupted series of papers to be read at the Society's meetings, the maintenance of so high a standard of accuracy in the Society's publications, and the issue of so many volumes in spite of the manifold difficulties of the times, have been a remarkable achievement, of which the Council desire to record their high appreciation.

The Council had intended in 1940 to propose to the Fellows certain alterations in the arrangement of the Society's business, but were constrained to defer this to a more convenient season. They desire now to take up the matter.

The present organization of the Society's business involves the employment of three official years none of which coincides with the calendar year. The term of office for the officers of the Society and for Council begins in February, the financial year runs from 1 November to 31 October, and the *Transactions* cover the period from October to June. The effect of this is that the annual report relating to the conduct of the Society's business, and the financial statements covering the period 1 November 1944 to 31 October 1945 and presented to the Anniversary Meeting in February 1946, will appear in a volume of *Transactions* containing the papers read between October 1945 and June 1946 and published in January or February 1947. The annual report is, therefore, when it appears in *Transactions*—and this is the shape in which it reaches the libraries—already nearly a year old and may have reference to events two years and a quarter past. Moreover, the list of officers and Council which will appear in the same volume, and which has been corrected to 31 October previous, will be out of date almost as soon as it is published.

This inconvenience could in a large measure be remedied were the financial year to be closed on 30 June instead of 31 October, and the Anniversary Meeting held in December instead of February, and if the volume of *Transactions* were to contain the papers delivered during the calendar year instead of those delivered during the session. If this were done, there would be time between the end of the financial year in June and the 31st December to set up in print all the papers except the Presidential address; the annual report and the financial statements would be ready for consideration

by Council at its meeting in October; and the notice of the Anniversary Meeting together with the annual report and financial statements could go out before the end of November. The result would be that the volume of *Transactions* published in January or February of the following year would contain the papers read during the twelve months which had just ended and the annual report and accounts for the session which had terminated in the previous June; and the list of officers and of Council which appeared in it would be the list for the calendar year which had just begun.

Were the proposal adopted, the effect would be that there would be two Anniversary Meetings in the calendar year 1946, namely, one in February and one in December, that the financial year 1945–46 would contain only eight months, and that the terms of the office of members of Council due to retire in February 1947 would be curtailed. No alteration would be made in the date of the publication of *Transactions* or in the sequence of the volumes, but the volume issued in 1947 would have to cover eleven instead of eight meetings of the Society and would contain two annual reports. Neither would there be any alteration of the date at which subscriptions are due.

The Council will propose at the Anniversary Meeting the amendment of By-law XXIV necessary to give effect to these reforms.

The Council desire further to know the views of Fellows upon the most convenient time at which to hold the Ordinary Meetings of the Society. These Meetings are required by By-law XXVIII to be held on the second Thursday of each month, from November to June, or at such other times as the Council shall determine. It was the practice before the war to meet at 5.30 p.m., tea being provided before the meeting. Since the beginning of 1940, however, the time has been changed to 3 p.m. on Saturdays and tea has been provided after the meeting. While there is doubtless much to be said for and against both hours of meeting, there is no conclusive evidence in favour of either. The Society had been in its new premises for two years before the outbreak of war, and the Thursday meetings in Chelsea were successful. But those held during the war on Saturday afternoons have been equally well attended. The Saturday meetings have the advantage for the President and Council that their business

can be transacted before the meeting without preventing their joining the Fellows at tea, which they were seldom able to do when the meetings were held at the later hour on Thursdays.

A further and substantial sum has been realized by the sale of the greater part of the remaining books withdrawn from the Library. The collection of the record series published by various historical societies and of State papers published by H.M. Stationery Office having been completed, so far as the volumes were obtainable, by the outbreak of war, the Library Committee proposes to turn its attention to the collection of separate publications of original sources, and is indebted to Miss A. M. Armstrong for a list of *desiderata* down to 1300.

The following publications have been issued during the session 1944–45 :—*Transactions*, Fourth Series, Volume XXVII ; *The Domesday Monachorum of Christ Church, Canterbury*, edited by Professor D. C. Douglas, issued in lieu of a Handbook in respect of the session 1940–41, and distributed in accordance with the arrangements announced in the Report for 1941–42 (*Transactions*, Fourth Series, Volume XXVI, pp. 84–85) ; the second and final volume of *Ministers' accounts of the earldom of Cornwall*, 1296–1297 (Camden Third Series, Volume LXVIII), edited by Miss L. Margaret Midgley and assigned to the session 1941–42 ; Miss Mary Coate's *Letter-book of John Viscount Mordaunt*, 1658–1660 (Camden Third Series, Volume LXIX), also issued in respect of that session ; and the *Handbook of dates for students of English history*, edited by Professor C. R. Cheney and assigned to the session 1939–40. In view of the high cost of production of *The Domesday Monachorum* and the *Handbook of Dates*, the Council have decided not to issue any Handbooks in respect of the sessions 1941–42 and 1942–43. The publications of which the issue is thus outstanding are, therefore, a second Camden volume for 1942–43 and the volumes due for the sessions 1943–44 and 1944–45. These have been delayed by the inability of their editors to obtain the necessary access to the manuscripts. The Council have accepted for publication, in addition to the works previously reported, an edition of the *Encomium Emmae*, by Mr. Alastair Campbell ; an edition of Polydore Vergil's *Anglica Historia*, from 1485 to 1538, by Mr. Denys Hay, based on the Vatican Library manuscript and early printed editions ; and a revised edition of Le Neve's

Fasti ecclesiae anglicanae to be prepared by Professor A. Hamilton Thompson and issued in the Guides and Handbooks series.

Miss Kathleen Edwards relinquished her work on *Writings on British History*, upon her appointment to a full-time post on the "National Register of Archives" under the Historical Manuscripts Commission. As stated in the Report for 1942–43, the volume for 1937 is ready for the press. About eight months' work remains to be done to complete the volumes for 1938 and 1939. It is hoped that it may be possible to deal with the years 1940–45 in three volumes.

A first step towards the resumption of relations with the scholars of the liberated territories was taken when the President and past and present members of Council entertained at tea, on 26 September, a party of French historians who were visiting London as the guests of the British National Committee of the International Historical Congress.

At the Anniversary Meeting held on 10 February, 1945, Professor R. W. Seton-Watson was elected President, on the expiry of the second term of the Presidency of Professor F. M. Stenton. The Vice-Presidents retiring under By-law XVII were Professor A. Hamilton Thompson and C. T. Clay. Professor G. N. Clark and Professor T. F. T. Plucknett were elected to fill the vacancies. The Members of Council retiring under By-law XVII were C. W. Crawley, Professor Margaret Deanesly, Miss K. Major and H. G. Richardson. A further vacancy was created by the resignation of Professor W. K. Hancock. Miss M. Coate, Dr. R. A. Humphreys, Professor M. M. Postan, Miss D. Whitelock and Professor C. H. Williams were elected to fill the vacancies. Messrs. C. Ryland Beeby and Co. were appointed auditors for the year 1944–45.

The following papers were read during the Session, 1944–45:—

"The transition to Christianity in the South Pacific." By Dr. W. P. Morrell. (14 October 1944.)

"Some aspects of the history of chantries in the later Middle Ages." By Miss K. L. Wood-Legh. (11 November 1944.)

"Forms of eighteenth-century industrial organisation in the West Midlands." By W. H. B. Court. (16 December 1944.)

"Some aspects of the recent history of American historiography." By Professor H. Hale Bellot. (13 January 1945.)

"The Commons and medieval politics." By H. G. Richardson. (10 March 1945.)

"War and history." By Professor B. H. Sumner. (12 May 1945.)

The President, Professor F. M. Stenton, delivered an address at the Anniversary Meeting on 10 February, 1945, on "Early English history, 1895–1920". The Alexander Medal was awarded to Mrs. Helen Suggett for her essay entitled "The use of French in England in the later Middle Ages". The essay was read on 16 June, 1945.

The Council record with regret the deaths of 8 Fellows; amongst them the Council would especially mention Professor J. Huizinga, a Corresponding Member from 1935 until his death; Dr. A. G. Little, a member of Council from 1913 to 1923, a Vice-President from 1924 to 1927, 1928–31, 1932–36, 1937–40, and an Honorary Vice-President from 1937 until his death; Professor A. S. Turberville, a member of Council from 1938 to 1942; and of Dr. R. B. Merriman, Guernsey Professor of History and Political Science at Harvard University. In addition, 3 Fellows and 1 Library have been lost by resignation and 4 Fellows have been struck off the Roll for non-payment of subscriptions. Thirteen Fellows and 3 Associates have been elected and 6 Libraries have been admitted as Subscribing Libraries. One Fellow has been reinstated. The membership of the Society on 31 October, 1945, was 782 Fellows, including Ordinary, Life, and Honorary Fellows and Corresponding Members, and 50 Associates; there were 305 Subscribing Libraries, including 13 in Germany. Of the Fellows, 1 was Honorary, 31 were Corresponding Members and 178 were Life Fellows. There was a net loss of 1 Fellow and a net gain of 3 Associates. There were 24 Societies, British and foreign, which exchanged their publications with the *Transactions* and Camden Series. Nine of these Societies have been in enemy and enemy-occupied territory, and no exchanges have been possible, but it is hoped shortly to resume the exchanges with Societies in liberated territories.

The Treasurer reports that the income of the year 1944–45 exceeded the expenditure chargeable against it by £388 15*s.* 8*d.* This surplus has been allocated, as to £380 0*s.* 0*d.* to the Publications Reserve Fund, and as to £8 15*s.* 8*d.* to the General Income and Expenditure Account. The sum of £1,070 0*s.* 0*d.* was granted for publications, as against £1,050 0*s.* 0*d.* for the previous year. During the year the sum of £1,000 0*s.* 0*d.* has been deposited in the Post Office Savings Bank. The accumulation of surpluses again shown in the Society's accounts

is due to the inability of the Society to maintain during the war its full programme of publications. But the accumulated reserves will enable arrears of publication to be made good as the opportunity offers.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

I.—Income and Expenditure Account for the Year ended October 31, 1945.

Dr. Cr.

Expenditure.	£ s. d.	*Income.*	£ s. d.
To Establishment Expenses :—		By Arrears of Subscriptions Account	128 2 0
Rent—96, Cheyne Walk £216 16 0		„ Subscriptions for 1945 :—	
Rent—Warehousing of Stock 19 10 0		49 Associates at 21s. £51 9 0	
Rates 62 9 7		275 Libraries at 30s. 412 10 0	
Fire Insurance, less Commission 15 9 9		541 Fellows at 42s. 1,136 2 0	
Repairs 11 4			1,600 1 0
Wages 52 0 0		„ Life Subscriptions 106 1 0	
Extra Service and Cleaning 13 3 9		*Less* Proportion required by By-Law IX to be invested (see Balance Sheet) 64 12 0	
Lighting and Heating 21 6 1			41 9 0
National Insurance 5 17 0		„ Proceeds from Sale of Publications	200 11 1
Workmen's Compensation Insurance 14 6		„ Dividends on Investments—Gross	314 11 8
Monthly Meetings—Refreshments 8 6 0		„ Interest on Deposit Account at Bank	9 0 2
416 4 0		„ The Sir George W. Prothero Bequest :—	
„ Secretarial and Administrative Expenses :—		Dividends on Investments and Tax recovered 788 8 6	
Salary 400 0 0		Royalties 16 6 1	
Typing 17 10 9			804 14 7
General Printing and Stationery 93 15 10			
Accountancy and Audit 34 13 0			
Postages 41 15 3			
Telephone 9 18 0			
Travelling Expenses 8 9 6			
Sundries 10 4 4			
616 6 8			
„ Library :—			
Grant 100 0 0			
„ Other Charges :—			
Friends of National Libraries 1 1 0			
British Records Association 1 0 0			
Alexander Medal 5 12 0			
British National Committee of the International Congress of Historical Sciences 15 15 0			
23 8 0			
„ Publications :—			
Directors' Honoraria 150 0 0			
Payment for Deputy Assistant Officer's Services 102 6 6			
Premium on Pension Fund for Assistant Officer. 30 17 7			
Grant for Publications £1,070 0 0			
Proceeds from Sales 200 11 1			
1,270 11 1			
1,553 15 2			
2,709 13 10			
„ Balance, being Excess of Income over Expenditure for the year, transferred :—			
(*a*) to Publications Reserve Fund 380 0 0			
(*b*) to General Income and Expenditure Account 8 15 8			
388 15 8			
£3,098 9 6			£3,098 9 6

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

II.—Publications Account for the Year ended October 31, 1945.

Dr. Cr.

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
To Payments made during the Year:—				By Balance of Allocations at October 31, 1944, Brought Forward	3,216	0	10
Camden Third Series:—				„ Allocation for Publications 1944-45:—			
Vol LXVIII	311	1	9	Grant £1,070 0 0			
„ LXIX	409	13	2	Proceeds of Sales 200 11 1			
Transactions, Vol. XXVII	204	5	10	(As per Income and Expenditure Account)	1,270	11	1
Domesday Monachorum	643	14	6				
Handbook of Dates	521	12	6				
Sundry Postage, Packing and Expenses	11	14	6				
	2,102	2	3				
Balance of Allocations at October 31, 1945, Carried Forward	2,384	9	8				
	£4,486	11	11		£4,486	11	11

N.B.—There is an estimated liability of £201 17*s.* 3*d.* due to the Printers, of which £167 is chargeable against the allocations for future years.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

III.—Balance Sheet as at October 31, 1945.

Liabilities.			£ s. d.
Life Subscriptions required to be invested as Capital Account (By-Law IX) :—			
Amount brought forward from last Balance Sheet	£2,155 0 0		
Add Proportion of Life Subscriptions received in 1945 (see Income and Expenditure Account)	64 12 0		
		2,219 12 0	
Publications Reserve Fund :—			
Balance from last Account	1,000 0 0		
Add Amount transferred from Income and Expenditure Account	380 0 0		
		1,380 0 0	
Lease Renewal Fund :—			
Balance from last Account		112 0 4	
Fund in Aid of Pensions :—			
Balance from last Account	2,456 4 6		
Less Payment to Miss M. B. Curran	200 0 0		
		2,256 4 6	
Publications Account :—			
Balance of Allocations at October 31, 1945		2,384 9 8	
Library Account :—			
Balance from last Account	174 17 2		
Grant for the year	100 0 0		
Receipts from sales of books withdrawn	74 4 6		
	349 1 8		
Less Expenditure during the year	73 18 0		
		275 3 8	
Carried forward		£8,627 10 2	

Assets.			£ s. d.
Investments, viz. :—			
£699 9s. 9d. Consols 2½%, valued in 1920 at	£314 0 0		
£4,052 12s. 4d. Conversion Stock 3½% at cost	3,638 11 0		
£1,000 Defence Bonds 3% at cost	1,000 0 0		
£2,310 13s. 1d. Local Loans 3% at cost	2,230 17 5		
£400 Metropolitan Water Board 4½% "D" Stock at cost	470 1 0		
500 National Savings Certificates at cost	400 0 0		
£744 19s. 6d. National War Bonds 2½% 1945/47, at cost	750 0 0		
£296 4s. New Zealand 4% Stock, 1943/63, at cost	297 6 10		
£250 Savings Bonds 3% 1960/70, at cost	250 0 0		
		9,350 16 3	
(Market Value at October 31, 1945, £10,331 8s. 1d.)			
Cash at Bank : Current Account	283 4 9		
Deposit Account	479 1 2		
P.O. Savings Bank	1,000 0 0		
„ in Hand	5 0 0		
		1,767 5 11	
Stock of Publications :—			
Book value		600 0 0	
Library :—			
Book value		1,000 0 0	
Furniture, Etc. :—			
Book value		300 0 0	
Subscriptions in Arrear estimated to be received		35 0 0	
Carried forward		£13,053 2 2	

Brought forward		£8,627 10 2
Subscriptions Received in Advance		28 13 0
The Sir George W. Prothero Bequest :—		
Balance from last Account		22,303 10 6
"Writings on British History":		
Production Account :—		
Balance from last Account		900 0 0
General Income and Expenditure Account :—		
Balance of accumulated income at October 31, 1944	£3,488 3 4	
Add Excess of Income over Expenditure for the year, as per Account	8 15 8	
		3,496 19 0
		£35,356 12 8

Brought forward		£13,053 2 2
The Sir George W. Prothero Bequest :—		
Investments	22,278 9 1	
Cash at Bank—Deposit Account	25 1 5	
		22,303 10 6
(Market Value of Investments at October 31, 1945, £22,299 8s. 1d.)		
		£35,356 12 8

We have examined the foregoing Income and Expenditure Account and Balance Sheet with the Books and Vouchers of the Society. We have verified the Investments appearing in the Balance Sheet. We report that the above Balance Sheet is, in our opinion, properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the affairs of the Society, according to the best of our information and the explanations given to us, and as shown by the books of the Society.

C. RYLAND BEEBY & CO.,
Chartered Accountants, Auditors.

London and Slough.
December 5, 1945.

THE DAVID BERRY TRUST.

Income and Expenditure Account for the year ended October **31, 1945.**

DR. CR.

Receipts.	£	s.	d.	*Payments.*	£	s.	d.
To Balance in hand, October 31, 1944, brought forward from last Account, viz. :—				By Printing and Postages	1	6	6
Cash at Bank—Current Account . . 93 16 9				„ Balance in hand, October 31, 1945, carried forward, viz. :—			
„ „ Deposit Account . . 41 0 8				Cash at Bank : Current Account . . £61 10 0			
„ in hand 1 1 10				„ „ Deposit Account . . 21 7 2			
£200 3% Defence Bonds (at cost) . . 200 0 0				„ in Hand 1 0 10			
	335	19	3	£300 3% Defence Bonds (at cost) . . 300 0 0			
„ Dividends on Investments per Charity Commissioners .	41	19	7		383	18	0
„ Interest on £300 3% Defence Bonds . . .	6	19	2				
„ Interest on Deposit Account at Bank . . .		6	6				
	£385	4	6		£385	4	6

The late David Anderson Berry, by his Will dated the 23 day of April 1926, left £1000 to provide in every third year a gold medal and prize money for the best essay on the Earl of Bothwell or, at the discretion of the Trustee, on Scottish History of the James Stuarts I to VI, in memory of his father, the late Rev. David Berry.

The Trust is now regulated by a Scheme sanctioned by the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice dated the 23rd day of January 1930, and made in an Action 1927.A.1233 David Anderson Berry decd., Hunter and another v. Robertson and another.

This Society is now the Trustee, and the investments consist of £634 17*s.* 2*d.* 3½% Conversion Stock and £540 13*s.* 2*d.* Local Loans 3%.

The Trustee will in every second year of the three-year period advertise in *The Times* inviting essays.

We have examined the above account and find it correct.

C. RYLAND BEEBY & Co.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

LONDON AND SLOUGH.
December 5, 1945.

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL. SESSION 1945–46

THE Council of the Royal Historical Society have the honour of presenting the Annual Report to the Anniversary Meeting as follows :—

The Fellows, at the Anniversary Meeting held on 16 February 1946, having adopted the proposals for the re-organization of the Society's business set out in the Annual Report for the Session 1944–45, the present Report covers a period of eight months only, namely from November 1945 to June 1946.

In June 1946, Miss C. Jamison resigned the office of Assistant Secretary which she had undertaken temporarily in 1943, when she came to the assistance of the Society on the enforced resignation of Miss Curran. The Society is much indebted to Miss Jamison for carrying the burden of the Society's affairs during three difficult years and until the Council were in a position to make a permanent appointment ; and the Council record their warm appreciation of the help that they have received from her. The Council have changed the title of the post from 'Assistant Secretary' to 'Secretary' and have appointed to that office, as from 24 June 1946, Miss A. M. A. E. Armstrong. Miss Armstrong is an Associate of the Society and an External Graduate of the University of London, having studied at University College, Reading, before Reading received its charter. She was Secretary to the Hon. Director of the English Place-Name Society from 1930 to 1942, and Secretary to that Society from 1942 to 1946.

In November, 1945, Mr. A. T. Milne resigned the post of Assistant Officer and Junior Librarian upon his appointment as Secretary and Librarian at the Institute of Historical Research, University of London. Mr. Milne came to the Society in 1935 to inaugurate the series of *Writings on British History*. He was responsible for the issue of the volumes for 1934, 1935 and 1936, and he has undertaken to supervise the completion of the volumes for 1937, 1938 and 1939. Mr. Milne displayed wide bibliographical knowledge and was successful in establishing a high reputation for the series. The Council will not find it easy to replace him, and have not yet made a new appointment to this post. They have,

however, appointed Miss Dora Howard as from 23 September 1946, to complete the work on the volumes for 1937, 1938 and 1939 under Mr. Milne's direction.

The Council, after careful consideration and after receiving expert advice, have accepted the reversionary bequest of the residue of the estate of the late Miss E. M. Robinson referred to in their Report for the Session 1943–44.

In view of their lack of experience of Saturday meetings during peace-time, the Fellows hesitated at the Anniversary Meeting to amend the time of meetings prescribed in By-law XXVIII, and resolved instead that Council be instructed to arrange for meetings to be held on Saturday afternoons during the session 1946–47 only. The summer party, resumed in 1945, was given on the 6th July this year.

Many of the volumes contained in the list of *desiderata* for the period down to 1300 have now been added to the Library; and it is the intention of Council to proceed, from time to time, as their resources permit, to build up other sections in the same way.

The session 1945–46 having been shorter than usual, the only publication issued during this period has been *Transactions*, Fourth Series, Volume XXVIII. Of the publications in preparation which were mentioned in the last Report of Council, the edition of the *Encomium Emmae* by Mr. Alastair Campbell is at present in the press and will be ready for issue during 1946–47. That of the *Anglica Historia* of Polydore Vergil by Mr. Denys Hay has been delayed by the decision that the edition of the work should be accompanied by a translation, but it should shortly be ready for the printer. A number of other works whose publication had been earlier approved by Council, but which had been held up owing to the inaccessibility of necessary materials, should also be ready for the press in the next few months. Professor Sir Maurice Powicke and Mr. Tyson have relinquished their work on the *Proceedings under the Dictum de Kenilworth*, and Council have approved the transfer of the editorship of this to Professor R. F. Treharne. Council have accepted for publication, in addition to the works previously reported, an edition of *The Restoration Visitation of Oxford University and its Colleges*, by Mr. F. J. Varley, to be included in a future Camden Miscellany, and a volume of *Household Ordinances of the Fifteenth Century*, to be edited by Mr. A. R. Myers.

Council have also attempted to fill the widely recognized need for some agreed system in the preparation of authors' manuscripts for the press, and approved the publication of a leaflet entitled *Royal Historical Society Transactions. Guidance for Contributors*. Although primarily intended for the purpose indicated in the title, it is hoped that it may provide a convenient standard which other periodicals may find it useful to adopt, with such modifications as may be required to meet their own particular needs. The leaflet was issued in March, and it is already clear that its usefulness has been appreciated outside the bounds of the Society. The manuscript of the *Bibliography of British History, 1715–89*, has now been completed, and Council hope to proceed before long to arrangements for the publication of the volume.

At the Anniversary Meeting held on 16 February 1946 the Vice-Presidents retiring under By-law XVII were Professor Lilian M. Penson and L. C. Lloyd. A further vacancy was caused by the resignation of Professor F. M. (now Sir Maurice) Powicke, who was elected an Honorary Vice-President. C. T. Clay, C. T. (now Sir Cyril) Flower and B. H. Sumner were elected to fill the vacancies. The members of Council retiring under By-law XVII were A. Aspinall, Miss H. M. Cam, C. G. Parsloe and J. G. Edwards. A further vacancy was caused by the appointment of P. Grierson to the office of Literary Director. Professor C. R. Cheney, C. W. Crawley, Professor R. R. Darlington, Mrs. E. George and A. V. Judges were elected to fill the vacancies. Dr. W. P. Morrell resigned in March, 1946, upon his departure from England ; and Council supplied the vacancy in accordance with By-law XIX by the election of Miss K. Major. Messrs. C. Ryland Beeby and Co. were appointed auditors for the year 1946–47.

The following papers were read during the session 1945–46 :—

'Lincoln at the Norman Conquest.' By J. W. F. Hill. (13 October 1945.)

'The Duchy of Lancaster records.' By R. Somerville. (10 November 1945.)

'Prester John.' By Malcolm Letts. (15 December 1945.)

'The Kiev state and its relations with Western Europe.' By Professor F. Dvornik. (12 January 1946.)

'The Yorkshire Association and the crisis of 1779–80.' By Professor H. Butterfield. (16 March 1946.)

'Henry VIII and Scotland.' By Professor J. D. Mackie. (11 May 1946.)
'Woodrow Wilson: an interpretation.' By Professor Dexter Perkins. (15 June 1946.)

The President, Professor R. W. Seton-Watson, delivered an address at the Anniversary Meeting on 16 February 1946 on 'The foundations of British policy'. No award of the Alexander Medal has been made this session.

Council record with regret the deaths of 16 Fellows, 3 Corresponding Members and 1 Associate; amongst these, Council would mention especially Sir John Clapham, a Vice-President from 1937 to 1940 and an Honorary Vice-President from 1940 until his death; Professor H. T. Colenbrander, a Corresponding Member from 1930 until his death; Professor F. J. C. Hearnshaw, a Member of Council from 1913 to 1922, from 1923 to 1926 and from 1930 to 1934, Honorary Treasurer from 1930 to 1931, and Honorary Secretary from 1931 to 1934; Professor W. Michael, a Corresponding Member from 1913 until the 1914–18 War and from 1935 until his death; Sir Charles Oman, a Member of Council from 1892 to 1913, an Honorary Vice-President from 1913 to 1917, President from 1917 to 1921, a Vice-President from 1921 to 1928, and an Honorary Vice-President from 1928 until his death; and Professor J. Susta, a Corresponding Member from 1930 until his death. 8 Fellows and 1 Associate have resigned and 7 Fellows have been struck off the Roll for non-payment of subscriptions. 34 Fellows and 8 Associates have been elected and 11 libraries have been admitted as Subscribing Libraries. The membership of the Society on 30 June 1946 was 777 Fellows, including Ordinary, Life and Honorary Fellows and Corresponding Members, and 56 Associates; the Subscribing Libraries numbered 317. Of the Fellows, 1 was Honorary, 28 were Corresponding Members and 180 were Life Members. 26 Societies, British and Foreign, exchanged their publications with those of the Royal Historical Society.

The Treasurer reports that the income of the eight months from 1 November 1945 to 30 June 1946 exceeded the expenditure chargeable against it by £478 5*s.* 2*d.* This surplus has been allocated as to £200 0*s.* 0*d.* to Publications, and as to £278 5*s.* 2*d.* to the General Income and Expenditure Account. The sum of £1,050 0*s.* 0*d.* has been granted for publications, as against £1,070 0*s.* 0*d.* for the previous year.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

I.—Income and Expenditure Account for the Period from 1 November, 1945, to 30 June, 1946.

Dr. Cr.

Expenditure.			*Income.*		
	£ s. d.			£ s. d.	
To Establishment Expenses :—			By Arrears of Subscriptions Account		94 4 0
Rent—96, Cheyne Walk	£164 14 0		„ Subscriptions for 1946 :—		
Rent—Warehousing of Stock . . .	9 15 0		50 Associates at 21s.	£52 10 0	
Rates	28 12 6		282 Libraries at 30s.	423 0 0	
Fire Insurance, less Commission . .	13 8 1		510 Fellows at 42s.	1,071 0 0	
Repairs	23 5 3			1,546 10 0	
Wages	35 0 0		„ Life Subscriptions	148 11 0	
Extra Service and Cleaning . . .	4 11 9		*Less* Proportion required by By-law IX to be invested (see Balance Sheet) . . .	89 0 0	
Lighting and Heating	16 19 5			59 11 0	
National Insurance	5 2 3		„ Proceeds from Sale of Publications . . .		225 15 5
Workmen's Compensation Insurance . .	15 9		„ Dividends on Investments—Gross . . .		170 6 10
Monthly Meetings—Refreshments . .	6 15 8		„ Interest on Deposit Account at Bank . . .		3 6 1
	308 19 8		„ Interest on Post Office Savings Bank Account . . .		22 18 4
„ Secretarial and Administrative Expenses :—			„ The Sir George W. Prothero Bequest :—		
Salary	300 0 0		Dividends on Investments and Tax recovered	590 18 2	
Clerk's Salary (Part)	27 0 0		Royalties	1 13 0	
Typing	16 10 0			592 11 2	
General Printing and Stationery . .	122 5 10				
Accountancy and Audit	34 13 0				
Postages	31 7 0				
Telephone	5 2 4				
Sundries	13 13 9				
	550 11 11				
„ Library :—					
Grant	100 0 0				
„ Other Charges :—					
Friends of National Libraries . . .	1 1 0				
British Records Association . . .	1 0 0				
British National Committee of the International Congress of Historical Sciences . .	15 15 0				
	17 16 0				
Publications :—					
Directors' Honoraria	132 10 0				
Clerk's Salary (Part)	27 0 0				
Other Secretarial Expenses	19 3 8				
Premium on Pension Fund for Assistant Officer.	5 1 0				
Grant for Publications . . £850 0 0					
Proceeds from Sales . . . 225 15 5					
	1,075 15 5				
	1,259 10 1				
	2,236 17 8				
* „ Balance, being Excess of Income over Expenditure for the period transferred :—					
(*a*) as a further Grant for Publications . .	200 0 0				
(*b*) to General Income and Expenditure Account	278 5 2				
	478 5 2				
	£2,715 2 10				£2,715 2 10

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

II.—Publications Account for the Period from 1 November, 1945, to 30 June, 1946.

Dr. **Cr.**

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
To Payments made during the Period :—				By Balance of Allocations at 31 October, 1945, Brought Forward	2,384	9	8
Transactions, Vol. XXVIII (part cost)	188	15	8	„ Allocation for Publications, 1945–46 :—			
British Diplomatic Representatives	39	13	4	Grants £1,050 0 0			
Sundry Postages, Packing and Expenses	15	0	10	Proceeds of Sales 225 15 5			
	243	9	10	(As per Income and Expenditure Account)	1,275	15	5
„ Balance of Allocations at 30 June, 1946, Carried Forward	3,416	15	3				
	£3,660	5	1		£3,660	5	1

THE DAVID BERRY TRUST.

Income and Expenditure Account for the period from 1 November, 1945, to 30 June, 1946.

DR. CR.

Receipts.	£	s.	d.	*Payments.*	£	s.	d.
To Balance in hand, 31 October, 1945, brought forward from last Account, viz. :—				By Printing and Postages	1	6	10
Cash at Bank—Current Account . . 61 10 0				„ Balance in hand, 30 June, 1946, carried forward, viz. :—			
„ „ Deposit Account . . 21 7 2				Cash at Bank : Current Account . . £86 18 2			
„ in hand 1 0 10				„ „ Deposit Account . . 21 9 3			
£300 3% Defence Bonds (at cost) . . 300 0 0				„ in Hand 1 0 2			
	383	18	0	£300 3% Defence Bonds (at cost) . . 300 0 0			
„ Dividends on Investments per Charity Commissioners .	19	4	4		409	7	7
„ Interest on £300 3% Defence Bonds . . .	7	10	0				
„ Interest on Deposit Account at Bank . . .	2	1					
	£410	14	5		£410	14	5

The late David Anderson Berry, by his Will dated the 23rd day of April, 1926, left £1,000 to provide in every third year a gold medal and prize money for the best essay on the Earl of Bothwell or, at the discretion of the Trustee, on Scottish History of the James Stuarts I to VI, in memory of his father, the late Rev. David Berry.

The Trust is now regulated by a Scheme sanctioned by the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice dated the 23rd day of January, 1930, and made in an Action 1927.A.1233 David Anderson Berry decd., Hunter and another v. Robertson and another.

This Society is now the Trustee, and the investments held on Capital Account consist of £634 17*s.* 2*d.* 3½% Conversion Stock and £540 13*s.* 2*d.* Local Loans 3%.

The Trustee will in every second year of the three-year period advertise in *The Times* inviting essays.

We have examined the above account and find it correct.

C. RYLAND BEEBY & Co.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

LONDON AND SLOUGH.
24 *September*, 1946.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

III.—Balance Sheet as at 30 June, 1946.

Liabilities.			£ s. d.
Life Subscriptions required to be invested as Capital Account (By-law IX) :—			
Amount brought forward from last Balance Sheet	£2,219 12 0		
Add Proportion of Life Subscriptions received in 1946 (see Income and Expenditure Account)	89 0 0		
	2,308 12 0		
Less Amount transferred to General Income and Expenditure Account	86 0 0		
		2,222 12 0	
Publications Reserve Fund :—			
Balance from last Account		1,380 0 0	
Lease Renewal Fund :—			
Balance from last Account		112 0 4	
Fund in Aid of Pensions :—			
Balance from last Account	2,256 4 6		
Less Payment to Miss M. B. Curran	150 0 0		
		2,106 4 6	
Publications Account :—			
Balance of Allocations at 30 June, 1946		3,416 15 3	
Library Account :—			
Balance from last Account	275 3 8		
Grant for the period	100 0 0		
	375 3 8		
Less Expenditure during period	172 16 1		
		202 7 7	
Carried forward		£9,439 19 8	

Assets.			£ s. d.
Investments, viz. :—			
£699 9s. 9d. Consols 2½%, valued in 1920 at	£314 0 0		
£1,177 19s. Consols 2½% at cost	1,144 19 6		
£4,052 12s. 4d. Conversion Stock 3½% at cost	3,638 11 0		
£1,000 Defence Bonds 3% at cost	1,000 0 0		
£2,606 5s. 2d. Local Loans 3% at cost	2,527 1 5		
500 National Savings Certificates at cost	400 0 0		
£744 19s. 6d. National War Bonds 2½% 1945/47, at cost	750 0 0		
£250 Savings Bonds 3% 1960/70, at cost	250 0 0		
		10,024 11 11	
(Market Value at 30 June, 1946, £11,371 7s. 3d.)			
Cash at Bank : Current Account	614 4 5		
Deposit Account	554 12 11		
P.O. Savings Bank	1,022 18 4		
„ in Hand	10 17 8		
		2,202 13 4	
Stock of Publications :—			
Book value		600 0 0	
Library :—			
Book value		1,000 0 0	
Furniture, Etc. :—			
Book value		300 0 0	
Subscriptions in Arrear estimated to be received		35 0 0	
Carried forward		£14,162 5 3	

Brought forward				£9,439	19	8
SUBSCRIPTIONS RECEIVED IN ADVANCE				32	5	3
THE SIR GEORGE W. PROTHERO BEQUEST :—						
Balance from last Account	22,303	10	6			
Less Loss on redemption of Investment	2	18	11	22,300	11	7
"WRITINGS ON BRITISH HISTORY": PRODUCTION ACCOUNT :—						
Balance from last Account				900	0	0
GENERAL INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT :—						
Balance of accumulated income at 31 October, 1945	3,496	19	0			
Add Amount transferred from Life Subscription Account	86	0	0			
Excess of Income over Expenditure for the period as per Account I	278	5	2			
	3,861	4	2			
Less Loss on redemption of Investments	71	3	10	3,790	0	4
				£36,462	16	10

Brought forward				£14,162	5	3
THE SIR GEORGE W. PROTHERO BEQUEST :—						
Investments	22,275	10	2			
Cash at Bank—Deposit Account	25	1	5			
				22,300	11	7
(Market Value of Investments at 30 June, 1946, £22,839 13*s.* 10*d.*)						
				£36,462	16	10

We have examined the foregoing Income and Expenditure Account and Balance Sheet with the Books and Vouchers of the Society. We have verified the Investments appearing in the Balance Sheet. We report that the above Balance Sheet is, in our opinion, properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the affairs of the Society, according to the best of our information and the explanations given to us, and as shown by the books of the Society.

C. RYLAND BEEBY & CO.,
Chartered Accountants, Auditors.

LONDON AND SLOUGH.
24 *September*, 1946.

ALEXANDER PRIZE

The Alexander Prize was established in 1897 by L. C. Alexander, F.R.Hist.S. It consists of a Silver Medal awarded annually for an essay upon some historical subject. Candidates may select their own subject provided such subject has been previously submitted to and approved by the Literary Director. The essay must be a genuine work of original research, not hitherto published, and one which has not been awarded any other prize. It must not exceed 6,000 words in length and must be sent in on or before 28 February 1946.

LIST OF ALEXANDER PRIZE ESSAYISTS (1898–1946)[1]

1898. F. Hermia Durham (" The Relations of the Crown to Trade under James I ").

1899. W. F. Lord, B.A. (" The Development of Political Parties in the reign of Queen Anne ").

1901. Laura M. Roberts (" The Peace of Lunéville ").

1902. V. B. Redstone (" The Social Condition of England during the Wars of the Roses ").

1903. Rose Graham (" The Intellectual Influence of English Monasticism between the tenth and twelfth centuries ").

1904. Enid W. G. Routh (" The Balance of Power in the Seventeenth Century ").

1905. W. A. P. Mason, M.A. (" The Beginnings of the Cistercian Order ").

1906. Rachel R. Reid, M.A. (" The Rebellion of the Earls, 1569 ").

1908. Kate Hotblack (" The Peace of Paris, 1763 ").

1909. Nellie Nield, M.A. (" The Social and Economic Condition of the Unfree Classes in England in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries ").

[1] No award was made in 1900, 1907, 1910, 1911, 1913, 1914, 1921, 1946. The prize Essays for 1909 and 1919 were not published in the *Transactions*. No Essays were submitted in 1915, 1916 and 1943.

1912. H. G. Richardson (" The Parish Clergy of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries ").
1917. Isobel D. Thornley, B.A. (" The Treason Legislation of 1531–1534 ").
1918. T. F. T. Plucknett, B.A. (" The Place of the Council in the Fifteenth Century ").
1919. Edna F. White, M.A. (" The Jurisdiction of the Privy Council under the Tudors ").
1920. J. E. Neale, M.A. (" The Commons Journals of the Tudor Period ").
1922. C. E. Martin (" The English Establishments on the Gold Coast in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century ").
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1928. Gladys A. Thornton, B.A., Ph.D. (" A Study in the History of Clare, Suffolk, with special reference to its development as a Borough ").
1929. F. S. Rodkey, A.M., Ph.D. (" Lord Palmerston's Policy for the Re-juvenation of Turkey, 1839–47 ").
1930. A. A. Ettinger, D.Phil. (" The Proposed Anglo-Franco-American Treaty of 1852 to guarantee Cuba to Spain ").
1931. Kathleen A. Walpole, M.A. (" The Humanitarian Movement of the Early Nineteenth Century to Remedy Abuses on Emigrant Vessels to America ").
1932. Dorothy M. Brodie, B.A. (" Edmund Dudley, Minister of Henry VII ").
1933. R. W. Southern, B.A. (" Ranulf Flambard and Early Anglo-Norman Administration ").
1934. S. B. Chrimes, M.A., Ph.D. (" Sir John Fortescue and his Theory of Dominion ").
1935. S. T. Bindoff, M.A. (" The Unreformed Diplomatic Service, 1812–60 ").
1936. Rosamond J. Mitchell, M.A., B.Litt. (" English Students at Padua, 1460–1475 ").
1937. C. H. Philips, B.A. (" The East India Company ' Interest,' and the English Government, 1783–4 ").
1938. H. E. I. Phillips, B.A. (" The Last Years of the Court of Star Chamber, 1630–41 ").

1939. Hilda P. Grieve, B.A. ("The Deprived Married Clergy in Essex, 1553–61").
1940. R. Somerville, M.A. ("The Duchy of Lancaster Council and Court of Duchy Chamber").
1941. R. A. L. Smith, M.A., Ph.D. ("The *Regimen Scaccarii* in English Monasteries").
1942. F. L. Carsten, D.Phil. ("Medieval Democracy in the Brandenburg Towns and its Defeat in the Fifteenth Century").
1944. Rev. E. W. Kemp, B.D. ("Pope Alexander III and the Canonization of Saints").
1945. Helen Suggett, B.Litt. ("The use of French in England in the later Middle Ages").

DAVID BERRY PRIZE

The David Berry Prize was established in 1929 by David Anderson-Berry in memory of his father, the Reverend David Berry. It consists of a Gold Medal and Money Prize awarded every three years for Scottish History. Candidates may select any subject dealing with Scottish History within the reigns of James I to James VI inclusive, provided such subject has been previously submitted to and approved by the Council of the Royal Historical Society. The Essay must be a genuine work of original research not hitherto published, and one which has not been awarded any other prize. There is no limit to the length of the Essay. It must be sent in on or before October 31, 1949.

LIST OF DAVID BERRY PRIZE ESSAYISTS (1937–1943) [1]

1937. G. Donaldson, M.A. ("The Polity of the Scottish Reformed Church *c.* 1560–1580, on the Rise of the Presbyterian Movement").
1943. Rev. Prof. A. F. Scott Pearson, D.Th., D.Litt. ("Anglo-Scottish Religious Relations, 1400–1600").

[1] No Essays were submitted in 1940.

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MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS.

Domesday commemoration. Notes on the manuscripts, etc., exhibited at the Public Record Office. 1886. 5s. (*Out of print.*)

Domesday studies. 2 vols. Edited by P. E. Dove. 1886. 24s. (*Out of print.*)

England and Napoleon in 1803 : being the despatches of Lord Whitworth and others. Edited by Oscar Browning. 1887. 7s. 6d. (*Out of print.*)

Walter of Henley's Husbandry, together with an anonymous Husbandry, Seneschaucie, and Robert Grosseteste's Rules. Edited by Elizabeth Lamond and the Rev. W. Cunningham. 1890. 12s.

Proceedings of the Gibbon commemoration, 1794–1894. 1895. 5s.

The Domesday of Inclosures, 1517–18. Edited by I. S. Leadam. 2 vols. 1897. 30s.

A bibliography of the historical works of Mandell Creighton, William Stubbs, S. R. Gardiner and John, Lord Acton. Edited by W. A. Shaw. 1903. 5s. (*Out of print.*)

German opinion and German policy before the War. By G. W. Prothero. 1916. 4s.

Magna Carta commemoration essays. With preface by the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce. Edited by H. E. Malden. 1917. 25s.

* A repertory of British archives. Part I. England. Compiled by Hubert Hall. 1920. 10s. 6d.

A list and index of the Transactions and publications of the Royal Historical Society (1869–1924) and of the publications of the Camden Society (1840–1897). Edited by Hubert Hall. 1925. 5s.

The *Domesday monachorum* of Christ Church, Canterbury. 1944. 30s. (7s. 6d. to Fellows, Associates and subscribing libraries.)

BIBLIOGRAPHIES ISSUED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION.

Bibliography of British history : Tudor period, 1485–1603. Edited by Conyers Read. 1933. Oxford Univ. Press, 30s. (Special price, 20s. 9d.)

Bibliography of British history : Stuart period, 1603–1714. Edited by Godfrey Davies. 1928. Oxford Univ. Press, 21s. (Special price, 16s. 6d.)

Bibliography of British history : 1715–1789. Edited by D. J. Medley and S. M. Pargellis. (*In preparation.*)

ANNUAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES.

Writings on British history, 1934. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1937. London, Jonathan Cape, 12s. 6d. (Special price, 10s.)

Writings on British history, 1935. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1939. London, Jonathan Cape, 12s. 6d. (Special price, 10s.)

Writings on British history, 1936. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1940. London, Jonathan Cape. 12s. 6d. (Special price, 10s.)

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GUIDES AND HANDBOOKS.

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2. Handbook of British chronology. Edited by F. M. Powicke, with the assistance of Charles Johnson and W. J. Harte. 1939. 7s. 6d. (*Out of print.*)
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4. Handbook of dates for students of English history. By C. R. Cheney.

Provisionally accepted for future publication :

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